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Thesis Summary 
This research considers State control and legal responsibility for the violation of migrant’s 
fundamental rights at the hands of privatised or externalised procedures of European Union 
(EU) Member State migration control and border management. 
The assertion is made that a migrant’s access to justice can be frustrated based on who 
(privatisation) it is that is implementing the procedure or because of where (externalisation) it 
is being implemented. Access to justice is frustrated by the failure of a court to overcome 
certain key preliminary issues which must be established before the merits of the case – the 
alleged rights violation – can be considered. These preliminary issues therefore represent 
triggers for greater consideration of State legal responsibility. 
Privatisation’s trigger is a court’s potential application of a narrow reading of the State such 
that a private actor is deemed to be liable for rights violations arising out of the implementa t ion 
of a procedure. This decision can be made even when the State holds a significant amount of 
control and authority over the implementation of the procedure in question. Externalisation’s 
trigger is that a court may pursue a restrictive reading of extraterritorial jurisdict ion such that 
the State is not interpreted as having engaged its jurisdiction and as a result that court will not 
consider the alleged violations and thus legal responsibility will not be established. 
The State’s exercise of ‘compulsory powers’, the use of physical force in the implementa t ion 
of a migration control and border management procedure, has been relied upon as the indicator 
as to whether legal responsibility should be triggered for the State. This research argues that 
the exercise of compulsory powers is an arbitrary tool by which to decide legal responsibility 
and results in the neglect of other, more subtle indicators that State legal responsibility should 
be established. 
In the absence of a silver bullet resolution to the challenges posed by the triggers of legal 
responsibility for both externalisation and privatisation, doctrinal solutions are proposed. These 
solutions enable the courts to provide easier access to justice for migrants and better reflect 
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Introduction – Who and Where? 
A Scenario 
In an airport in Pakistan, a British immigration officer examines the travel documents of a 
Pakistani woman who is attempting to board a plane bound for the UK. The officer advises 
the employees of the airline that that airline will be fined by the UK if they provide passage 
to the woman. That advice having been imparted, the officer leaves the final decision as to 
whether to board to the airline. The woman’s intention is to travel to the UK to apply for 
asylum as she fears persecution in her native Pakistan. However, her passage is denied and 
she subsequently experiences persecution in Pakistan. 
There are two details which make this scenario different from the orthodox 
perception of what migration control and border management entail. The first is that the 
implementation of a document check and the decision as to access to the UK takes place 
in an airport in Pakistan rather than being instigated at the ‘traditional’ border check at the 
destination airport in the UK. Secondly, the crucial decision to facilitate access to the 
destination country is made by a private actor, albeit with significant input from UK public 
authorities. This simple narrative thus involves the private implementation of a migrat ion 
control and border management procedure inside a third State1 at the behest of an EU 
Member State. This particular account is fictional yet it is based on current EU law2 and 
there is overwhelming anecdotal evidence that it is replicated in thousands of instances 
around the world every year. Privatised and externalised procedures are constantly 
diversifying, have grown increasingly sophisticated and are far from being limited to the 
specific procedures at work in the scenario taken here. There is perhaps no clearer 
expression of State power and sovereignty than the procedure of admitting or rejecting a 
                                                                 
1 Third State refers to a State which is not a EU Member State. 
2 Fines for carriage of an inadequately documented passenger are known as carrier sanctions and the 
immigration officer posted abroad is known as an Immigration Liaison Officer. 
See: Council Directive 2001/51/EC of June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985. 
And: Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 of 19 February 2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison 
officers network. Regulation (EU) No 493/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 
2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison officers  
Network. 
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person at a State’s borders but the type of privatisation and externalisation that is 
exemplified by this scenario challenges certain assumptions as to the implementation of 
migration control and border management by EU Member States. 
Delimiting the Scope of this Research – The Triggers 
The focus of this research, as the title suggests, is control exercised by EU Member States 
and State legal responsibility for that control in the context of externalised and privatised 
procedures. The reasons for certain decisions taken in this research is explored later in this 
introduction (section: Parameters of the Research) but it is important to delimit the scope 
of this research at the very beginning.  
This research does not pretend to be an all-encompassing study of externalisa t ion 
and privatisation. Instead it concentrates on control and the triggering of legal 
responsibility for rights violations arising out of the implementation of externalised and 
privatised procedures. As chapters III and IV will illustrate, control is all-important in the 
attribution of legal responsibility. Control’s importance does not come in deciding whether 
or not to attribute responsibility to the State. The attribution of legal responsibility to the 
State, if it does come, only arrives with the courts’ contemplation of the alleged rights 
violation. Rather, control-based tests dominate courts’ approaches in deciding whether 
wider consideration of legal responsibility at the merits stage should be triggered.  
These triggers of legal responsibility for both externalisation and privatisation are 
at the heart of this research. For externalisation, extraterritorial jurisdiction must be 
evaluated upon – did the State engage its extraterritorial jurisdiction? For privatisation, the 
constitution of the act itself must be assessed –should the State be made liable for the acts 
of a private actor? These are threshold questions which, as a preliminary issue, decide 
whether or not the State will have to answer in court for the actions which led to an alleged 
violation of human rights. These triggers therefore decide whether or not a migrant’s 
fundamental rights will be vindicated by the court and thus whether legal responsibility is 
to be attributed to the State or not. The line from the State or private actor’s action from 
which an allegation of a rights violation has arisen to the moment in which legal 
responsibility is attributed, hinges on the triggering of contemplation of such responsibility 
through control. This research is concerned with these crucial triggers. 
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 This research sets out that certain privatised procedures and certain externalised 
procedures implicate State responsibility more easily simply because physical force 
(compulsory powers) is used.3 On this basis the research proposes alternative ways forward 
by which the courts may adjudicate more fairly and not need to rely on such an arbitrary 
and indefinite approach as waiting for the State to physically manifest itself in such an 
obvious manner. On this basis, it is posited that neither privatisation nor externalisa t ion 
take a lead role in this thesis. These phenomena are considered collectively because to a 
great extent they represent the future direction of migration control and border management 
and because of the effect that those phenomena have on that most basic tenet of justice – 
that the exercise of control should entail responsibility for that control. Rather than 
attempting an all-encompassing and unwieldy thesis on all aspects of externalisation and 
privatisation, this research considers the nature and effect of State control in trigger ing 
legal responsibility for that control through these phenomena. This approach provides an 
insight into the initial challenges faced by lawyers in making the modern State ultima te ly 
responsible for any violation of rights arising out of its implementation of privatised and 
externalised procedures. 
 In Chapter II, this research takes several privatised and externalised procedures as 
examples of the kinds of migration control and border management which can cause 
uncertainty as to control such that questions arise as to whether legal responsibility can be 
triggered for the State. In total, this study examines four procedures of privatisation and 
two procedures of externalisation in Chapter II. The consideration of particular procedures 
serves to illustrate the typical make-up and implementation of externalised and privatised 
procedures. This examination is also undertaken in order to contextualise the presence and 
absence of compulsory powers for the analysis that follows in Chapters III, IV and V. The 
procedures themselves should not be taken as being the focus of this research. They serve 
as examples and reference points but do not drive the analysis. That drive comes from the 
consideration of relevant jurisprudence and its application to such externalised or privatised 
procedures in Chapters III and IV. 
                                                                 
3 Compulsory powers are later defined in section 1.2.1 but for the sake of completeness here, they are the 
use of physical force in coercing a specific result. 
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 The layout and structure of the research is laid out below in the final section of this 
introduction. Suffice to say at this point that the thesis may be approached by the reader as 
first setting out a conceptual framework (Introduction and Chapter I) for approaching 
privatisation and externalisation in migration control and border management. Second, the 
work sets out the afore-mentioned procedures on a descriptive basis (Chapter II). Third, 
and finally, the research undertakes an analysis on the basis of that conceptual framework 
and by continual use of the procedures as reference points (Chapters III and IV). This 
process culminates in the doctrinal solutions set out in Chapter V (Section 5.4). These 
solutions are ways forward by which the courts can rise to the challenges set out in the 
preceding analysis.  These new tests represent clear proposals on a new path by which legal 
responsibility can be attributed to the State in a way which does not impose an undue 
burden on the State but which also offers migrants more meaningful access to justice than 
simply being dependent on arbitrary and unfair tests in seeking to vindicate their rights for 
an alleged violation. 
Who and Where? 
The questions of who and where have become increasingly crucial in migration control and 
border management. The questions are: who is it that implements a specific procedure of 
migration control and border management? And, where is it implemented? These questions 
have become decisive in the attribution of legal responsibility for a breach of a migrant’s 
fundamental rights which occurs during the implementation of externalised and privatised 
procedures. Rather than skipping to the consideration of particular rights violations, these 
questions reflect the triggers of legal responsibility for each phenomenon.  
The questions of who and where are crucial to privatisation and externalisa t ion 
respectively. ‘Privatisation,’ in this context, comprises any measure that delegates the 
implementation of a migration control or border management procedure to a private actor. 
‘Externalisation’ involves the implementation of a migration control and border 
management procedure beyond the EU’s external border.4 The concurring judgment of 
                                                                 
4 This definition thus excludes procedures aimed at the de-territorialisation of Member States in 
immigration no-mans land most notably in airport transit ones. These have been already considered in the 
ECtHR (Amuur v France, 19776/92) and the CJEU (C-170/96, Commission of the European Communities 
v Council of the European Union (‘Airport Visas Case’)). 
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Judge Pinto De Albuquerque in the maritime migrant interdiction case of Hirsi5 is worth 
quoting at this juncture: 
“Immigration and border control is a primary State function [sic] and all forms of this 
control result in the exercise of the State’s jurisdiction. Thus, all forms of immigration 
and border control of a State party to the European Convention on Human Rights are 
subject to the human rights standard established in it and the scrutiny of the Court, 
regardless of which personnel are used to perform the operations and the place where 
they take place.”6 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque argues that migration control and border management remain 
State functions no matter who (‘the personnel that are used to perform the operations’) is 
involved in its implementation and where (‘the place where those operations take place’) 
that implementation occurs. This research seeks to examine this claim. 
The judicial framework, upon which the EU rests, does not recognise migrat ion 
control and border management as inherently being the legal responsibility of the State in 
the way Justice de Albuquerque envisages. Instead the national courts and the regional 
courts which consider fundamental rights, exercise disparate and complex approaches to 
attributing legal responsibility. For externalised procedures, the principle obstacle (and key 
trigger) in attributing legal responsibility for migration control and border management to 
the externalising State has been extraterritorial jurisdiction. Whether or not a State has 
engaged its extraterritorial jurisdiction is dependent upon the nature of the control that that 
State has exerted in the implementation of the externalised procedure in question. With 
privatised procedures, the principle impediment (and key trigger) in attributing legal 
responsibility for migration control and border management to the externalising State is 
that the private actor is instead seen as being liable for any wrong. The inability to attribute 
legal responsibility to the State for procedures which they continue, de facto, to control 
goes against the traditional public law assumption that State control entails State legal 
responsibility.7 That assumption is a long-standing norm of public law that has been used 
                                                                 
5 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 27765/09, [GC]. 
6 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 27765/09, [GC]. Concurring Opinion of Justice de Albuquerque. 
7 Lawson speaking in terms of control giving rise to extraterritorial jurisdiction, says: “Personally I believe 
in the basic tenet ‘control entails responsibility.’” Lawson. R., Life after Bankovic: On the Extraterritorial 
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(and misused) sometimes by public lawyers and oftentimes by lay people to the law, in 
trying to argue for State legal responsibility. This research examines this norm in the 
context of privatisation and externalisation. 
Control and Legal Responsibility for that Control 
The primary concern of Member States of the European Union (EU) in migration control 
and border management remains control. Being ‘in control’ of migration control and border 
management procedures is held up as being demonstrative of a Member State’s own ability 
to govern and as a manifestation of its sovereignty. As a result, any attempt to dilute the 
State’s control in institutional or procedural terms is usually resisted. Entrusting 
implementation to a private actor and moving procedures to outside of the State’s territory 
would appear at first glance to represent just such a dilution. However, a Member State can 
remain fixated with control of procedures while also pursuing externalisation and 
privatisation as governance strategies; it is not a contradiction. This is because these 
phenomena can serve to frustrate legal responsibility despite the State retaining 
considerable control in the implementation of a given procedure. Therefore, although these 
phenomena may, prima facie, appear to weaken State control, they, in fact, still provide 
the State with the ability to effectively govern the implementation of migration control and 
border management procedures. They do this while also obscuring the clear line of legal 
responsibility to the State. 
Externalisation and privatisation can therefore represent a paradox within that core 
premise of public law – that control entails legal responsibility. This thesis argues that the 
judicial framework for the protection of fundamental rights in the EU has, for the most 
part, not adequately recognised and addressed this reality of externalisation and 
privatisation. Derivatives of that premise of public law can be identified in the context of 
both of the phenomena considered here. It is widely held that a State cannot do abroad that 
which it is obliged not to do at home.8 Similarly, it is commonly agreed that a State cannot 
                                                                 
Application of the European Convention on Human Rights. Page 86. In Coomans. F., & Kamminga. MT., 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (2004). 
8 As Lawson puts it: It would be “morally wrong and legally unsound if, in the field of human rights, States 
were allowed to do abroad what they have undertaken not to do at home.” Brouwer. E., Extraterritorial 
Migration Control and Human Rights: Preserving the Responsibility of the EU and its Member States. In 
Ryan. B., and Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control (2010). Page 217. Brouwer is quoting: 
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delegate tasks to a private actor which may include acts that it has undertaken not to do 
itself.9 Both of these norms can be frustrated in the implementation of externalised or 
privatised migration control and border management. The primary route by which to gauge 
legal responsibility for the control that a Member State exerts is to refer to the fundamenta l 
rights framework to which that Member State is obligated. If legal responsibility cannot be 
attributed to the State on the basis of the control exerted by the State then a migrant does 
not adequately gain access to justice such that their rights have fair opportunity to be 
vindicated by the court in question.10 
This research examines Member State control as it is exerted through privatised or 
externalised procedures by considering the approach taken to those procedures by that 
Member State’s domestic courts, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This research is focussed on consideration 
of EU Member State control over externalised or privatised procedures in the context of 
migration control and border management, and legal responsibility for that control. As will 
be considered, control is all-important in adjudicating on both externalisation and 
privatisation. Rather than being an examination of legal responsibility for the violation of 
a particular set of rights, this research concentrates on the crucial triggers of legal 
responsibility. For externalisation, the legal hurdle that triggers consideration of a State’s 
legal responsibility is extraterritorial jurisdiction. All consideration of rights violat ions 
flow from the court having established that the State has engaged its extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction. Similarly, courts will examine the legitimacy of public accountability for, 
prima facie, private actions that led to rights violations before it ever considers the 
                                                                 
Lawson. R., Life After Bankovic: On the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, chapter in: 
Coomans. F., Kamminga. MT., Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (2004). Page 97. 
See generally: Miller. S., Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the European Convention (2010) The European Journal of International 
Law Vol. 20(4). 
9 For example: Harris. DJ., O’Boyle. M., Bates. EP., Buckley. CM., Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (2014). Page 907. 
10 Similar concepts have been considered previously. See: Gammeltoft-Hansen. T., Access to Asylum: 
International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of Migration Control (2011). Page 222. See also: 
Gammeltoft-Hansen. T., The Rise of the Private Border Guard Accountability and Responsibility in the 
Migration Control Industry. Page 143. In Gammeltoft-Hansen. T., & Nyberg Sørensen. N., The Migration 
Industry and the Commercialisation of International Migration (2013). See also: Ryan. B., Extraterritorial 
Immigration Control: What Role for Legal Guarantees? Page 22. In Ryan. B., & Mitsilegas. V., Ryan. B., 
& Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control (2010). 
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violations themselves. These control triggers are a pre-requisite to that later attribution of 
legal responsibility. In establishing that the State maintains its ability to control, insofar as 
it is possible to do so, the first half of this research’s framework is accomplished. More 
fundamental though is consideration of whether or not State legal responsibility for State 
control can be frustrated before it ever has the chance to be properly considered and that is 
the crucial second half of this research’s framework. 
The Research Questions 
The research question posed is two-fold. Firstly, what is the nature and effect of any control 
that a Member State retains despite having delegated implementation of a procedure to a 
private actor or having relocated implementation of a procedure beyond the EU’s external 
borders? Secondly, can legal responsibility be attached to the State on the basis of that 
retained control?  
The first question addresses control. The nature of the State’s control refers to the 
way in which the State ensures implementation of a procedure in line with its own 
preferences. The effect of the State’s control links control to the theme of the second 
research question – legal responsibility. The nature of control decides its effect and so the 
method by which the State controls impacts upon whether legal responsibility will arise for 
that State. Each phenomenon poses a different set of obstacles for a migrant seeking to 
vindicate a human right having experienced a violation of that right. These obstacles 
facilitate the frustration of legal responsibility. It is a starting position of this thesis that the 
exercise of control by a State, as control has been defined in this work, should engage the 
legal responsibility of that State. 
It is impossible to say with certainty whether or not the fact that a procedure has 
been externalised or privatised increases the frequency and intensity of fundamental rights 
violations. From the international waters in the Mediterranean where people on board 
unseaworthy vessels are interdicted by the Member States to the private escorts who escort 
irregular migrants onto commercial aeroplanes in order to return them to their country of 
origin, the fundamental rights risks are significant and ubiquitous. The 21st century has 
seen privatisation become an almost inherent part of the operation of globalised, western 
democracies. This research certainly does not set out any ideological stall against private 
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actor involvement in the work of public authorities. However, the starting position of this 
research in approaching privatisation is that keeping migration control and border 
management in the hands of the State achieves a key objective for any State seeking to 
uphold rights: It increases the legal transparency of those procedures which in turn can help 
to ease access to justice for aggrieved individuals. Similarly, this research does not 
automatically rail against the idea of externalising procedures which has by now become 
an intrinsic feature of Union migration control and border management. Nevertheless, this 
research does generally posit that externalised procedures must provide parallel rights 
guarantees rather than be implemented in a complete protection vacuum. While nodding 
toward these policy preferences in the implementation of externalisation and privatisat ion, 
this research is much more concerned with charting the effective judicial oversight of these 
phenomena. 
Parameters of the Research 
In addition to the section above which delimited the scope of this research, certain other 
parameters of the work are important to note. 
Case-Study: UK 
This examination of State control and legal responsibility is undertaken in the context of 
fundamental rights protection within EU Member States.11 Consideration of all Member 
States, or even a large sample is rejected in favour of a more precise investigation of one 
Member State: the UK. The UK12 has invested extensively in both externalisation and 
privatisation. The UK has been at the cutting edge of externalisation – from its vast use of 
Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) to, in the early 2000s, its campaigning for external 
processing. Similarly, the UK’s investment in privatisation has resulted in its migrant 
detention estate becoming part of “Europe’s most privatised criminal justice system.”13  
                                                                 
11 Brouwer. E., Extraterritorial Migration Control and Human Rights: Preserving the Responsibility of the 
EU and its Member States. In Ryan. B., & Mitsilegas 
. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control (2010). Page 211. 
12 It should be noted that while reference is made to the UK, only the English and Welsh courts are 
considered. 
13 Bacon. C., The Evolution of Immigration Detention in the UK: The Involvement of Private Prison 
Companies (2005) Working Paper No. 27, University of Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre . Page 13. 
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 The UK will be an EU Member State for a limited time only. This research was 
undertaken at a time when any future in-out referendum for UK membership of the EU was 
a vague and uncertain prospect. The announcement of a referendum, the subsequent 
campaign and eventual result have not taken away from the choice of the UK as a case-
study. Migration control and border management were subject to a particularly outspoken 
public discussion in the lead up to the so-called ‘Brexit’ referendum14 and are commonly 
regarded as being key spurs for a ‘Leave’ vote.15 Externalisation and privatisation have 
been invested upon as governance strategies most deeply in the Member State which is 
leaving the Union in large part due to a perceived loss of control of migration and borders. 
This dichotomy makes the UK the logical choice as a case-study. 
 The UK’s conservative government has also signalled its intent to repeal the Human 
Rights Act. In August 2016, Liz Truss, the then Justice Secretary, stated that it will be 
replaced by a UK Bill of Rights.16 Indeed, there have even been murmurings of its repeal 
in parallel to a withdrawal altogether from the ECHR but the latter has yet to be debated at 
a high level. Prime minister Theresa May has stated that she intends to derogate from the  
ECtHR in the event of Britain being involved in future conflicts in order to curb an 
“industry of vexatious claims” against soldiers.17 In any case, this research concentrates on 
the current status quo which necessarily includes full application of the Human Rights Act 
and the interaction between the UK judges and their counterparts in Strasbourg on the basis 
of that Act.  
 The UK’s ‘splendid isolation’ through its non-membership of Schengen, alongside 
its opt-outs from certain legislative initiatives of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
are worth noting but do not take away from its suitability as a case-study Member State. A 
Member State cannot evade engagement of the Charter for certain procedures by way of a 
simple opt-out from EU legislation. In particular, it should be noted that the UK did not 
                                                                 
14 Also known as: The United Kingdom European Union Membership Referendum, 2016. 
15 Mandelson. P., Why is the Brexit camp so obsessed with immigration? Because that’s all they have. The 
Guardian, 3rd of May 2016. 
16 Wilkinson. M., Human Rights Act will be scrapped in favour of British Bill of Rights, Liz Truss pledges . 
The Telegraph, 22nd of August 2016. 
17 Walker. P., & Bowcott. O., Plan for UK military to opt out of European convention on human rights . The 
Guardian, 4th of October 2016. 
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participate in the Frontex founding Regulation18 or any of its amending legislation19 
including the ‘Frontex at sea’ Regulation.20 Neither is the UK a party to the European 
border and coast guard Regulation.21 The UK only has observer status on the Frontex 
Management Board but it has contributed to practical cooperation and has been involved 
in several joint operations.22 The UK is subject to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
despite Protocol 3023 which the UK and Poland demanded in order to sign up to the Charter. 
Most commentators now agree that that protocol is a clarification rather than being an opt-
out.24 The UK remains subject to the direct effect of the Charter and thus subject to the 
CJEU where the CJEU finds that EU law applies.25  
                                                                 
18 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union. Articles 12, 20(5) and 23(4). 
19 Amending legislation: Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 July 2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers  of 
guest officers. 
Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 
Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 
establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur). 
20 Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 
21 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. 
22 Ryan. B., The EU’s Borders: Schengen, Frontex and the UK (2016) Free Movement Blog. Available at: 
https://www.freemovement.org.uk/brexit-and-borders-schengen-frontex-and-the-uk/ 
23 For UK domestic court stating that the Charter creates freestanding rights in immigration law, see: Abdul 
(section 55 - Article 24(3) Charter) [2016] UKUT 106 (IAC). 
For commentary, see: Yeo. C., EU Charter of Fundamental Rights creates freestanding rights in 
immigration law says tribunal (2016) Free Movement Blog. Available at: 
https://www.freemovement.org.uk/eu-charter-of-fundamental-rights-creates-freestanding-rights-in-
immigration-law-says-tribunal/ 
For UK domestic case-law which openly states that Charter creates freestanding  
24 Cases that are interesting in this context: 
UK courts: Saeedi v SSHD [2010] EWHC 705.  
CJEU: C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS and ME, [GC]. 
25 C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, [GC]. 
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The Limited Influence of International Law Sources 
The focus of this work being the triggers for legal responsibility rights violations arising 
out of the implementation of externalised and privatised procedures, itself serves to limit 
the relevancy of international law sources. While relevant public international law exists, 
it is of limited application to the vindication of rights by individuals which itself, in turn, 
is limited by the aforementioned triggers of legal responsibility. Instead, this research’s 
analysis relies upon an in-depth examination of the relevant jurisprudence from domestic 
courts, the Court of Justice of the EU and the European Court of Human Rights. Only then 
can that analysis properly understand the extent to which legal responsibility can be 
frustrated by narrow judicial interpretations of the triggers of that responsibility. 
 At the same time, it would be remiss not to acknowledge the basic principles of 
State responsibility in public international law even if they are not directly applicable to 
the analysis that follows. Those principles do mirror the ultimate objective of this research 
in that they focus on setting out how and when States should be held responsible for 
violations of their international obligations, including international human rights law. 
These principles do not themselves set out obligations for States, they simply set out 
responsibility and remedies with regard to the already existing primary obligations of 
States. As such, they can in fact be researched and written about independently from 
consideration of the obligations themselves. In this way, the present research mirrors such 
a study as it concentrates on the initial trigger for responsibility rather than an in-depth 
consideration of whether the action itself did indeed violate the right in question, as alleged. 
The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) marked a turning point in moving State legal 
responsibility toward being more concrete and certain and less theoretical. The Draft 
Articles have already been cited by the International Court of Justice.26 Amongst a wide 
range of other provisions, the Draft Articles established the circumstances under which the 
actions of officials and private actors may be attributed to the State.27 
                                                                 
26 The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary-Slovakia), International Court of Justice, Judgment of 25 
September 1997, Page 35-36. 
27 Article 5 of the Articles on State Responsibility refers to the conduct of persons or entities exercising 
elements of governmental authority. 
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 The focus in the present research is on the eventual individual vindication of rights 
in court. That focus naturally limits the scope of application for relevant international law 
sources. Thus, while it is important to acknowledge the basic principles of State 
responsibility, their application here is limited. Instead the examination of EU Member 
State legal responsibility in the context of externalisation and privatisation is made with 
reference to the judicial framework of protection for fundamental rights that is applicable 
to those States. That framework consists of the Member States’ domestic courts 
(represented in this study by the UK’s court system), the CJEU and the ECtHR. These 
“…complex legal issues will ultimately be tested in the courts”28 and so, this research 
examines the applicable jurisprudence across the three judicial settings in order to 
understand the triggers for the attribution of legal responsibility for violations of rights that 
occur in the implementation of externalised or privatised procedures. The jurisprudence 
examined does not concentrate solely on the migration control and border management 
context but also analyses other fields in order to more fully understand the courts’ actual 
and potential approaches to these triggers. 
Certain commentators have approached the issues raised in this research, 
externalisation especially, through the prism of public international law.29 Public 
international law is influential insofar as it has impacted upon the shaping of opinions 
within the aforementioned judicial framework. However, this research ultimately only 
extends to examining a migrant’s access to justice in terms of the merits of that migrant’s 
case being heard. At any rate, as an international organization and by virtue of its 
international legal personality,30 the EU is bound by customary international law. As a 
matter of EU law, Articles 21 and 3(5) of the Treaty on the European Union (“TEU”) stress 
the EU’s commitment to strict observance of international law including customary 
                                                                 
28 Roberts. D., Deputy Director, Immigration Service, Home Office, UK. From contribution made at: 
Round Table on Carriers’ Liability Related to  Illegal Immigration (2001) Round Table on Carriers’ 
Liability related to Illegal Immigration was jointly organized by the International Road Transport Union, 
the European Community Shipowners  Association, the International Air Transport Association and the 
International Union of Railways in close cooperation with the European Commission. Available at: 
https://www.iru.org/apps/cms-filesystem-action?file=en_events_2001/Illegal2001.pdf 
29 For a more international perspective, see: den Heijer. M., Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (2011). 
30 Article 47, Treaty on the European Union. 
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international law and international treaties to which it becomes a party. These commitments 
effectively turn these international obligations into EU law.31 
There has been a considerable amount of judicial dialogue between the three 
judicial settings. One author has even argued that this is true to a degree – in the context of 
refugee law at least – whereby EU Member States are now moving toward being part of an 
“intra-European space where internal borders are transformed to give way to a quasi-
single jurisdiction for the treatment of refugees…”32 It is crucially important that any such 
ius commune is capable of predictably and consistently vindicating the rights of migrants 
in general against the State whenever those migrants suffer a fundamental rights violat ion 
at the hands of a privatised or externalised migration control or border management 
procedure. That vindication depends upon the judicial framework being able to establish 
that consideration of State legal responsibility should be triggered. For externalisation this 
means consideration of the circumstances in which the State engages its extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction and for privatisation it means consideration of the circumstances in which 
private action leads to public responsibility. 
Motivation or Design – the limits of the Framework 
Some commentators have argued that there exists “...a strong incentive to seek other ways 
of carrying out frontier controls where State agencies are less immediately implicated in 
the problems which may arise.”33 Though it could be opined that externalisation and 
privatisation are governance strategies borne of such incentives, this research does not 
make any major assertions as to State motivation or strategy. Those arguments have already 
been made extensively by political scientists34 and are almost impossible to prove 
definitively in law. The focus here is on examining the judicial framework’s approach to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and the public/private divide and its application to migrat ion 
                                                                 
31 In Kadi, the CJEU restated that the Union must respect international law. See: C-402/05 and C-415/05 P 
and Kadi, [GC]. Paragraph 291. In ATAA, the Court stressed the EU’s obligation to adhere to international 
customary law, C-366/10, ATAA, [GC]. Paragraph 101.  
32 Gil-Bazo. MT., The Protection of Refugees under the Common European Asylum System. The 
Establishment of a European Jurisdiction for Asylum Purposes and Compliance with International Refugee 
and Human Rights Law (2007) Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto, Vol. 36, 153. Page 157-8. 
33 Guild. E., The Borders of the EU: Visas and Carrier Sanctions (2004) Tidsskreftet Politick, Volume 7(3), 
34.  Page 45. 
34 Virginie Guiraudon, Gallya Lahav and Sandra Lavenex must be singled out for their contribution. 
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control and border management. That examination takes place irrespective of whether the 
frustration of legal responsibility, in spite of the exercise of significant State control, has 
arisen inadvertently or by design on the part of the State. This research thus considers the 
kind of control that the State exerts over privatised or externalised procedures and how 
legal responsibility may be attached to the State on the basis of that control for a violat ion 
of a migrant’s rights in the implementation of such a procedure. The consequence is that 
this research’s findings cannot be taken as an all-encompassing critique on the direction 
that EU migration law and policy has taken so much as contributing to the literature on the 
effects of privatising and externalising migration control and border management 
procedures. Any frustration of legal responsibility in spite of significant State control is 
certainly worth highlighting, yet it should not be taken as an overall assessment of the field.  
Layout and Structure 
Having made multiple references in this introduction to various crucial terms, such as 
‘control’ and ‘legal responsibility,’ the first chapter35 of this research seeks to draw 
together all of the key concepts and terms employed in this research. The first chapter also 
delves deeper into privatisation and externalisation. 
 Chapter II provides a descriptive account of a selection of the procedures that have 
been privatised or externalised. The priority here is not only to detail how the procedure 
works. The genesis of that procedure, any legislation which enforces its implementa t ion 
and how it has been implemented in practice are also important considerations. The degree 
to which the procedure affords the State control of its implementation is the underlying 
interest. In practical terms however, it is not possible to state definitively whether the State 
retains control or not as control is defined in this work. Only the courts can conclusive ly 
state whether the State has exercised control or not.  
 Chapters III and IV may be considered a two-part set, one half of which examines 
externalisation (chapter III) and the other half scrutinises privatisation (Chapter IV). Both 
chapters are structured around the jurisprudence of the UK’s domestic courts, the CJEU 
and the ECtHR. To provide a more coherent and engaging account of the case-law of each 
                                                                 
35 The word ‘chapter’ will be capitalised in this work only when it is referring to the title of the chapter, e.g. 
‘Chapter II’; ‘the second chapter.’ 
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court and their application of the Human Rights Act, the Charter and the Convention 
respectively, the sequence in which these courts are examined varies. In Chapter III 
(externalisation) the crucial consideration is extraterritorial jurisdiction. The inter-court 
dialogue between the UK domestic courts and the ECtHR recounts a difficult evolution for 
this key impediment to the vindication of a migrant’s rights. It is the potential of the CJEU 
and the Charter to create change that is examined in this chapter, rather than any material 
effect that they have had as of yet. In the fourth chapter, the UK domestic courts’ approach 
to a particularly crucial provision of the Human Rights Act for this research, is examined. 
The ECtHR’s approach to private action is next examined. That approach gives rise to 
positive and negative obligations for the contracting State of the ECHR. The final section 
of that chapter considers the Luxembourg Court’s attitude vis-à-vis Member State 
responsibility for private actions which is, again, a story of potential. 
 The fifth chapter of this research seeks to tie together the different strands through 
which the research question has been answered. It also seeks to critique the judicia l 
approaches to both phenomena and to set out the practical and procedural hurdles faced by 
migrants in vindicating their rights. Finally, and most crucially, the chapter offers up 
certain doctrinal solutions which are capable of ensuring legal responsibility is tied more 
definitively to State control in a reliable and effective manner by the courts. 
 The final part of this research draws a conclusion to the preceding examination by 
further considering how legal responsibility is triggered, the viability of the doctrinal 
solutions suggested and the contribution this makes to the vindication of rights and the 
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I. Control and Legal Responsibility for 
Externalised and Privatised Procedures 
1.1 Introduction – Does Control entail Responsibility? 
This chapter outlines the conceptual framework which is used in approaching the 
phenomena in question – privatisation and externalisation. The key concepts in the 
framework are State control and State legal responsibility for that control. What is control 
and how does the State exercise it? What is legal responsibility and when should it be 
attributed to a State? Understanding whether or not a State’s legal responsibility will be 
substantively considered by a court depends upon the triggers of legal responsibility which 
in turn largely depend upon the nature and effect of the control exercised by the State. 
These triggers, as will be considered in Chapters III and IV, have been orientated around 
control-based tests. The eventual vindication of rights depends completely upon the court 
finding, as a preliminary matter, that the State has acted so as to trigger consideration of its 
legal responsibility. 
Control, legal responsibility and a migrant’s relationship with each of those 
concepts is the subject of the next section (1.2). The subsequent section (1.3) explores the 
phenomena of externalisation and privatisation themselves. Privatisation is approached in 
the traditional sense of that word but a distinction is made between those procedures which 
have been privatised through contract and those which are implemented by a private actor 
on a more informal basis (1.3.1). The section on externalisation distinguishes externalised 
procedures from other external procedures that do not involve an organ of the State directly 
operating in a third State or in international waters (1.3.2). The final section (1.4) of this 
chapter seeks to draw a conclusion by contextualising the conceptual framework for the 
chapters that follow. 
1.2 Access to Justice – Control and Legal Responsibility 
Access to justice may be defined as being “the right of individuals to enforce their human 
rights vis-à-vis the Member States. This implies the right of access to legal remedies, 
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including the state's possible liability…”1 Access to justice can be denied on multiple of 
grounds and can be frustrated for a variety of reasons including procedural and practical 
issues.2 The most serious obstacles to a substantive consideration of alleged rights 
violations come with preliminary matters (pre-merit issues) before the court. These 
preliminary considerations are whether extraterritorial jurisdiction3 (externalisation) is 
engaged and whether an action against the State is appropriate or even possible given the 
private nature of the offending procedure’s implementation (privatisation). These obstacles 
can serve to trigger legal responsibility for the State but they can also deny the opportunity 
for a court to substantively consider the State’s legal responsibility.  4 Access to justice in 
the context of rights violations at the hands of externalised procedures is compromised by 
narrow judicial interpretations of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In privatisation, access to 
justice is constrained by a court’s holding that only private liability is applicable for any 
alleged wrong and the State has no responsibility. The capacity of a migrant to overcome 
these hurdles is the crucial test in the present context of examining a migrant’s access to 
justice for alleged rights violations arising out of the implementation of a privatised or an 
externalised procedure. 
Control is an elusive concept and this research does not seek to set out a tip ping 
point on a scale whereby State control can be said to exist. It is tempting to interpret control 
as being that point at which the courts’ find that legal responsibility has been engaged. 
Control must instead remain a somewhat fluid and flexible concept which can be applied 
                                                                 
1 Brouwer. E., Extraterritorial Migration Control and Human Rights: Preserving the Responsibility of the 
EU and its Member States . Page 201. In Ryan. B., & Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control 
(2010). 
2 These practical issues will be considered in Chapter V (5.3.1). 
3 For an alternative examination of the interplay between legal responsibility and jurisdiction, see: 
Brouwer. E., Extraterritorial Migration Control and Human Rights: Preserving the responsibility of the EU 
and its Member States. Page 199. In Ryan. B., & Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control 
(2010). 
4 Rijpma and Cremona make a similar point: “It is jurisdiction more than anything else that triggers a 
State’s responsibility…” See: Cremona. M., and Rijpma. J., The Extra-Territorialisation of EU Migration 
Policies and the Rule of Law (2007) Working Paper No.1, European University Institute . Page 17. 
Cremona and Rijpma make reference to: Gil-Bazo. MT., The Practice of Mediterranean States in the 
context of the European Unions Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country 
Concept Revisited. 18 International Journal of Refugee Law, 3-4 (2006), 593. 
Also interesting in this context: Besson. S., The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to (2012) Leiden 
Journal of International Law Vol. 25(04), 857. 
20 | P a g e  
 
to increasingly complex and multi- faceted problems. The definition of control must reflect 
the fact that States exercise different levels of control and it is not a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
question of whether the State is in control. It is for this reason that consideration of control 
responds to the research question by considering the nature of control and its effect. 
Examining the nature of the control exerted allows for consideration of control on a scale 
in order to reflect the different levels and types of control afforded by externalised and 
privatised migration control and border management procedures. The migration control 
and border management procedures themselves are later examined (Chapter II) in order to 
better understand the kind of control that the State implements through these procedures. 
Jurisprudence from the courts will be used to gauge the effect of that control (Chapters III 
and IV). Legal responsibility, unlike control, can be answered with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ although 
how that answer is reached can vary. For both externalised and privatised procedures, the 
frustration of legal responsibility is all-important. The national courts, the CJEU and the 
ECtHR must interpret where and how exactly the threshold of legal responsibility is 
engaged. Whether by design or by happenstance, the nature of control is sometimes such 
that the State is able to materially control the implementation of externalised and privatised 
procedures without engaging that threshold point. In such circumstances, the State does 
not have legal responsibility for any rights violations arising out of its control over the 
implementation of the offending procedure. 
This section will first consider control (1.2.1) before turning to examine legal 
responsibility (1.2.2). 
1.2.1 State Control – A Multi-Faceted Concept 
Control is a legally ambiguous word and can mean different things in different 
circumstances. In this research’s case-study Member State, the UK, the ‘Leave’ argument 
for the Brexit referendum repeatedly made reference to ‘taking back control’ in the context 
of migration and borders. This reference to control was made in the general context of 
arguing that the UK executive must wrest back the ability to shape law and policy on 
immigration from the EU. This work considers control more in the context of 
implementation. Nevertheless, the ‘Leavers’ campaign shows what a multi- faceted and 
difficult concept control is. On the face of it, there lay an internal contradiction within 
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control with States desiring ‘control’ which is associated with the invocation of their 
sovereignty and ensuring internal security. At the same time, this desire for control drives 
States to invest in privatised and externalised procedures which, paradoxically, resembles 
a dilution of State control over implementation. However, in actual fact, externalisa t ion 
and privatisation can still provide States with control but one may well ask, what type and 
level of control this is? 
The title of this research makes reference to ‘EU Member State Control’ and to 
‘Legal Responsibility.’ It does not use the term ‘legal control.’ Control in the present 
context can be defined as being the extent to which a Member State is capable of directing, 
steering and influencing the implementation of a migration control or border management 
procedure.5 Legal control, as has been laid down in the courts (to be considered in Chapter 
III and IV) struggles to reflect such an even-handed definition. This struggle reflects the 
courts’ hesitancy in over-burdening the State with the potential to be liable for all and every 
private act that gives rise to a rights violation or to attribute legal responsibility to the State 
for any involvement in the implementation of a procedure in a third State. That concern 
must be balanced with the fact that legal responsibility must be attributed to the State in a 
consistent and fair manner. The end result is that consideration of potential State legal 
responsibility for the violation of a right, arising out of the implementation of externalised 
or privatised procedures, often struggles to be triggered in the courts despite the State 
exercising control as it has been defined here. A gulf exists between control as it has been 
defined here and the legal control which does give rise to legal responsibility. 
The State may exercise a substantial level of control without ever engaging any 
legal responsibility. Defining control more generally provides an important reference point 
to constantly guide the discussion. This is what the expectation of control is when control 
of migrants and borders are being discussed. The courts have no such reference point and 
                                                                 
5 Busuioc, with reference to Roness, defines control similarly in the context of EU agencies: “Control 
refers to a whole range of mechanisms employed by the controlling actor in order to direct, steer and 
influence decision making and behaviour of the controlled agents.” See: Busuioc. M., Accountability, 
Control and Independence: The Case of European Agencies (2009) European Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 5, 
599. Page 605. 
See also: Roness. P., et al, Autonomy and Regulation of State Agencies: Reinforcement, Indifference or 
Compensation? (Pisa, 6–8 September 2007), Paper Presented at the Fourth ECPR General Conference, 5. 
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the definition of control varies, not just in the context of migration control and border 
management but across fields in consideration of the triggers of consideration of legal 
responsibility – extraterritorial jurisdiction and the potential for public liability for the acts 
of private actors. The courts are limited in their ability to reflect the gradation of control.  
A court can only conclude positively or negatively as to whether a State controlled 
implementation. It can reflect the difficulty of gauging control of a particular situation 
through its judgment but its findings can only say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as to whether the State held 
control and, under many judicial approaches, thus as to whether consideration of the State’s 
legal responsibility has been triggered. 
 The courts approach to control in externalisation and privatisation is oftentimes 
driven by consideration of the use of compulsory powers in the implementation of the 
procedure in question.6 Compulsory powers refer to the use of physical force in coercing a 
specific result.7 The test can be reduced to consideration of whether the implementation of 
the procedure incorporated a physical expression of power and authority such as arrest, 
detention or restraint. The exercise of such powers in the implementation of an externalised 
or privatised procedure is taken by the courts as being indicative that the State has control 
such that consideration of its legal responsibility should be triggered.  
On the one hand there is direct control which involves the exercise of compulsory 
powers in the implementation of a procedure by an organ of the State (externalisation) or 
by an agent of the State (privatisation). On the other hand, indirect control does not 
incorporate the exercise of compulsory powers.8 Organs of the State may well be involved 
in the implementation of a migration control and border management procedure but 
crucially, they do not include the exercise of any physical force. Indirect control does not 
extend to the use of compulsory powers but it still affords the State control by relying on 
governance tools such as the design, coordination, oversight and decision making involved 
in the implementation of a procedure. Those externalised or privatised procedures which 
                                                                 
6 Chapters III and IV. 
7 The use of this term reflects its use in the courts of England and Wales in the context of responsibility for 
the actions of private actors. 
8 For new, less obvious forms of control that are exercised by the State, see: Bloom. T., Risse. V., 
Examining hidden coercion at state borders: why carrier sanctions cannot be justified (2014) Ethics & 
Global Politics Vol. 7(2), 2014, 65. 
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do not incorporate compulsory powers may well not be interpreted as having engaged a 
State’s legal responsibility.9 The type of control exercised by the State can sometimes mean 
that it has a very real control yet it will not be interpreted as triggering consideration of that 
State’s legal responsibility. 
Obviously this conceptualisation of control is quite fluid. Exceptions arise and 
sometimes direct control may be found by a court not to trigger consideration of the State’s 
legal responsibility for the violation in question. On certain other occasion, indirect control 
may also be found by a court to have triggered such consideration. In any case, the 
definition of control set out above, which encompasses both categories of control, is 
designed with an understanding that control can be achieved through a broad sweep of 
different powers exercised by the State. Control, as will be discussed, is not the only basis 
by which State legal responsibility can be established, but it is the dominant method for 
both phenomena. The courts, in focussing on control to understand whether the State’s 
legal responsibility should be considered, can take a narrow approach to what control can 
mean and focus too much upon the exercise of the direct form. Such an approach, therefore, 
focuses upon the exercise of compulsory powers and ignores other, more subtle, 
mechanisms which still afford the State actual control of the procedure in question. 
A narrow approach to what constitutes State control is what distorts the public law 
expectation that legal responsibility should run in parallel to that control. A more open 
mind on what can constitute control would take into account the State’s ability to control a 
procedure beyond merely considering the absence or presence of compulsory powers. 
Alternatively, the courts could dispense with attempting to use control-based tests to guide 
the trigger of legal responsibility. The nature of control is the means (direct or indirect) by 
which the State regulates implementation of a privatised or externalised procedure. 
Examining the nature of control will establish whether compulsory powers are present or 
not and the means by which the State controls implementation. The (legal) effect of control 
depends on the nature of that control. Both direct and indirect control can satisfy the 
                                                                 
9 Moreno-Lax. V., Seeking Asylum in Europe – Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under 
EU Law (2012) PhD Thesis, Université Catholique de Louvain. Page 304. 
See also: See: Klug. A., & Howe. T., The Concept of State Jurisdiction and the Applicability of the Non -
Refoulement Principle To Extraterritorial Interception Measures. Page 94. In Ryan. B., and Mitsilegas. V., 
Extraterritorial Immigration Control (2010). 
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definition of control used in this work and can thus provide the State with the ability to 
regulate implementation but only direct control is capable of triggering legal responsibility.  
1.2.2 State Legal Responsibility – Where does the buck stop?10 
‘Legal responsibility’ refers to the vindication of an individual’s fundamental rights. That 
vindication comes through the success of judicial proceedings brought against a Member 
State on the basis of a violation of those rights arising out of the implementation of a 
migration control or border management procedure. In other words, legal responsibility 
entails the vindication of a migrant’s rights by a court.11 
There is no primary conception in either private or public law of what it means to 
‘vindicate’ rights, or indeed a singular understanding of what the purpose of vindica t ing 
rights might be.12 In the current context, vindication is restricted to actions taken in 
fundamental rights. That is not to say that alternative remedies are in some way deficient. 
In certain circumstances alternative remedies, such as an action for damages through tort, 
can represent important resolution for the migrant. However, this research only considers 
the potential for actions in fundamental rights as these are best placed to act as a public 
expression of rights vindication for the benefit of the whole community.13 Public actions 
also serve to test the capability of the EU’s fundamental rights framework in providing 
adequate protection to migrants who experience a breach of their fundamental rights at the 
hands of a privatised or externalised procedure. Alternative remedies are only considered 
                                                                 
10 While being questioned by MPs as to who was responsible for the death of a returnee during deportation, 
Mr. David Wood, the Interim Director General of the UK Immigration Enforcement Directorate  distanced 
the State and the private actor from any responsibility and instead laid the blame on the employees of the 
private actor who, he said, had failed to implement the training that they had been given. In frustration at 
the answers being given as to who was legally responsible, Steve Mc Cabe, Member of Parliament, asked 
simply: “Where does the buck stop?” The story of this returnee, Mr Jimmy Mubenga, will be returned to in 
Chapter II. 
Oral Evidence taken before the Home Affairs Committee. The work of the Immigration Enforcement 
Directorate. Tuesday 16 July 2013. 
11 Consideration of responsibility for both externalisation and privatisation has been examined before. For 
example, for externalisation, see: Brouwer. E., Extraterritorial Migration Control and Human Rights: 
Preserving the Responsibility of the EU and its Member States. In Ryan. B., & Mitsilegas. V., 
Extraterritorial Immigration Control (2010). 
For privatisation, see: Gibney. M., Beyond the Bounds of Responsibility: Western States and Measures to 
Prevent the Arrival of Refugees. (2005) Global Migration Perspectives. No. 22. 
12 Barker. K., Private and Public: The Mixed Concept of Vindication in Torts and Private Law. Page 91-92. 
In Pitel. S., Neyers. J., & Chamberlain. E., Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (2013). 
13 On this point, see: Steele. J., Damages in tort and under the Human Rights Act: remedial or functional 
separation? [2008] Cambridge Law Journal 606. Page 618. 
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(in section 5.3.2) insofar as private law may represent an alternative remedy that may attract 
migrants away from the unqualified vindication that only an action in fundamental rights 
can offer. A failure to attach responsibility to the State for a fundamental rights breach 
should not be taken as State responsibility being erased. Member State responsibility 
cannot be erased but can be frustrated. Alternative remedies perform important roles and 
may attach legal responsibility to the State but their ability to vindicate the fundamenta l 
rights of a migrant complainant is questionable.  
Rodier refers to externalisation as involving a ‘transfer’ of responsibility away from 
the State and to another State.14  A ‘transfer’ gives the impression of a total disassociation 
of the State from legal responsibility for externalised procedures and this does indeed seem 
to be Rodier’s intention. Other authors have written in a similar vein but that word was not 
a focus of their work and its use cannot be taken as a strict avowal of how they see the 
capabilities of externalised procedures in successfully evading legal responsibility and so 
‘passing the buck.’15 Similarly, privatisation has sometimes been taken as representing a 
complete and total ‘transfer’ of legal responsibility away from the State and to a private 
actor. Externalisation and privatisation and this supposed ability to ‘transfer’ legal 
responsibility in this way are considered in the next section (1.3). 
A final proviso to be added is that this reading of State legal responsibility should 
not be taken as negating any possibility of shared responsibility. States may be found to be 
jointly responsible with other States for externalised procedures. Similarly, parallel actions  
may be made against both a private actor and the State for an alleged wrong. 
                                                                 
14 “The externalisation of the European asylum and immigration system can be broken down into two main 
aspects: The EU’s plan to ‘relocate’ outside its territory certain border control procedures; and its plan to 
hold 3rd countries accountable, through the transfer of responsibilities, for the consequences of its 
obligations in relation to the application of International commitments…”  Rodier. C., DG for external 
policies of the Union. ‘Analysis of the external dimension of the EU’s asylum and immigration policies’ – 
summary and recommendations for the European Parliament (2006). Page 10-11. 
15 Den Heijer speaks in terms of “shifting responsibilities” and also of a “transfer.” See Den Heijer. M., 
Europe Beyond its Borders: Refugee and Human Rights Protection in Extraterritorial Immigration Control 
in Ryan. B., & Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control (2010). 
Peers also uses the word ‘transfer.’ See Peers. S., EU Justice and Home Affairs Law. (2011) Page 127 and 
page 530.  
As does Gil-Bazo: Gil-Bazo. MT., The Practice of Mediterranean States in the context of the European 
Union’s Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited. Int J 
Refugee Law (September/December 2006) 18 (3-4), 571. Page 596. 
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1.3 Privatisation and Externalisation 
Externalisation and privatisation are strategies through which the State can implement its 
policy and realise its objectives. Certain works have already plotted the evolution of EU 
law and policy to the point whereby externalisation and privatisation became central tools 
for Member State migration control and border management.16 This section intends rather 
to set out the basic tenets of each phenomenon and the way in which they have been 
integrated into States’ immigration and border systems. 
 ‘Externalisation’ involves the implementation of a State’s migration control and 
border management beyond the EU’s external borders. ‘Privatisation’ comprises any 
measure by a State that delegates the implementation of a migration control or border 
management procedure to a private actor.17 What is in question then are, firstly, nationa l 
or Union procedures which are implemented in a third State or on the high seas and which 
result in a violation of fundamental rights; and secondly, procedures implemented by a 
private actor which have been delegated to that private actor by the State and whose 
implementation gave rise to the violation of a migrant’s rights. Each will be examined here 
in turn. 
1.3.1 Privatisation – Who? 
In the field of migration control and border management, in certain circumstances, the State 
delegates to a private actor. Delegation consists of a private actor assuming State authority 
in the implementation of a given procedure. The State provides for this delegation with the 
expectation that that agent (the private actor delegate) will use that authority to achieve 
                                                                 
16 See: Moreno-Lax. V., Chapter 2 – EU Border Integration: Towards ‘Integrated Border Management.’ In 
Moreno-Lax. V., Seeking Asylum in Europe – Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under 
EU Law (2012) PhD Thesis, Université Catholique de Louvain. 
See also: Papagianni. G., Institutional and Policy Dynamics of EU Migration Law (2006). 
See also: Den Heijer. M., Chapter 5 – Extraterritorial Asylum under European Union Law. In Den Heijer. 
M., Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (2012). 
Finally, see also: Trevisanut. S., Which Borders for the EU Immigration Policy? : Yardsticks of 
International Protection for EU Joint Borders Management. In Azoulai. L., & de Vries. K., EU Migration 
Law: Legal Complexities and Political Rationales (2014). 
17 For discussion as to how privatisation should be defined in the current context, s ee: Kritzman-Amir. T., 
Privatization and Delegation of State Authority in Asylum Systems (2011) Law & Ethics of Human Rights, 
Vol. 5(1), Art. 6. Page 200. 
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State objectives.18 The delegate is empowered to perform tasks either concurrently with the 
public authorities19 or unilaterally. 
The Dutch Scientific Council on Government Policy has argued that, as a result of 
the increased complexity of a globalised society, regulators (governments) feel that they 
no longer have the necessary knowledge to make rules and lack the capacity to check for 
compliance.20 The inference is that States now need private actors in order to govern 
effectively. The actor involved in this privatisation is a commercial undertaking rather than 
any other type of natural or legal person.21 Each instance of privatisation is unique and 
must be considered on the basis of the facts particular to it. However, broadly defined 
categories can be set out. Two such categories are of particular importance in the present 
context – those activities that are privatised by contract and those which have been 
privatised on the basis of the private actor being enforced to comply with rules that have 
been set out by the State under the threat of sanction.22 Therefore the two types of 
privatisation examined in this research are contractual privatisation and ‘enforced’23 
privatisation respectively.24 
With privatisation by contract, a public tender is usually issued and private actors 
compete for contracts from the State for the migration control or border management 
                                                                 
18 Cox. A., & Posner. E., Delegation in Immigration Law (2011) John M. Olin Law & Economics Working 
Paper  NO. 572 (2D Series) Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 360. University of Chicago. 
Page 4. 
19 Davies. A., The Public Law of Government Contracts (2008). Page 249. 
20 See: de Lange. T., The Privatization of Control over Labour Migration in the Netherlands: In Whose 
Interest? European Journal of Migration and Law (2011) 13, 185. Page 186. 
21 Colombi-Ciacchi. A., European Fundamental Rights, Private Law, and Judicial Governance. In Micklitz. 
H., Constitutionalization of European Private Law (2014). Page 103. 
22 “…forces certain responsibilities on employers…” Similarly de Lange argues that different types of 
privatisation exist – coerced; contracted etc. Importantly for the current context, De Lange argues that a 
coercive approach to privatisation meets opposition while a permissive approach encounters  acquiescence. 
See: de Lange. T., The Privatization of Control over Labour Migration in the Netherlands: In Whose 
Interest? European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011) 185. Page 186. 
Meanwhile, Simons and Macklin speaks about ‘command and control’ regu lation, a coercive or 
prescriptive form of regulation by the State. See: Simons. P., & Macklin. A., The Governance Gap – 
Extractive Industries, Human Rights and the Home State Advantage (2014). 
23 This term has been used before: Scholten. S., The Privatisation of Immigration Control through Carrier 
Sanctions: The Role of Private Transport Companies in Dutch and British Immigration Control (2015) PhD 
Thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen. Page 9. 
24 On the different ways in which a State can privatise and going beyond the limited categories considered 
here, see: England. E., Privatization: Analyzing the Process of Privatization in Theory and Practice (2011) 
Student Pulse, 3(08). 
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procedure that the State has decided to privatise. Unlike enforced privatisation, contracts 
often do include compulsory powers and so the firms which tender for such contracts are 
specialised security firms. Contractual privatisation therefore often represents a direct 
control. Davies notes that, in a way, the contracting process does not raise any difficult 
questions about the public/private divide. The government/purchaser is clearly public and 
the contractor/vendor is clearly private. However, the shift from simple procurement to 
more complex and long-term contractual arrangements has made this analysis difficult to 
sustain.25 Privatisation by contract represents a clear shift in terms of a procedure that was 
habitually undertaken by the State will now be implemented by a private actor.26 The 
detention and escorted return of migrants are prime examples of privatisation by contract. 
 By contrast with those privatised by contract, procedures of enforced privatisa t ion 
have not previously been implemented by the State. These are new procedures, designed 
by the State but never implemented by it. They are instead implemented by private actors 
who are not in any way specialised to work in the field of migration control and border 
management. Enforced privatisation is established by legislation and imposed mainly 
through the application of punitive measures (usually monetary) for a failure to implement 
or for the inadequate implementation of the procedure in question. Such procedures afford 
the State an indirect control in that they do not incorporate compulsory powers. Private 
actors’ actions on the basis of these sanctions are limited to decision-making, information 
gathering or other so-called ‘soft’ powers. Employer sanctions and carrier sanctions are 
examples of enforced privatisation. 
Many different factors can influence a State to privatise. Private actors often have 
access to information and data which leaves them in a unique position from which they can 
police irregular migration in ways which the State cannot. Efficiency, money saving, other 
particular qualities or even political ideology must also be considered as points that can 
influence whether or not States privatise migration control and border management 
procedures. The motivation for delegating implementation of a migration control and 
                                                                 
25 Davies. A., Government Contractors: Public or Private? (2008). Page 231. 
26 See: Cox. A., & Posner. E., Delegation in Immigration Law (2011) John M. Olin Law & Economics 
Working Paper, No. 572 (2D Series) Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 360. University of 
Chicago. See also: Strausz. R., Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship (1997) The 
Review of Economic Studies Vol. 64(3), 337. 
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border management procedure to a private actor is not the focus here; rather it is purely the 
implications of that privatisation for legal responsibility which is under consideration. To 
be more precise, it is the legal effect of indirect (non-compulsory powered) control that is 
especially of interest here as this is what is best placed to frustrate legal responsibility by 
not being capable of triggering consideration of such responsibility. Thus, while it is 
absolutely necessary to consider both contracted and enforced privatisation, it is more so 
the latter in which legal responsibility can be frustrated. 
There are a number of ways in which to examine privatisation. It is possible to consider 
the legislative and regulatory limits; there are also administrative law controls on the 
delegate which could be examined. Perhaps the greatest scope for research (certainly in the 
context of privatisation) is in the framework of private law controls on the delegate. 
Notwithstanding these alternative avenues of research, this study is primarily concerned 
with EU Member State legal responsibility for violations of fundamental rights.27 The 
research examines the ability of migrants to vindicate their rights and so alternative 
remedies through private law are of interest but are not the focus. The potential for private 
actions are only examined insofar as they may inhibit or distract from fundamental rights 
based actions against the State. This also means that the horizontal application of 
fundamental rights is not the focus here.28 
The argument goes that if a private actor performs public functions, it should comply 
with public law standards in relation to those actions. However, as Davies argues, such a 
statement is “fraught with difficulty.” 29 Primarily, how are public functions to be defined? 
Procedures in a field such as migration control and border management are presumed to be 
overtly public functions but this is not necessarily borne out upon closer inspection. Such 
procedures are, in practice, often a unique hybrid of the public and private which are highly 
complex to a degree whereby it can be difficult for the Courts to tell State action and that 
                                                                 
27 Donnelly gives more all-encompassing approach. See: Donnelly. C., Delegation of Government Power to 
Private Parties – A Comparative Perspective (2007) 
28 This research does not contemplate the “apocalyptic legal question” of a potential horizontal effect for 
the Human Rights Act which has seen limited application, see: Morgan. J., Questioning the ‘True Effect’ of 
the Human Rights Act (2002) Legal Studies 259. Page 259. 
29 Davies. A., Government Contractors: Public or Private? (2008). Page 231. 
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action which is genuinely private, apart.30 While it is necessary that the State is not declared 
to be culpable for all of the wrongs of its private citizens, migrant control and border 
management are the epitome of public actions and ask very difficult questions as to where 
it is that the State ends and private action begins. Essentially, there are two key questions 
relating to privatisation in the current context: Firstly, “should public bodies be subject to 
liability, or should the process of contracting allow them to place certain activities beyond 
the reach of the routine mechanisms…” 31 of legal responsibility? Secondly, in the context 
of enforced privatisation, should the State be subject to liability for the actions of private 
actors in implementing procedures under threat of sanction from that State?  
The supposition is that “…a public authority cannot divest itself of its public powers 
or duties by entrusting performance to a contractor. Where the law allocates powers or 
duties to a public authority, the authority remains legally …accountable for their exercise 
or performance regardless of whether it acts directly, or through contract, or some other 
mechanism.”32 That expectation may be extended to procedures of enforced privatisation 
as well yet, in the context of migration control and border management, that conviction has 
been challenged. Chapter IV considers how the courts have responded to that challenge. 
1.3.2 Externalisation – Where? 
In terms of migration control and border management, the first significant signal of a move 
toward deeper investment in external action by the EU or its Member States was the 
Tampere programme.33 Tampere signalled the Council’s strong interest in external action. 
It underlined that ‘partnerships’ with countries of origin and transit were needed in order 
to formulate “a comprehensive approach to migration…”34 This early policy priority has 
evolved such that the EU’s integrated border management35 policy, alongside the global 
                                                                 
30 See: Gilmour. R., & Jensen. L., Reinventing Government Accountability: Public Functions, Privatisation 
and the Meaning of State Action (1998) Public Administration Review, Vol. 58, No. 3, 247. 
31 Leyland. P., & Anthony. G., Textbook on Administrative Law (2012). Page 457. 
32 Davies. A., Government Contractors: Public or Private? (2008). Page 232. 
33 Tampere European Council, 15th and 16th October 1999. 
34 Tampere European Council (Presidency) Conclusions, 15 and 16 October 1999. Paragraph 11. 
See also: Garlick. M., The EU Discussions on Extraterritorial Processing: Solution or Conundrum? (2006) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 18 (3-4) 601. Page 611. 
35 JHA Council Conclusions, 4 and 5 of December 2006. 
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approach to migration,36 has made external action a central plank of the EU’s migration 
control and border management law and policy. More recently, in response to the mass 
influx of migrants throughout 2015, the Union legislated for a ‘Border Package,’37 a feted 
part of which was the external action element. 
A distinction may be made between how the ‘partnerships,’ as envisaged by the 
Tampere agreement, have developed.38 The distinction is between externalisation where 
an organ of a Member State implements a procedure as opposed to the external dimension 
where no immigration official of the Member State is present. With the external 
dimension,39 the EU, alongside the Member States,40 has incorporated migration into its 
relations with third countries.41 The external dimension can give rise to a third State 
                                                                 
36 The Global Approach to Migration (2005) which became the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
(2011) is the overarching framework of EU external migration and asylum. 
See: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on The Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility, COM (2011) 743 final. 
37 See: European Commission’s press release from the 15th of December 2015. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6332_en.htm 
38 This distinction is also made in: Mc Namara. F., Member State Responsibility for Migration Control 
within Third States – Externalisation Revisited (2013) European Journal of Migration and Law 15, 319. 
See a similar distinction being made in: Den Heijer. M., Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (2011). Page 
181.  
For a similar distinction, see also: Costello. C., & Moreno-Lax. V., The Extraterritorial Application of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model. Page 1658. In 
Peers. S., Hervey. T., Kenner. J., Ward. A., The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2014). 
“…we use the term ‘external’ to refer to those EU laws and policies that are directed towards third 
countries. We use the term ‘extraterritorial’ to capture the instances when those laws and policies are 
actually applied or have a direct impact on those outside the territory of the Member States of the EU. In 
this sense, ‘extraterritorial’ is a subcategory of ‘external’.” 
39 Rijpma. J., Chapter 10 - The External Dimension of EU Border Management. In Rijpma. J., Building 
Borders: The Regulatory Framework for the Management of the External Borders of the EU (2009) PhD 
Thesis, European University Institute. 
40 The external dimension of the AFSJ is not an exclusive competence of the Union, it is a shared 
competence. See: Article 4(2) (j) TFEU. On this basis Member States have continued to unilaterally 
exercise their powers in foreign policy, see: Protocol 23 to the TEU and the TFEU. For summary, see: 
Monar. J., EU’s Growing Role in AFSJ Domain: Factors, Framework and Forms of Action (2013) 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 27(1), 147.  Page 5. 
41 Alternative definition of external dimension in Garlick. M., The EU Discussions on Extraterritorial 
Processing: Solution or Conundrum? (2006) International Journal Refugee Law 18 (3-4) 601. Page 611.  
Another alternative in: Gil-Bazo. MT., The Practice of Mediterranean States in the context of the European 
Union’s Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited (2006) 
18 International Journal of Refugee Law, 3-4, 593. Page 581.  
See also: Lavenex. S., Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control. West 
European Politics (2006) Vol 29(2), 329: “The external dimension consists of the mobilisation of third 
countries to control migration flows into Europe .” 
Claire Rodier has argued that externalisation is taking over from a phase of EU foreign policy. This 
research presents that foreign policy (the external dimension) and externalisation as operating in parallel. 
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implementing compulsory powers in their migration control and border management but 
an EU immigration official will not be involved in that implementation. This is distinct 
from externalisation whose procedures necessitate that an organ of the State is present and 
involved. 
 The external dimension can facilitate externalisation. For example, internationa l 
agreements can enable the work of Immigration Liaison Officers or maritime interdic t ion 
which are prime examples of externalisation. With externalisation the State does not have 
to delegate implementation to another actor as is the case in privatisation and can be the 
case for the external dimension. The State may cooperate with a local, third State, as part 
of implementation of an externalised procedure but an organ of the State is always present. 
This presence can result in the exercise of direct control or indirect control. In this way, 
there exists another distinction within externalisation. Readmission and other such 
agreements are examples of the external dimension of the Union’s AFSJ. Of readmission 
and the resettlement of refugees, O’Nions states: “Whilst it is apparent that Member States 
retain legal responsibility for actions which are under their control, many of these 
mechanisms effectively remove the element of Member State control.” 42 The external 
dimension does not afford the State control as it has been defined here (section 1.2.1). 
 On this basis, to take an example, the EU-Turkey Statement or other similar deals 
such as the Italian-Libyan Treaty of 2008,43 cannot in and of themselves trigger legal 
responsibility as the State does not demonstrate control as is needed so as to engage a 
State’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. This is not to say that such agreements do not give rise 
to procedures that could very well lead to actions which are capable of triggering legal 
responsibility by engaging extraterritorial jurisdiction. This is made especially clear from 
                                                                 
See: Rodier. C., DG for external policies of the Union. ‘Analysis of the external dimension of the EU’s 
asylum and immigration policies’ – summary and recommendations for the European Parliament (2006). 
Boswell on the other hand voiced a distinction between what she termed externalisation and ‘preventative 
measures.’ The first term denoted forms of cooperation that essentially externalise traditional tools of 
domestic or EU migration control, thereby strengthening border controls, the latter term refers to measures 
designed to change the factors which influence people’s decisions to move or change their choice of 
destination. See: Boswell. C., The External Dimension of EU Cooperation in Immigration and Asylum 
(2003) International Affairs 619. 
42 O’Nions. H., Asylum - A Right Denied: A Critical Analysis of European Asylum Policy (2014). Page 
165-166. 
43 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Co-operation by Italy and Libya (2008). 
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this research’s consideration of maritime interdiction. While the Italian-Libyan treaty itself 
did not give rise to consideration of Italian legal responsibility, its implementa t ion 
necessitated maritime interdiction. That interdiction did give rise to a discussion as to 
Italian legal responsibility and led to the case of Hirsi44 which is a cornerstone case of this 
research and which will be considered at length in Chapter III. This is without prejudice to 
concerns was to the legality of such agreements. The legality of the agreements themselves 
can and are challenged45 but not in any way that can contribute to this research’s 
understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction as a trigger of legal responsibility which is the 
continual focus. 
The geographic distance involved in externalisation does not diminish the State’s 
ability to control but it can have a substantial impact on a migrant’s ability to access justice 
in very practical ways.46 The main legal hurdle for migrants who suffer a fundamenta l 
rights violation as a result of an externalised procedure is restrictive interpretations of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Externalised procedures give rise to fundamental questions as 
to the jurisdiction of a court before the merits of the case can be considered. The key issue 
revolves around understanding what the nature of control must be so as to have the effect 
of engaging the State’s extraterritorial jurisdiction and thereby triggering legal 
responsibility.47 The administrative reach of a State far exceeds its territorial borders.48 The 
idea that externalised procedures might circumvent legal constraints is essentially based on 
the understanding that a State’s obligations are engaged by a territorial nexus.49 Of the 
judicial systems considered in this work, the ECtHR has provided the most well developed 
jurisprudence on extraterritorial jurisdiction. Exceptions to the territorial based approach 
                                                                 
44 Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, 27765/09, [GC]. 
45 See: T-192/16, T-193/16 and T-257/16 NF, NG and NM v European Council. 
46 These practical impediments will be explored in section 5.3.1. 
47 “When, if ever, is migration control beyond EU borders tantamount to extraterritorial jurisdiction?”  
This question was asked in: Gammeltoft-Hansen. T., The Externalisation of European Migration Control and 
the Reach of International Refugee Law. Page 13. In Guild. E., Minderhoud. P., The First Decade of EU 
Migration and Asylum Law (2010)  
48 Noll. G., Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry under International Law? (2005) International 
Journal Refugee Law, 17 (3), 542. Page 567. 
49 Cremona. M., and Rijpma. J., The Extra-Territorialisation of EU Migration Policies and the Rule of Law 
(2007) Working Paper No.1, European University Institute. Page 17. 
See also: Gil-Bazo. MT., The Practice of Mediterranean States in the context of the European Union’s 
Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited (2006) 18 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 3-4, 593. 
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to extraterritorial jurisdiction have emerged with varying degrees of clarity. One can now 
pronounce with certainty that the ECHR is not territorially bounded and that its jurisdic t ion 
is, at least to a certain degree, “…tied to the power of governance by the authorities over 
people not by the map.”50 Chapter III explores the extraterritorial jurisdiction’s complex 
jurisprudence in the UK domestic courts, the ECtHR and also considers the potential for 
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in an extraterritorial setting by the CJEU.  
1.4 Conclusion – The Commensurability of Responsibility to 
Control 
This chapter set out the conceptual framework of this work. Both control and legal 
responsibility, in the context of externalisation and privatisation, have been considered. 
This conceptual framework serves as the basis for an analysis of the courts ability to ensure 
that State control triggers consideration of State legal responsibility as appropriate. One 
might ask whether the State’s obligation to secure a migrant’s rights is commensurate with 
the extent of their control of the procedure in question?51 Consideration of this question 
can only be made once the key concepts are defined and understood, thus providing a 
framework of analysis by which to approach the nature of control and its effect and in 
finding whether control should be the key guidance for legal responsibility at all. 
States have the right to enforce migration control and border management but this right is 
tempered by the obligation to refrain from the implementation of procedures in ways which 
could endanger the fundamental rights of migrants.52 The nature by which the State 
implements a rights-violating procedure decides legal effect i.e. whether the State will be 
made legally responsible for that violation. Chapters III and IV will examine the degree to 
which legal responsibility has been commensurate with the control exerted by the State, 
especially with regard to the exercise of indirect control. Chapter V will set out doctrinal 
solutions which themselves represent a critique of the court’s use of State control to trigger 
consideration of State legal responsibility. 
                                                                 
50 Guild. E., Security and European Human Rights: Protecting Individual Rights in Times of Exception and 
Military Action (2007). Page 18. 
51 See: Coomans. F., & Kamminga. T., Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (2004). Page 
105. 
52 Mc Namara. F., Member State Responsibility for Migration Control within Third States – Externalisation 
Revisited (2013) European Journal of Migration and Law, 15, 319. Page 334. 
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II. Externalisation and Privatisation: The 
Procedures 
2.1 Introduction – A Description 
This chapter examines several examples of migration control and border management 
procedures which take place in an externalised setting or which are implemented by a 
private actor. This chapter by no means represents an exhaustive list of the procedures 
which have been privatised or externalised nor is it a meticulous investigation of each 
particular procedure. Such an examination is beyond the scope of this work. Likewise, the 
externalised and privatised procedures examined in this research vary in their application 
and in how they are addressed by the Member States, even where harmonising legisla t ion 
has been issued. Nonetheless, this chapter is not a simple descriptive work in which the 
basic functioning of the procedures in question are outlined; the objective in examining 
each of these procedures is to gain an understanding of the nature of the control that certain 
procedures afford to the State. This entails an examination of the legislative basis of a given 
procedure or, if applicable, its more informal genesis. It also requires scrutiny of how the 
procedure works in practice. 
  This chapter next turns to examine privatisation through contract (2.2) and 
considers two different privatised procedures in this context – privatised detention and 
privatised return escorts. It then turns to privatisation by sanction and in this context 
examines employer sanctions and carrier sanctions (2.3). The fourth section considers 
externalised procedures (2.4) – maritime interdiction processing and immigration liaison 
officers. The final section (2.5) concludes this deliberation upon privatised and externalised 
procedures with some general thoughts on the typical nature of the control afforded to the 
State through these procedures. That nature is crucial to the following chapters’ 
consideration of the effect of the control afforded to the State by externalised or privatised 
procedures (Chapters III and IV). 
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2.2 Contracted Privatisation  
This section examines two procedures of migration control and border management that 
are implemented by a private actor after having been delegated to that private actor through 
contract.1 They have also been chosen on the basis that they represent ‘classic’ privatisat ion 
through contract and because of their prominence. The procedures examined in this section 
are the privatised detention of irregular migrants and the privatised escort of migrants being 
returned to their countries of origin or to countries of transit. Both procedures have been 
regularly contracted to private security firms across Europe, especially in the UK. 
2.2.1 Detention 
In January 2013, Alois Dvorzac, an 84 year old naturalised Canadian citizen of Slovenian 
origin, was refused entry and detained at Gatwick airport in the UK and was subsequently 
moved to the private detention centre at Harmondsworth. Mr Dvorzac, a retired electrical 
engineer, suffered from dementia and it is not clear how he came to travel to the UK but it 
is supposed that his intention was to travel back to visit his family in his native Slovenia. 
Two weeks after that initial entry refusal and his subsequent detention, Mr Dvorzac was 
taken to hospital in handcuffs and chained to an employee of the private security firm Geo. 
When paramedics and doctors voiced their surprise at these seemingly excessive restraint 
measures, they were told it was “Home Office procedures.”2 By the time he died he had 
spent the previous five hours restrained by handcuffs, had complained of chest pains and 
had asked to be released.3 Mr Dvorzac passed away while wearing handcuffs and one of 
the custody officers working for the private firm Geo stated at the inquest that the handcuffs 
were only taken off “when they realised he had stopped breathing.”4 
Mr Dvorzac had been detained with the intention of removing him from the UK 
despite the fact that a doctor who examined him had declared him unfit for detention, unfit 
for removal and in need of care. A prison’s inspectorate report detailing the detention stated 
                                                                 
1 Among those contracted by the UK Home Office are: Serco Limited; Mitie Care and Custody Limited; 
G4S; GEO Group. 
2 O’Carroll. L., Man, 84, awaiting deportation died in handcuffs ‘due to Home Office rules’. The Guardian, 
27th October 2015. 
3 O’Brien. P., Left to die in British detention: who was Alois Dvorzac? Channel 4 News, 18th March 2014.  
4 O’Carroll. L., Man, 84, awaiting deportation died in handcuffs ‘due to Home Office rules’. The Guardian,  
27th October 2015.  
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that Mr Dvorzac had been “…needlessly handcuffed in an excessive and unacceptable 
way…”5 Mark Harper who at that time was the UK immigration Minister, stated: “The use 
of restraint in this case seems completely unjustified and must not be repeated. Clear 
instructions have been issued making clear that restraint should only happen where 
absolutely necessary.”6 A spokesman for Geo stated: “Managers have to use discretion to 
take difficult decisions and we have issued them with additional guidance.”7 The case 
illustrates the expectations that are commonly placed on what has traditionally been a 
public responsibility – the detention of a migrant – and the failure of a private actor to live 
up to those expectations. 
2.2.1.1 Background 
Detention of irregular migrants8 is no longer regulated solely at the national level.9 The 
Reception Conditions Directive10 and the Returns Directive11 both contribute to setting out 
a harmonised approach for EU Member States for the detention of third country nationa ls.  
Detention pending removal is dealt with by the Returns Directive and any other form of 
administrative detention, most likely detention pending an asylum application,12 is dealt 
with by the Reception Directive.13 
                                                                 
5 Travis. A., Detention centre castigated over death of elderly man. The Guardian, 16th of January 2014.  
6 Travis. A., Detention centre castigated over death of elderly man. The Guardian, 16th of January 2014.  
7 Travis. A., Detention centre castigated over death of elderly man. The Guardian, 16th of January 2014.  
8 For general reference, see: Bosworth. M., Inside Immigration Detention (2014). 
See also: Wilsher. D., Immigration Detention - Law, History, Politics (2011). 
9 See the Geneva based Global Detention Project for an overview at a national level:  
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/home.html 
10 Original Directive: Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for 
the reception of asylum seekers. 
Recast: Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down 
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast). 
11 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third -country nationals. 
See also: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on EU Return 
Policy COM (2014) 199 final. 
See: CONTENTION Project, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute. Available at: 
http://contention.eu/ 
And: REDIAL Project, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute. Available at: 
http://euredial.eu/ 
12 For consideration of the effect of an asylum application on detention pending return, see: C-534/11, 
Arslan. 
13 The recast Reception Conditions Directive entered into force on the 21st of July 2015 and goes into much 
greater depth than its predecessor on the subject of detention. See: Directive 2013/33/EU of the European 
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The UK opted out of the Returns Directive, opted in to the original Reception 
Directive but opted out of the recast version of that Directive. In the UK alone, in 2015, 
32,400 people entered immigration detention.14 The vast majority of this detention was 
carried out on the basis of an administrative decision taken by a Home Office official rather 
than on the basis of an order made by a court. At the same time, the UK leads the way in 
the privatisation of immigration detention centres in the EU – Seven of the UK’s eleven 
immigration detention centres are run by the private sector.15 This compares to around ten 
per cent of the UK’s prisons.16  
Privatised detention on this scale is not reflective of the overall picture in the EU.  
Certain Member States have privatised some or all of their detention facilitie s. While 
acknowledging that privatisation can be difficult to identify and track within individua l 
Member States, the Global Detention Project have stated that Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Ireland, Estonia, Italy, France, Portugal, 
Finland, and Germany have all privatised some form of immigration detention at some 
point.17  
2.2.1.2 In Practice 
Privatisation in detention can include both operational and bureaucratic characteristic s. 18 
The management of a facility could be privately run while the facility itself remains in 
public hands. A private actor who is contracted to provide security services might sub-
contract part of the basic services to another private actor. The permutations are endless. 
The focus here is on the privatisation of the security aspect of detention which involves the 
                                                                 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the recep tion of applicants for 
international protection (recast). 
14 The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford. Available at: 
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/immigration-detention-in-the-uk/ 
15 Global Detention Project. Available at: http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/united-
kingdom 
16 It is commonly held that this is because immigration detention is seen as administrative detention while 
prisons are seen as being punitive in nature and therefore more in need of the State’s direct supervision . For 
commentary on the reasons for migrant detention being privatised on such a scale, see: Bacon. C., The 
Evolution of Immigration Detention in the UK: The Involvement of Private Prison Companies (2005) 
Working Paper No. 27, University of Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre. 
17 Flynn. M., & Cannon. C., The Privatization of Immigration Detention: Towards a Global View (2009) 
Working Paper, Global Detention Project. Page 4. 
18 Flynn. M., Immigration Detention and Proportionality (2011) Working Paper No. 4, Global Detention 
Project 
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private enforcement of compulsory powers. The initial decision to detain can be 
administrative or judicial in nature.19 Despite often being called ‘illegal’ migrants, 
inadequately documented migrants that are detained are generally not convicted crimina ls, 
or even remand prisoners awaiting trial.20 Rather, like Mr Dvorzac, they are usually 
administrative detainees, people who are not charged with a crime but whom the State has 
decided to detain in order to carry out administrative procedures which concern them, like 
deportations or decisions on asylum claims.21  
In the UK, the framework for privatised detention rests upon contracts that are put 
up for tender by the State. The best bid wins the contract and security firms compete with 
each other in bidding for contracts. The contracts are released to the public but the part 
which deals with compulsory powers is redacted.22 Incidents of fundamental rights 
violations stem from the improper application of compulsory powers. There have been 
some high-profile instances of abuse by the personnel of security firms that have been 
contracted to detain migrants.23 The anecdotal evidence of the abuse or misuse of 
compulsory powers is overwhelming. Then, there have also been instances of downright 
criminal behaviour of individuals employed by the private actor to work in detention. 
Revelations in 201324 as to serious sexual harassment of a female detainee by an employee 
                                                                 
19 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down 
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast). Article 9(2) and (3). 
20 See: Quieroz. MB., Illegally Staying in the EU - An analysis of illegality in EU migration law (2015) 
PhD Thesis, European University Institute. 
21 Flynn. M., & Cannon. C., The Privatization of Immigration Detention: Towards a Global View (2009) 
Working Paper, Global Detention Project. Page 3. 
22 See Freedom of Information requests listed in Annex I. 
23 An example from Germany: Meiritz. A., & Weiland. S., Mutmaßliche Misshandlung: Schockbilder 
entfachen Debatte über Flüchtlingsheime. Spiegel Online, 29th of September 2014. 
Statement in reply to this incident from the German Federal Government website. Available at: 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/IB/Artikel/Asyl-Fluechtlinge/2014-09-29-Vorfaelle-
Asylbewerberunterkunft.html;jsessionid=514EFAFBFE9350BCCF93AB47D69C1976.s4t2 
See also: Hill. J., German police probe abuse at Burbach asylum centre. BBC News, 29th of September 
2016. 
Finally, see also: Atlas of Torture, Germany: Footage shows “pictures that we only know from 
Guantanamo,” Human Dignity and Public Security team of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human 
Rights (BIM) in Vienna, 29th of September 2016. 
24 Townsend. M., Sexual abuse allegations corroborated at Yarl's Wood immigration centre, The Guardian, 
21st of September 2013. 
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of the security firm Serco was compounded by that firm’s failure to adequately investigate 
the allegations made.25  
 
2.2.2 Escorts for Return 
On the 12th of October 2010, Mr Jimmy Mubenga died in Heathrow airport in London. 26 
Mr Mubenga had been forced to board a commercial airline by escorts working for G4S – 
the private security firm who were contracted by the UK Border Agency to carry out 
returns.27 The airline carrier was beginning its journey to Angola when Mr Mubenga began 
resisting his removal and the G4S personnel started to exert restraint.28 At the time of 
Jimmy Mubenga’s death, G4S had a bonus system in place which incentivised its 
employees to stop returnees from causing disturbances on-board the plane facilitating the 
deportation. Several passengers of the airline witnessed the removal attempt, including Mr 
Mubenga’s resistance to boarding and, once on board, his cries that he could not breathe. 
In the immediate aftermath of his death, the now disbanded UK Border Agency mainta ined 
that it was a matter for the security firm.29 Two weeks after Jimmy Mubenga’s death G4S 
lost its contract with the UKBA for carrying out deportation orders.  However, the UKBA 
did not revert to public execution of deportations but instead contracted another private 
security firm to carry out the work. The entire staff of G4S were transferred to the new 
firm, Reliance, which had underbid G4S for the contract to provide removal services to the 
UKBA. At the time G4S stated that they “…believe that at all times we acted appropriately 
                                                                 
25 Grandjean. G., et al. Yarl's Wood sex abuse allegations: 'They are treating us like animals' – video. The 
Guardian, 17th of May 2014. 
26 The author previously considered the Jimmy Mubenga case in a journal article. See: Mc Namara. F., Do 
good fences make good neighbours? This Century’s Review (2014) Vol. 3. 
27 Verkaik. R., Private security firms should face investigation, says former prisons chief. The Independent, 
16th of October 2010. 
28 The same restraint techniques that were used on Jimmy Mubenga were condemned by the coroner of 
another inquest. That was the inquest of Gareth Myatt in 2004, a teenager who had died while being 
restrained in the same fashion. The coroner instructed the Home Office to issue a warning about the use of 
those restraint techniques. See: Ramsbottom. D., Why the Jimmy Mubenga trial matters. Open Democracy 
UK, 21st of March 2014. 
29 See: Verkaik. R., Security firm accused of abusing deportees sacked. The Independent, 30th of October 
2010. 
See also: Amnesty International UK. Out of Control: The case for a complete overhaul of enforced 
removals by private contractors (2011). Page 12. 
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and in full compliance with the terms of our contract”30 and later argued that its employees 
had inadequately implemented its instructions. Finally, those employees denied culpability. 
The Crown Prosecution Service investigated the death and initially arrested the three G4S 
employees involved but did not press any charges against G4S or its employees – a decision 
which was roundly criticised at the time.31 The jury in Mr Mubenga’s inquest returned a 
verdict of “unlawful killing” after an eight-week hearing but did not make a finding as to 
the responsibility of each of the actors involved – the State, G4S, G4S employees.32 In July 
2013, in light of “all new evidence” which emerged from the inquest, the Crown 
Prosecution Service announced that the three employees of G4S were to be charged with 
manslaughter. In December 2014, more than four years after Mr Mubenga’s death, the 
three G4S employees were found not guilty of his manslaughter 
2.2.2.1 Background 
The EU attempted to harmonise Member State removals through the Return Directive in 
2008. The Directive establishes a common minimum set of procedural safeguards on 
decisions related to return which are meant “to guarantee effective protection of the 
interests of the individuals concerned.”33 The Return Directive sets out that removal may 
be enforced as a last resort by the use of compulsory powers (it refers to “coercive 
measures”) but that these measures must be proportional, not exceed reasonable force and 
be in accordance with human rights and the dignity and integrity of the person concerned. 34 
Frontex has been charged with coordinating return activities.35 According to Frontex’s 
                                                                 
30 Jimmy Mubenga: G4S guards face plane death charges . BBC News, 20th of March 2014. 
31 See: Jimmy Mubenga: G4S guards face plane death charges. BBC News, 20th of March 2014. For 
criticism of this decision, see: Lord Ramsbottom speaking in the UK House of Lords debate, 19th of July 
2012. Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/120719-
0002.htm#12071967000298 
For further commentary, see: Sambrook. C., Lord Ramsbotham attacks 'perverse' decision not to prosecute 
G4S over Mubenga death. Open Democracy UK, 10th of July 2013. 
32 Taylor. M., Jimmy Mubenga: three G4S guards to be charged with manslaughter. The Guardian, 20th of 
March 2014. 
33 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third -country nationals. Recital 
11. 
34 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third -country nationals. Article 
8(4). 
35Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament 
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2016 risk analysis, 286,725 return decisions were made in the EU in 2015. This represented 
a 14% increase from 2014. However, the figure is likely to be actually much higher as no 
data was available from a number of Member States including France, the Netherlands and 
Sweden. There were 175,220 “effective returns”36 in 2015. For these roughly one hundred 
and seventy-five thousand people, 47% were reported as being on a voluntary basis and 
41% were forced returns. The type of return was not specified for the remaining 12%. The 
European Border and Coast Guard Regulation37 expands the agency’s role in returns by 
providing for a pool of forced return escorts.38 That Regulation references the provision 
from the Return Directive39 which states that “coercive measures” must be used only as a 
last resort and must be proportionate. The European Border and Coast Guard Regulat ion 
also provides that escorts remain subject to the disciplinary measures of their home 
Member State in the course of all return operations undertaken.40 
The Commission’s communication on return policy41 stated that the Return 
Directive has been “a driver for change in forced return monitoring.”42 Eleven out of 
fourteen Member States now take account of the EU guidelines on forced returns by air.43 
The report states that seven Member States were not compliant with the obligation to set 
                                                                 
and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. Articles 27 – 33. 
36 Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2016. Page 34. 
37 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. 
38 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. Article 30. 
39 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third -country nationals. Article 
8(4). 
40 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. Article 30(5). 
41 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on EU Return Policy 
COM (2014) 199 final. 
42 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on EU Return Policy.  
COM (2014) 199 final. Page 21. 
43 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on EU Return Policy.  
COM (2014) 199 final. Page 21. 
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up a forced return monitoring system and the Commission had started related EU Pilot 
procedures.44 The report also states that there is a broad split between those States which 
monitor removals through ombudsmen or authorities that are tied into the national Ministry 
and those States which monitor through human rights NGOs.45 The report did not provide 
detailed statistics as to the percentage of returns by Member States which are actually 
monitored, and as to whether any complaints have been made as to the treatment received 
by irregular migrants during removals.46 Neither did the report give any breakdown of what 
kind of compulsory powers are employed and how frequently they are resorted to in each 
Member State. The Commission’s report is also lacking information as to whether removal 
operations have been proportionate and have used only reasonable force, were consistent 
with fundamental rights and observed the dignity and physical integrity of irregular 
migrants.47  
2.2.2.2 In Practice 
Subject to the law, it is the prerogative of the State to decide who will be returned and when 
it will happen. Just as was the case with detention, it is the exercise of compulsory powers 
which gives rise to the most risk of violations. While a return which represents refoulement 
is still clearly the legal responsibility of the State, a rights violation arising out of the 
exercise of compulsory powers is not categorically the State’s responsibility. This is 
particularly true when the escorts to a return are the employees of a private actor rather 
than the State. 
 The UK’s system of escorts for returns has been completely privatised. 
According to figures provided by the now defunct UK Border Agency to the House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee, compulsory powers have only been exercised in a 
                                                                 
44 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on EU Return Policy.  
COM (2014) 199 final. Page 21. 
45 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on EU Return Policy.  
COM (2014) 199 final. Page 21. 
46 Peers. S., The EU’s Returns Directive: Does it improve or worsen the lives of irregular migrants?  (2014) 
EU Law Analysis. Available at: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2014/03/the-eus-returns-directive-does-
it.html 
47 Peers. S., The EU’s Returns Directive: Does it improve or worsen the lives of irregular migrants?  (2014) 
EU Law Analysis. Available at: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2014/03/the-eus-returns-directive-does-
it.html 
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small minority of returns undertaken in the UK.48 Nevertheless, the Committee was 
investigating the use of force during removals in light of the claims made in the 
Outsourcing Abuse report written by Birnberg Peirce, Medical Justice and the National 
Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns.49 The Immigration Act of 2014 extended the 
power to use force during returns.50 The suggestion was made during debates on the 
Immigration Act that “…the problem is that the Home Office has delegated all use of force 
to the contracting companies without overseeing it or insisting that anyone do so.”51 The 
few reports into monitoring that have been done52 add credence to the belief that there is a 
problem with the disproportionate use of force during removal. Immediate reaction to 
Jimmy Mubenga’s death mainly focussed on a review of the ‘restraint techniques’ used by 
the employees of the private security firm. Obviously, it would be naive to argue that the 
replacement of these employees of a private actor with employees of the State would 
automatically guarantee that deportees would receive better treatment. Nevertheless, the 
performance of employees of State would inevitably be more transparent and accountable 
than those of a private security firm.  
In general, State practice of reception and return of migrants is carefully monitored 
by NGO’s, civil society and academia. The exercise of compulsory powers causing death 
will obviously draw investigation. Less obvious injuries can still represent a violation of 
rights. The ability to monitor private enterprise is a much more arduous task. In the UK, 
the death of Jimmy Mubenga was the first death to occur during enforced removal since 
                                                                 
48 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee Report. Rules  Governing Enforced Removals from the 
UK. Eighteenth Report of session 2010-12. Paragraph 3. 
49 Birnberg Peirce & Partners, Medical Justice, National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns, 
Outsourcing Abuse: The Use and Misuse of State-sanctioned Force during the Detention and Removal of 
Asylum Seekers (2008) 
50 Immigration Act 2014. Schedule 1. 
51 House of Lords debate on Immigration Act 2014, 3rd March 2014. Clause 2: Enforcement powers. 
Amendment 12. Moved by Lord Rosser. Column 1143. Amendment 12 suggested oversight powers for 
certain authorities such as HM Inspector of Prisons, was withdrawn. 
52 See: Amnesty International UK. Out of Control: The case for a complete overhaul of enforced removals 
by private contractors (2011). 
See: Birnberg Peirce, Medical Justice and the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns Report: 
Outsourcing Abuse - The use and misuse of State-sanctioned force during the Detention and Removal of 
Asylum Seekers (2008). 
Also see: Baroness O’Loan: Report to the UK Border Agency on “Outsourcing Abuse” (2010). 
Finally, see: HM Inspectorate of Prisons Report: A Thematic Review on Detainee Escorts and Removals 
(2009).  
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Mrs Joy Gardner died after being gagged and restrained by officers from the Metropolitan 
Police's specialist deportation squad at her home in London in 1993. The officers involved 
in Mrs Gardner's death were found not guilty of manslaughter at a subsequent trial but the 
specialist deportation squad was disbanded and the job of carrying out forced deportations 
was from then on contracted out by the State. It was only after Mr. Mubenga’s death that a 
public review of private security firms’ conduct was initiated. That review exposed many 
questionable practices by the private actor involved such as the system of bonus payments 
that rewarded guards if they could keep a detainee quiet until the aircraft took off. A system 
of transparent procedures conducted by the State with a clear chain of command would at 
least ensure that the State does everything it can to avoid rights breaches. It would also 
offer a better opportunity for rights breaches to be reported and dealt with which would 
help foster a fairer and more accountable system of removal. 
2.2.3 The Nature of Control through Contract 
Migrant detention and removal, the two most prominent procedures that have been 
privatised by contract are not new procedures. Accordingly, their implementation by 
private actors represent the traditional understanding of privatisation as being a transfer of 
public power to the private sector. The private actors involved are very much for profit, are 
all specialised in security and won contracts that were tendered by the UK Home Office. 
This specialisation in security is a prerequisite to the implementation of procedures that are 
privatised by contract, because those procedures include the use of compulsory powers.  
The Home Office’s policy and method in releasing the details of contracts are less 
than straightforward. The Home Office does release some of its contracts through its 
‘contractsfinder’ search portal – albeit redacted versions.53 Annex I details correspondence 
between the author and the Home Office. This correspondence eventually led to access to 
the contracts between the Home Office and several private security firms for a diverse 
range of services all of which are “looking to maximise the efficient use of its [the UK 
Home Office] immigration estate.”54 The author managed to secure further disclosure of 
                                                                 
53 The UK Home Office’s ‘contractsfinder’ search portal is difficult to navigate. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder 
54 Quoted from the ‘Gatwick Re-tender Project’ which was an open tender requesting expressions of 
interest from private security firms to bid for a “Contract for the provision of operational, management and 
47 | P a g e  
 
contracts through correspondence. The contract which exists between the Home Office and 
Serco “for the provision of operation, management and maintenance services at Yarl's 
Wood Immigration Removal Centre” between November 2014 and April 202255 is typical 
of such contracts. That contract is worth £70,000,000.56 Many aspects of that contract were 
made available such as the schedules for maintenance and cleaning and for financial reports 
and audit rights.57 However, the schedules which one would expect to be most likely to 
deal with the crucial issue of the limits on compulsory powers for the firm’s employees are 
“exempt from disclosure.” 58 Schedule D (Operational Requirement) is key in this regard, 
as can be gleaned from Schedule G (Performance Evaluation) which states that one 
“Performance Standard” for Serco is a “Failure to follow agreed processes and approved 
techniques and restraints during use of force as listed in schedule D.”59 When compulsory 
powers are used, Serco must issue a report to the “UK Manager” within 24 hours of the 
incident. The contract also states, quite broadly, that Serco must operate and manage the 
Removal Centre in accordance with the Human Rights Act.60 A general demand that the 
private actor that is contracted to carry out a procedure, does so in accordance with the 
State’s fundamental rights obligations has, in practice, not prevented violations in 
implementation by that private actor. Gaps appear between instructions to abide by human 
rights obligations and implementation on the ground by the private actor’s employees and 
by any sub-contractors.61  
                                                                 
maintenance services at Tinsley House Immigration Removal Centre, Brook House Immigration Removal 
Centre and Cedars Pre-Departure Accommodation.”  
Available at: https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/d0f3ed51-4746-4971-b619-d57c322db7c3 
55 The Yarl’s Wood contract. 
Available at: https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/02227540-2d38-461a-b53c-d344f8738ab9 
56 This figure is not exceptional; an eight year contract for the operation, management and maintenance of 
Colnbrook and Harmondsworth Removal Centres was worth £181,023,729. Available at: 
https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/6f06e335-cd7d-4bca-9514-43af3602385a 
57 Schedule C and Schedule T respectively. Available at: 
https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/02227540-2d38-461a-b53c-d344f8738ab9 
58 Schedule E – Contingency and Emergency Procedures . Schedule D – Operational Requirement. 
Available at: https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/02227540-2d38-461a-b53c-d344f8738ab9 
59 Schedule G – Performance Evaluation. Available at: 
https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/02227540-2d38-461a-b53c-d344f8738ab9 
60 Yarl's Wood IRC Final Contract - Terms & Conditions - Redacted version. Available at: 
https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/02227540-2d38-461a-b53c-d344f8738ab9 
61 Birnberg Peirce & Partners, Medical Justice, National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns, 
Outsourcing Abuse: The Use and Misuse of State-sanctioned Force during the Detention and Removal of 
Asylum Seekers (2008). 
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 The State can control its relationship with the private security firm from the start 
through the contract. Contract as a method of service delivery offers flexibility to the State 
in how to set out the terms of reference for the implementation of a procedure to suit the 
needs of the public authorities as they understand those needs. Contracting by tender means 
that the private security firms which compete for the contracts must abide by the State’s 
terms of reference or drop out of the race. Presumably private actors’ greatest tool in this 
competition is to lower their price. It stands to reason that undercutting each other in such 
a competitive environment inevitably leads to threats to the quality of the service that they 
are capable of delivering. Continued State control of privatised detention in the UK is 
evidenced by the permanent presence of officers of the Home Office on-site, which the 
Home Office refer to as their “Oversight team.”62  
The human rights obligations in implementation of a procedure under these 
contracts are sometimes publicly called into question as a result of a particular tragedy 
which occurs in the care of the firm. The State responds to these tragedies with statements 
that promise to review standards just as in the case of Minister Harper’s response to Mr 
Dvorzac’s death considered above.63 Such reviews have not resulted in tangible changes in 
the contracts as far as can be publicly seen and it may be questioned whether they make 
any material difference in practice. In November 2015, less than a month after the inquest 
into the death of Alois Dvorzac, the Home Office were accused of breaching their new 
rules by using handcuffs to bring detainees to the hospital.64 The Home Office, had 
promised that new controls on the use of handcuffs would implemented in light of a 
damning report of the prison ombudsman65 as to the failings that led to Mr Dvorzac’s death. 
The contracts between the Home Office and the relevant private companies lack clearly 
defined lines of accountability for serious errors and do not touch upon legal responsibility 
                                                                 
62 UK Parliament Live Television Home Affairs Committee public hearing, 24th of June 2014. Available at: 
http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=15608&st=15:54:00 
63 For another example, see: Taylor. D., Detention centre failures contributed to death of asylum seeker, 
inquest finds, The Guardian, 25th of May 2012. 
64 O’Carroll. L., Home Office accused of breaking rules on cuffing asylum seekers. The Guardian, 9th of 
November 2015. 
65 A Report by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman Nigel Newcomen CBE. Investigation into the death 
of a man on 10 February 2013 while a detainee at Harmondsworth Immigration Removal Centre. July 
2014. Available at: http://www.ppo.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/H176-13-Death-of-a-male-
detainee-in-hospital_Harmondsworth-IRC_10.02.13_Nat.pdf 
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for fundamental rights violations which occur as a direct result of the implementation of 
compulsory powers. Media reports follow a familiar pattern of condemnation coming from 
the Home Office or a government Minister and a response from the private actor which 
avows that the occurrence was exceptional and its procedures will be reviewed and 
reformed accordingly. However, it is difficult to tell the extent to which there is any change 
in practice. 
With a contracted relationship, the scope is there for wholly private internal review 
of procedures while public involvement is limited to condemnation and a demand for 
improved service delivery. There is no evidence of contracts being subject to fundamenta l 
rights standards and being suspended in the event that those standards are not met. With 
contract, the State continues to effectively control traditionally public tasks such as 
detention and removal but it is the private actor which is on the front-line and takes 
criticism and face most tort actions which arise. It is difficult to see how “the mere fact of 
contracting out a function can change its nature from public to private: if a function is 
regarded as public when delivered by a local authority in-house, it should equally be 
regarded as public under the HRA when contracted out to be performed by a private 
organisation on the local authority's behalf.”66  
2.3 Enforced Privatisation 
This section examines two procedures of migration control and border management that 
are implemented by a private actor under threat of sanction. The procedures examined in 
this section are Employer Sanctions and Carrier Sanctions. Both procedures are examples 
of enforced privatisation. They have not been privatised in the traditional sense of there 
being a public to private transfer of any kind. These procedures were never undertaken by 
the public authorities. Rather, they are new forms of migration control and border 
management which rely upon private actors for their very existence. 
                                                                 
66 Williams. A., Public authorities: what is a hybrid public authority under the HRA? Page 51. In  
Hoffman. D., The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (2011). 
See also: Craig. P., Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial review (2002) Law 
Quarterly Review, 118, 551. Page 556. 
50 | P a g e  
 
2.3.1 Employer Sanctions 
In April of 2013, two hundred migrant workers whom were working on a strawberry farm 
near the town of Manolada on the Peloponnese peninsula in Greece; gathered to demand 
six months of back pay that they were owed. The farmers shot at the workers, seriously 
wounding twenty-eight of them. Fast-forward to July 2014 and a Greek court acquitted two 
of the farmers for the role that they played in the violence and although it convicted two 
others, it freed them pending an appeal. They were eventually fined and served no jail 
time.67 Unscrupulous employers across the EU hire migrants and typically offer them 
extremely low wages and provide poor working conditions in terms of safety, training or 
any other expected standards that are placed on normal employers. The Union’s response 
to the employment of irregular migrants is of interest in this section. 
2.3.1.1 Background 
The EU’s Employer Sanctions Directive68 represents the typical arrangements by which 
the procedure is implemented. 69 Criticism of the Directive has been vociferous with 
censure focused mainly upon the accusation that the Directive is based upon a great 
assumption. That assumption is that the supposed ease with which migrants can gain 
employment represents the great pull factor for irregular migrants to the EU. The Directive 
targets the eradication of such ‘illegal’ employment.70 Condemnation has also been voiced 
that the Directive does not adequately address the protection of migrants’ fundamenta l 
rights so much as the “…fight against illegal immigration into the EU…”71 While Article 
6(2)(a) and (5) of the Directive relate to procedures which ensure that employers must pay 
                                                                 
67 Smith. H., Greek court acquits farmers who shot 28 Bangladeshi strawberry pickers , The Guardian, 31st 
of July 2014. 
See also: PICUM Position Paper. Employer’s Sanctions: Impacts on Undocumented Migrant Workers’ 
Rights in Four EU Countries (2015). Page 9. 
68 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for 
minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third -country 
nationals. 
69 For a summary of the Directive’s provisions, see: Boeles. P., Den Heijer. M., Lodder. G., & Wouters. K., 
European Migration Law (2014). Page 397. 
70 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for 
minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third -country 
nationals. Recital 2. 
71 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for 
minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third -country 
nationals. Recital 2. 
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any outstanding wages which are due to the third country national who gave rise to the 
sanctions on that employer, very few Member States (only Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and 
Slovenia as of May 2014) have actually “explicitly transposed the right of illegally 
employed migrants to make a claim against their employer for any outstanding 
remuneration…”72 The UK opted out of this Directive but have their own regime of 
sanctions for employers.73 The Directive ensures that the employer will be held to account 
for a “lack of supervision or control” over the hiring of irregular migrants.74 It provides 
for minimum common standards on fines and other measures (disqualification from public 
benefits, etc.75) and, in serious cases, criminal penalties against the employers of third 
country nationals.76  
Under the Directive, before recruiting a third-country national, employers are required 
to check that they are authorised to stay, and to notify the relevant national authority if they 
are not.77 Employers have access to information that the public authorities, in normal 
circumstances, would not be able to access. How Member States place responsibilities on 
private sector actors for the management of immigration controls has been referred to as 
being “the key issue of the Directive…”78 The Directive takes a strong position on this: 
                                                                 
72 See: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and 
measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals COM (2014) 286 final.  
See also: Joint Report - Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), 
European Network Against Racism (ENAR) & SOLIDAR. Employers' Sanctions Directive: Will migrant 
workers pay the price of their exploitation? (2008). 
73 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for 
minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third -country 
nationals. Recital 38. 
See also: UK Government service and information website. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/penalties-for-
employing-illegal-workers 
74 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for 
minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third -country 
nationals. Article 11(2). 
75 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for 
minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third -country 
nationals. Recital 18. Article 7(1)(a). 
76 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for 
minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third -country 
nationals. Recital 21-25. Article 9-11. 
77 Press Release – European Commission. Sanctioning employers of irregular migrants: Commission urges 
three Member States to act. Brussels, 27 February 2012. 
78 Peers. S., Guild. E., Acosta Arcarazo. D., Groenendijk. K., Moreno-Lax. V., & Tomkin. J., EU 
Immigration and Asylum Law (2015). Page 443. 
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“employers are part of the system of immigration controls and must participate…”79 
Article 14 of the Directive provides that Member States shall ensure that effective and 
adequate inspections by State representatives are carried out to “control” the employment 
of illegally staying third country nationals.80 In any case, the State has the ability to dictate 
the precise terms of implementation through its domestic legislation. In parallel, it holds 
the power to control just how that implementation is being done in a very practical sense. 
The emphasis of harmonisation within the Directive is in setting minimum levels and 
several Member States have actually decided to go “…beyond the scope of the Directive, 
applying it also to third-country nationals who are legally-staying but whose residence 
permit does not allow them to perform an economic activity.”81 
2.3.1.2 In Practice 
Employer sanctions are enforced through a threat of sanction for non-compliance or for 
inadequate compliance. The primary method of sanction is a financial fine but sanction is 
not limited to this. Gathering the necessary private information can be quite challenging 
for an employer as former UK Minister of State for Immigration, Mark Harper, found to 
his cost. Mr Harper was steering a controversial immigration bill through the UK House of 
Commons, part of which warned employers that they had a duty to check the status of their 
employees, when he was forced to resign.82 Harper’s resignation stemmed from the 
discovery that his self-employed cleaner of seven years did not have permission to work in 
the UK.83 As Harper learned, it is not always easy for an employer to ensure that all of his 
or her employees are legally resident. Added to this is the fact that many employment 
sectors, and particularly those which rely on employing migrants “such as construction, 
                                                                 
79 Peers. S., Guild. E., Acosta Arcarazo. D., Groenendijk. K., Moreno-Lax. V., & Tomkin. J., EU 
Immigration and Asylum Law (2015). Page 443. 
80 Peers. S., Guild. E., Acosta Arcarazo. D., Groenendijk. K., Moreno-Lax. V., & Tomkin. J., EU 
Immigration and Asylum Law (2015). Page 442. 
81 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of 
Directive 2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measu res against 
employers of illegally staying third-country nationals COM (2014) 286 final. 
 
82 Immigration Act 2014. Tougher sanctions for employers of irregular migrants have been introduced to 
the UK with the Immigration Act 2016. 
83 Townsend. M., Immigration Minister Mark Harper resigns over illegal immigrant cleaner. The Guardian, 
9th of February 2014. 
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agriculture, cleaning and hotel/catering,”84 also rely extensively upon sub-contractors to 
perform the work. The very industries in which sub-contracting abounds are those which 
have been targeted as being particularly concentrated with ‘illegal’ employment. They are 
also industries where labour can be exceptionally mobile and jobs can change hands 
quickly. 
A number of complementary tools ensure that the State can reward what it deems to be 
good behaviour or best practice among private actors. Under the UK’s sponsorship system, 
trusted employers receive preferential treatment and migration control responsibilitie s. 85 
These employers are entitled to fast-track simple immigration procedures, mainly for 
highly skilled migrant workers, in exchange for implementing State preferences in 
migration control.86 As the former Dutch Secretary of State Albayrak explained, the system 
is based on a concept of trust: once an employer is approved by the state, it will gain more 
responsibilities and will need less governmental approval in the admission process.87 
Employer sanctions encourage private actor cooperation with the State by use of 
complementary tools that make it even more in the private actor’s interest to comply. The 
State can control employers’ implementation by tailoring their sanction accordingly. The 
UK has provided for fines of up to £20,000 per irregular migrant.88 Fines or other penalties 
can specifically target certain types of employment, certain types of migrant and generally 
be tailored to suit the policy objectives of the State. 
The measures in the Directive which were designed to redress injustices suffered by 
irregular migrants have not been properly implemented by Member States. Access to 
justice in this regard has been explicitly stated by the Commission’s Transposition Report 
                                                                 
84 Frequently Asked Questions  – European Commission. The Employer Sanctions Directive. Brussels, 22 
May 2014. 
85 De Lange. T., The Privatisation of Control over Labour Migration in the Netherlands: In whose interest? 
European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011) 185-200. Page 185. 
86 De Lange. T., The Privatisation of Control over Labour Migration in the Netherlands: In whose interest? 
European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011) 185-200. Page 195. 
87 De Lange. T., The Privatisation of Control over Labour Migration in the Netherlands: In whose interest? 
European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011) 185-200. Page 186. 
88 UK Government service and information website. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/penalties -for-
employing-illegal-workers 
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to have been inadequately implemented by “weak or non-existing mechanisms.”89  By 
contrast, sanctions have been rigorously applied by the State to non-compliant employers. 
PICUM also point out that “labour inspectors in many member states are often obliged by 
national law to immediately report undocumented migrant workers to the migration 
authorities [and this] …takes precedence over their duty of protecting workers’ rights.”90 
It is very difficult to verify accusations that the general effect of the Directive has been 
that “It remains commonplace to deport undocumented workers instead of or before 
examining the violation of their labour rights.”91 The Directive is not bereft of protection 
for migrants found to have been working illegally. Article 6(2)(a) and (5) relate to 
procedures which ensure that employers must pay any outstanding wages which are due to 
the third country national who gave rise to the sanctions on that employer. However very 
few Member States92 have actually “explicitly transposed the right of illegally employed 
migrants to make a claim against their employer for any outstanding remuneration…”93 
Therefore, the Directive’s attempts at providing certain protection to employed irregular 
migrants have been inadequately implemented while the State has benefited from the 
unique information to which private actors are privy but which is new to the State. 
2.3.2 Carrier Sanctions 
In 1992, a Ghanaian named Kingsley Ofosu and eight of his compatriots stowed away on 
board the cargo ship MC Ruby, bound for Le Havre. During the journey the crew of the 
ship discovered the stowaways. The captain and crew, motivated by the heavy fines they 
                                                                 
89 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of 
Directive 2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against 
employers of illegally staying third-country nationals COM (2014) 286 final. Page 7. 
90 PICUM Press Release. Protecting the Rights of undocumented Workers: EU Parliament Hearing Calls 




91 PICUM Position Paper. Employer’s Sanctions: Impacts on Undocumented Migrant Workers’ Rights in 
Four EU Countries (2015). Page 11. 
See also: Guild. E., What are the Member States doing regarding sanctions on employers of irregularly 
staying third country nationals? (2015) EU Law Analysis Blog. Available at: 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2014/06/what-are-member-states-doing-regarding.html 
92 Only Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and Slovenia as of May 2014.  
93 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application  of 
Directive 2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against 
employers of illegally staying third-country nationals COM (2014) 286 final. Page 7.  
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knew they would face in France should they arrive there with undocumented migrants, 
decided to murder the stowaways and to dump their bodies off the coast of Portugal. 
Kingsley Ofosu managed to escape and raised the alarm once the ship arrived in France 
but his eight companions had already been killed.94 Carrier sanctions are designed to deter 
private transport companies from affording passage to irregular migrants by imposing 
punitive fines and other sanctions on those private actors when they failed to implement 
State migration law and policy or fail to do so adequately. Carrier sanctions are most keenly 
felt in the airline industry. There are 644 international air border crossing points in the EU 
with close to 375 million people per year entering the EU through one of these airports. 95  
That is much more people than road and sea entries combined. 
2.3.2.1  Background 
As Section 26 of the Schengen Convention outlines, carrier sanctions96 are fines or other 
penalties given to airlines or other transport companies for transporting inadequate ly 
                                                                 
94 See: Le Bourhis. K., Les Transporteurs et le Contrôle des Flux Migratoires (2001). Page 92-94. 
See also: Whitaker. R., Life terms for stowaway massacre. The Independent, 11th December 1995. 
95 Commission infographics on:  Entering the EU Borders and Visas. Taken from Europa.eu. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-
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Carlier. JY., & De Bruycker. P., Immigration and Asylum Law of the EU: Current Debates (2005). 
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Moreno-Lax. V., Must EU Borders have Doors for Refugees? On the Compatibility of Schengen Visas and 
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documented migrants.97 Article 26 of the Schengen Convention in fact obliges private 
carriers to “assume responsibility” for inadequately documented migrants that they have 
transported. In 2001, the EU introduced a Carrier Sanctions Directive.98 The UK opted-in 
to this Directive. The Directive does not go into how carriers should come to their decision 
to allow or deny entry to the Union but does state (Article 4) that sanctions should be 
“dissuasive, effective and proportionate.” Article 5 states that the Directive does not 
prevent Member States from taking additional measures for carriers which will add to a 
Member State’s ability to deter carriers from carrying inadequately documented migrants. 
Article 6 provides that there should exist effective rights of defence and appeal for the 
carrier. Section 6.10 of the Schengen Handbook further sets out that "If the refused third-
country national has been brought by a carrier by air, sea or land the carrier must be 
obliged immediately to assume responsibility for him/her again… When the refused third-
country national cannot be taken back immediately, the carrier must be made to bear all 
necessary costs of lodging, maintenance and return travel. If the carrier is not able to 
return the third-country national, it must be obliged to ensure that his/her return by any 
other means (e.g. by contacting another carrier).”99 The Directive contains no obligation 
to ensure that procedures are in place, whereby individuals who are refused passage can 
bring an appeal against a carrier or a State.100 The Schengen Borders Code saw fit that 
“persons refused entry have the right to appeal against this decision.”101 The Carrier 
Sanctions Directive does not provide for any such provision. 
                                                                 
97 The Schengen acquis - Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. Article 26. 
98 Council Directive 2001/51/EC of June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985. 
99 European Commission Recommendation establishing a common “Practical Handbook for Border Guards 
(Schengen Handbook)” to be used by Member States’ competent authorities when carrying out the border 
control of persons C(2006) 5186 final. 
100 Peers. S., EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (2016) Page 472. 
101 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union 
Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) . Article 
14(3).   
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 The drafting history of the Directive reveals that carrier sanctions are seen by 
certain Member States as being ineffective if an exception is made for asylum seekers.102 
The original French initiative had proposed that carriers be made exempt from sanctions 
where a third country national is admitted to the territory to enter into the asylum system. 103 
Eventually, the Directive’s final draft included a compromise and include s a reference that 
it does not prejudice protection obligations104 but it simultaneously does not include any 
duty or incentive for the carrier to differentiate in its decision on access on the basis of the 
protection requirements of the passenger.105 Peers states that “This replacement of an 
enforceable asylum exception with fuzzy ambiguity is the biggest disappointment of this 
Directive.”106 Peers also noted the apparent aim of the German delegation was to prevent 
asylum seekers from making landfall on Union territory as the delegation argued that 
inclusion of the asylum exception “could make penalties for carriers ineffective and 
increase asylum applications.”107 
2.3.2.2  In Practice 
Only half of the Member States have subsequently transposed the Directive in a way that  
takes into account the position of refugees and asylum seekers. A study done by the 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles found that France, Italy and the Netherlands 
waived the fines if a person was admitted to their asylum procedure, while Denmark, 
Germany and the United Kingdom fined carriers regardless of protection concerns.108 Even 
                                                                 
102 For commentary on the drafting of Council Directive 2001/51/EC of June 2001 supplementing the 
provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, see: 
Chapter 12 Carrier Sanctions. In Peers. S., Guild. E., Acosta Arcarazo. D., Groenendirk. K., & Moreno -
Lax. V., EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary).  
Chapter 5 Carrier Sanctions and Immigration Liaison Officers . In Moreno-Lax. V., Seeking Asylum in 
Europe – Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law (2012) PhD Thesis, 
Université Catholique de Louvain. 
Hathaway. J., Rights of Refugees under International Law (2005). Page 404. 
Peers. S., EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (2016) Page 471-472. 
103 Initiative of the French Republic with a view to the adoption of a Council Directive concerning the 
harmonisation of financial penalties imposed on carriers transporting into the territory of the Member 
States third-country nationals lacking the documents necessary for admission (2000/C 269/06). Recital 2. 
104 Council Directive 2001/51/EC of June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985. Recital 3 and Article 4(2).  
105 Council Directive 2001/51/EC of June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985. Article 4. 
106 Peers. S., EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (2016) Page 472. 
107 Peers. S., EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (2016) Page 472.  
See also: Comments of the German delegation (Council doc 12361/00, 16 October 2000). 
108 Den Heijer. M., Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (2011) PhD Thesis, Leiden University . Page 186. 
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as early as 2001, then Deputy Director of the Immigration Service within the UK Home 
Office stated that the inclusion of airlines in controlling migration had “really made the 
difference.”109 The UK authorities have introduced complementary guidance as to whom 
should be excluded. Guidance is also given to private actors on the spot by the UK’s 
immigration liaison officers.  
There has in fact been incidents of the carriers introducing more stringent standards 
than are required by Member States and refusing to sell certain customers tickets in order 
to ensure compliance.110 In the Netherlands the adoption of carrier sanctions led to the 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Netherlands and the national 
carrier – KLM. Under that agreement, in return for KLM agreeing to implement checks on 
every passenger, to train its staff, and to follow immigration liaison officers’ advice in all 
cases, it was agreed that it would only be prosecuted for inadequately documented 
passengers, up to a defined annual quota.111 
In truth, private actors are not capable of making a decision regarding access for 
someone who intends on lodging an application for asylum upon arrival. Staff trainin g, 
when it does occur, focuses on saving the private actor from further sanctions through more 
thorough checks on documents rather than the protection of rights. The final access 
decision, as public authorities and their representatives are eager to point out,112 is to be 
                                                                 
See also: European Council on Refugees and Exiles  Report. Defending Refugees’ Access to Protection in 
Europe (2007). Page 28-30. 
See also: Moreno Lax. V., (Extraterritorial) Entry Controls and (Extraterritorial) Non Refoulement in EU 
Law. Page 435. In Maes. M., Foblets. MC., De Bruycker. P., Venheule. D., Wouters. J., The External 
Dimensions of EU Asylum and Immigration Policy (2011). 
109 Roundtable on Carriers’ Liability Related to Illegal Immigration. Minutes of the Meeting. Brussels, 30th 
November 2001. 
110 Rodier. C., DG for External Policies of the Union. ‘Analysis of the external dimension of the EU’s 
asylum and immigration policies’ – summary and recommendations for the European Parliament (2006) 
Page 11. 
111 Ryan. B., Extraterritorial Immigration Control: What Role for Legal Guarantees? Page 21. In Ryan. B., 
and Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control (2010). See also: Scholten. S., & Minderhoud. P., 
Regulating Immigration Control: Carrier Sanctions in the Netherlands. 10 European Journal of Migration 
and Law 123, 2008. 
112 To give two examples, in aforementioned answer to Parliamentary questions E-3228/2008 on the 18th of 
July 2008, Mr Barot, on behalf of the Commission, stated “The ILOs can give advice to airline staff on the 
verification of travel documents and entry conditions upon arrival in the EU, but the company and the 
national authorities of the third-country are responsible for denying boarding.” Dave Roberts - Deputy 
Director, Immigration Service, Home Office, UK. Jean-Francois Duriex, UNHCR, Roundtable on Carriers ’ 
Liability: “Our 24-hour help lines: on-the-spot advice is given on whether a particular passenger might 
‘incur a chance’. 50’000 calls a year are made to the help line, but the responsibility for deciding whether 
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made by the carrier alone. Immigration Liaison Officers are a procedure that will be 
considered later in this chapter (2.4.2). Suffice to say that this point that the presence of 
these State officials alongside the threat of sanction from the State allows the State to direct, 
steer and influence that access decision. In doing so, the State relies upon the private actor’s 
natural preference to make a rational business decision and avoid the financial risk involved 
in carrying an inadequately documented person.113 
 Directive 2004/82 provided an obligation on carriers to communicate passenger 
data to the national authorities of the destination State in advance of departure.114  This 
directive refers to what has become known as Advanced Passenger Information (API). The 
UK participated in this Directive. This Directive works in conjunction with carrier 
sanctions rather than being a substitute to those sanctions.115 Carriers which fail in their 
obligation to transmit passenger data will be fined.116 Since 2003,117 the Commission had 
been looking to legislate for passenger name records (PNR) which are far more extensive 
than API. A PNR proposal was brought forward in 2011118 but it was rejected by the Civil 
Liberties Committee in 2013. It was only in April 2016 that the Council finally adopted a 
PNR Directive119 to which the UK opted-in. The UK already had a PNR system in place. 
Then Head of UK Border Force, Brodie Clark, stated: “In terms of the arrangements we 
have ... it is as near real time as we can make it. We want real-time information so that we 
can stop people getting on board the plane, which is the principle behind exporting the 
                                                                 
to board the passenger has to be with the carrier. We have no extra-territorial powers to refuse somebody’s 
entry…” 
113 Noll. G., Negotiating asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection, and the Common Market of 
Deflection (2000) Page 178. 
114 Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to Communicate passenger 
data. 
115 Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to Communicate passenger 
data. Article 3(3). 
116 Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to Communicate passenger 
data. Article 4. 
117 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament on  the Transfer of Air 
Passenger Name Records (PNR) Data: A Global EU Approach COM (2003) 826 final. 
118 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name 
Record Data for the Prevention, Detection, Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Offences and Serious 
Crime COM (2011) 132 final. 
119 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of 
passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
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border. Stopping people as far away from the UK as possible.”120 The EU has strengthened 
State involvement with carriers and the State has been able to benefit from the information 
that is normally only available to the carrier. 
As far as carrier resistance goes, in 1990, four major airlines (Lufthansa, Swissair, 
Iberia and Alitalia) refused to pay the fines levied against them by the UK government, on 
the grounds that they were being asked to ‘act as immigration officers.’ The British Home 
Office responded that if the airlines did not pay, they could lose their landing rights. 121 
Such resistance to the carrier sanctions regime, from the carriers themselves, have 
seemingly disappeared from the landscape. 122 The industry has moved to a time in which 
the carriers see cooperation with the State as the best option and have abandoned any 
attempts at not following the regime.123 
2.3.3 The Nature of Control through Sanctions 
Enforced privatisation does not incorporate compulsory powers. This is the primary 
contrast with the nature of control afforded to the State when it privatises through contract. 
That difference can have important implications for access to justice and, in turn, for the 
vindication of any rights that a migrant alleges to have been violated in the course of 
implementation of a migration control and border management procedure. The nature of 
control through sanctions is also such, that it provides the State with an effective means by 
which to control the relevant private actor. The terms and conditions attached to a sanction 
may be changed – through legislation if needs be – such that the State is capable of 
directing, steering and influencing the implementation of a migration control or border 
management procedure. Therefore, sanctions afford the State a reactive tool by which to 
control the private actor. In this sense, enforced privatisation resembles its contracted 
counterpart. Sanctions are in fact even more reactive to State needs than contracts which 
                                                                 
120 Interviewing Brodie Clark. The Times, April 2008. 
121 Cruz. A., Carrier Sanctions in Four European Community States: Incompatibilities  between International 
Civil Aviation and Human Rights Obligations (1991) Journal of Refugee Studies 1, 63. Page 72. 
122 In the UK, see: International Transport Roth GmbH and Other v SSHD [2002] 3 WLR 344. 
See also: R (on the application of Balbo B&C Auto Transport Internazional) v SSHD [2001] 1 WLR 1556. 
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123 Scholten. S., The Privatisation of Immigration Control through Carrier Sanctions: The Role of Private 
Transport Companies in Dutch and British Immigration Control (2015). Chapters 7 and 8. 
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can have long life spans. The State has the freedom to pursue its policy objectives by 
varying the severity of sanctions, the type of sanctions and the situations in which they will 
be applied. Just as a State can revise the terms of a tender that it offers private companies 
when it privatises through contract, the State can also vary its application of sanctions. The 
difference between the two, and the reason why they are distinguished here, is the absence 
of compulsory powers for procedures of enforced privatisation and their presence in 
contracted privatisation. 
 Both sets of firms are profit driven but they undertake a markedly different role 
within the State’s migration control and border management apparatus. The raison d'être 
of certain private actors is to bid for contracts and, as a prerequisite to winning that contract, 
they must be highly specialised in administering compulsory powers. By contrast, enforced 
private actors are simply seeking to protect their enterprise from State requirements which 
are an unwelcome hindrance to their actual work. They are not in any way specialised to 
undertake any procedure in migration control and border management. The participat ion 
of an enforced private actor in a procedure boils down to their unique ability to acquire 
important information to which the State is not privy and to make a commercial risk based 
decision about a migrant. 
In examining enforced privatisation it is important not to consider sanctions in 
isolation, instead of considering them alongside the ability of the State to incentivise 
cooperation among private actors and to implement the support structure. It is common for 
States not to implement sanctions or to apply them more forgivingly if the private actor 
agrees to apply extra controls and thereby improve upon the quantity or quality of the 
results of the procedure from the perspective of the State. For instance, informal 
arrangements exist across the airline industry, whereby one carrier can have an agreement 
which is completely different from their competitors. This results in practices such as that 
referred to in the carrier sanctions section (2.3.2.2), whereby carriers are excluding high 
risk passengers even beyond what is technically required of them by the letter of the 
recommendations made by public authorities. The sanctions have undergone “…a change 
from a deterrent approach focused on sanctioning, to an approach aimed at furthering 
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compliance.”124 Thus, while sanctions remains, to all intents and purposes, the State’s real 
leverage, there is now also this further inducement within enforced privatisation. 
The sanctions system provides the State with an increased flexibility and improved 
control while the private actor is attracted to the narrower degree to which it is liable to 
sanctions.125 Employers are incentivised by being able to gain easier access to approval for 
visas and documentation that it may need to give employment to regular migrants. Carriers 
can sign agreements with the State that they will undertake extra checks or undertake to 
follow all advice given by Immigration Liaison Officers if they are only made liable up to 
a certain amount of money each year. Such incentives have also helped to move the priva te 
actors on from initially flirting with the idea of resisting such sanctions. Alternat ive 
approaches to the imposition of sanctions are typically being developed while the threat of 
sanction is retained in the background.126 
Enforced privatisation creates an informal public/private relationship in comparison to 
privatisation on the basis of a contract. Rather than examining the contract itself, albeit in 
a redacted state, an examination of the public-private relationship must rely upon the 
State’s law which gives force to the sanction in question. In this sense, the nature of control 
through sanction is much less transparent than the more formal relationship of control 
through contract. The presence of a contract does confirm that a relationship exists but it 
is the nature of the control within a procedure which influences the courts toward finding 
whether the State is legally responsible. This control-based approach gives rise to the 
importance of compulsory powers in a procedure. While commentators confidently state 
that such powers will confirm State legal responsibility, placing such stock in their 
presence or absence works to the detriment of enforced privatisation procedures which do 
not incorporate such powers. Procedures undertaken by a private actor under threat of 
sanction and which consist of tasks which the State had not undertaken previously, like 
                                                                 
124 Scholten. S., The Privatisation of Immigration Control through Carrier Sanctions: The Role of Private 
Transport Companies in Dutch and British Immigration Control (2015). Page 281. 
125 Ryan. B., Extraterritorial Immigration Control: What Role for Legal Guarantees? Page 21. In Ryan. B., 
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decision-making and reporting to the State, constitute an indirect but substantial control 
which may not trigger judicial consideration of State legal responsibility for that control. 
2.4 Externalisation – Procedures  
This section examines two procedures which have been externalised.127 They have been 
chosen on the basis of their prominence and because they raise key questions as to legal 
responsibility for Member States. The procedures examined in this section are marit ime 
interdiction and immigration liaison officers. 
2.4.1 Maritime Interdiction 
In 2015, migration by boat in the Mediterranean Sea was said to have reached ‘crisis’ 
levels. Taking Greece alone, 856,000 people crossed the Aegean Sea from Turkey to 
Greece in 2015, almost twenty times as many as arrived in the whole of 2014. The crisis 
continued into 2016 with almost as many people arriving in the first two months of 2016 
as in the first seven months of 2015128 with the first month of 2016 being the deadliest 
January on record for migrant fatalities in the Mediterranean.129 The 2016 numbers 
subsequently decreased from their equivalent numbers of 2015 with 173,000 people 
arriving by November 2016 with a good proportion of that number having arrived in the 
first two months of the year. In fact of that 173,000, 151,000 had arrived by March of that 
year.130 It was only with the EU-Turkey Statement131 in March of 2016 that the mass influx 
slowed to a trickle. Italy has also borne witness to large numbers of arrivals132 which, in 
the absence of a Libyan version of the EU-Turkey Statement.133 Plans for closing down the 
central Mediterranean route have been very much to the fore in the spring of 2017.134 
                                                                 
127 For further consideration of instruments that have been externalised, see: De Boer. T., Closing Legal 
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One particular crossing from Turkey to Greece in 2015 ended with the drowning of 
several migrants and was unremarkable from innumerable other tragedies except for a 
picture taken by a press photographer of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old boy from Kobane, 
Syria. The boy was found on a Turkish beach having tried and failed to reach Greece with 
his family. The image quickly became an international sensation and was taken as 
encapsulating the challenge posed by migration at sea and faced by the EU. By the end of 
2015, the year in which the most migrants had gone to sea, roughly 3,770 had drowned or 
were missing in the Mediterranean Sea.135 One of the key responses of the Union to 
migrants arriving by sea, even before the mass influx of people fleeing the war in Syria, 
was to interdict migrants while they were still in international waters or in the territoria l 
waters of a third State. That procedure is the topic of this section. 
2.4.1.1 Background 
Maritime interdiction has a long history among Member States in a unilateral sense. 
However, nowadays Frontex implements joint sea-operations with Member States. Those 
operations were primarily focussed on the Aegean Sea and arrivals on the Greek islands 
from Turkey, but ever since the signing of the EU-Turkey Statement, numbers making the 
journey have dropped dramatically. As a result of monthly numbers having dramatica lly 
fallen off after the Statement was signed in March, attention has shifted to the central 
Mediterranean route. Maritime interdiction is by not limited to Libya but approximate ly 
90% of all migrants on the central Mediterranean route leave from Libyan shores and so it 
dominates discussion. At 181,000 individuals in 2016,136 it now stands as the largest 
maritime access point to the EU. 
Council Decision 2010/252 on the role of Frontex at sea dealt with that agency’s 
“surveillance of the sea external borders…”137 Frontex was made “responsible for the 
coordination of operational cooperation between Member States…”138 The Decision made 
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surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation co ordinated by the 
65 | P a g e  
 
reference139 to the obligations of Member States to refugees and asylum seekers, the 
particular duty of non-refoulement and requirements of the Procedures Directive.140 The 
Decision stated that in conducting border surveillance operation at sea, Member States 
would encounter craft that were in distress141 and that on such occasions, “priority should 
be given to disembarkation in the third country from where the ship carrying the persons 
departed or through the territorial waters or search and rescue region of which that ship 
transited.”142 In 2012, that Decision was annulled in Parliament v Council.143 The 
challenge was made on the basis of the aforementioned disembarkation priority. The Court 
found that that priority “constitutes a major development in the SBC system”144 rather than 
being a minor and non-essential provision of the Schengen Border Code as the Council had 
argued. The CJEU was concerned that the exercise of the Decision’s powers “meant that 
the fundamental rights of the persons concerned may be interfered with to such an extent 
that the involvement of the EU legislature is required.”145 
 Regulation 656/2014146 replaced Council Decision 2010/252 and its Article 4 
reflected the CJEU’s earlier decision in Parliament v Council by providing for greater 
protection of fundamental rights. The European Border and Coast Guard Regulation147 
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surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union (2010/252/EU). Recital 3. 
140 The Procedures Directive in force at that time: Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on 
minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status . 
141 Council Decision of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the 
surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union (2010/252/EU). Recital 7-8. 
142 Council Decision of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the 
surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union (2010/252/EU). Annex, Part II, Section 2.1. 
143 C-355/10, European Parliament v Council, [GC]. 
144 C-355/10, European Parliament v Council, [GC]. Paragraph 76. 
145 C-355/10, European Parliament v Council, [GC]. Paragraph 77. 
146 Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the Member States of the European Union. 
147 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 Sep tember 2016 on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and 
66 | P a g e  
 
affords significant extra powers to Frontex vis-à-vis maritime interdiction. These extra 
powers include being able to draw upon a rapid reserve pool of border guards and technical 
equipment.148 The Council, on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, can adopt a 
decision identifying measures to mitigate the identified risks which is to be implemented 
by the Agency.149 That decision will allow the Agency to step in and deploy European 
Border and Coast Guard Teams to ensure that action is taken on the ground even when a 
Member State is unable or unwilling to take the necessary measures.150 The new Regulation 
will also provide for certain strengthening of fundamental rights provisions.151 
 On the basis of this evolution, maritime interdiction is very much in the hands of 
Frontex in terms of its initiation and coordination, yet it remains the Member States for the 
most part who participate in a practical sense. Thus, the compulsory powers involved in 
the implementation of maritime interdiction will, prima facie at least, be at the hands of 
the State. 
2.4.1.2 In Practice 
The stated policy of the EU in facing migrants arriving to the Member States by sea has 
revolved around fighting against people smugglers152 and saving lives at sea. Maritime 
interdiction153 is part of the solution to these problems and turns on two policy options with 
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regard to disembarkation.154 The first is to intercept the boat that migrants are travelling on 
and bring them to EU territory and enter them into the immigration system whether that is 
within the asylum procedure or otherwise. The second option has been called ‘push-backs’ 
– the interception and return of migrants to the third State from which they departed. Both 
options can abide by the legal onus on Member States to rescue distressed craft at sea.155 
However, the second option is where legal conflicts can arise as push-backs can come at 
the cost of State’s abidance by certain of their legal obligations.156 Then UK Home 
Secretary, Theresa May, caused controversy in 2015 when she stated that interdiction acted 
as an incentive to economic migrants.157 The UK has contributed to several Frontex joint 
sea operations in the past158 and in 2016 it also made a large commitment of resources to 
the NATO response to the crisis. 159 
There are many variables at play in interdiction of a migrant vessel as it makes its 
way to the EU. Maritime interdiction necessarily involves stopping a boat of irregular 
migrants. Once stopped, the migrants may be left on board their own ship, they may be 
towed somewhere or they may be taken on board the intercepting craft. This decision may 
be heavily influenced by the circumstances of the interdiction – what the intercepting ship 
is capable of doing, what the standard of the intercepted ship is, what the weather permits 
etc. Stopping the ship itself already represents the power of the State in implementing this 
procedure and is a very physical manifestation of the State’s ability to direct and steer the 
situation toward the State’s preferred conclusion.  
                                                                 
Galand. AS., Rescue at Sea – Human Rights Obligations of States and Private Actors, with a Focus on the 
EU’s External Borders (2012) Policy Paper No. 05, RSCAS, European University Institute . 
154 Trevisanut. S., Which Borders for the EU Immigration Policy? Yardsticks of International Protection for 
EU Joint Borders Management. Page 127. In Azoulai. L., & de Vries. K., EU Migration Law: Legal 
Complexities and Political Rationales (2014).  
155 See: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, in force November 16th, 1994. Article 98 (1). 
156 For example: the right to asylum, Article 18, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; the 
prohibition on refoulement, Article 19, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 
3, European Convention on Human Rights . 
157 Perraudin. F., Theresa May: UK will not participate in EU migrant resettlement proposals . The 
Guardian, 13th of May 2015. 
158 Ryan. B., The EU’s Borders: Schengen, Frontex and the UK (2016) Free Movement Blog. Available at: 
https://www.freemovement.org.uk/brexit-and-borders-schengen-frontex-and-the-uk/ 
159 See UK government announcement: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-announces-uk-
deployment-for-nato-mission-in-aegean-sea-to-tackle-migrant-crisis 
See also NATO announcement: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_128746.htm 
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 The foregoing discussion presumes that the intercepting ship is manned, equipped 
and funded by a Member State. This may not always be the case. Frontex’s operational 
plan for the Hera III operation160 implemented bilateral agreements between Spain and 
Mauritania and Senegal and made the placement of Senegalese and Mauritanian agents on 
board vessels compulsory.161 A multitude of variables can come between the direct line of 
control between the State and the interdicted migrants. The presence of Frontex,162 the 
involvement of other Member States and the participation of a third State can mean that 
the clear line, between a Member State and a migrant, can become clouded. However, in 
general, in joint operations any contribution toward participation can be considered as 
potentially representing the ability to control implementation.  
2.4.2 Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs)   
In February 2001, the British and Czech governments signed an agreement. The effect of 
this agreement was to permit British immigration officials (ILOs) access to passengers at 
Prague Airport before they boarded aircraft bound for Britain. It was openly accepted that 
the objective of the procedure was to stem the flow of asylum seekers to Britain from the 
Czech Republic and indeed, that was its effect. The agreement was implemented in the 
summer of 2001 and the number of asylum claims arising from Czech passengers fell by 
90% in the three weeks after implementation in comparison to the three weeks prior to 
implementation.163 The vast majority of asylum seekers coming from the Czech Republic 
to Britain at this time were Roma. ILOs usually operate in close cooperation with carriers. 
In 1999 a Council of Europe report164 found that a Czech Airline was writing ‘G’, for 
gypsy, beside the names of passengers who had Roma names or who looked like Roma 
with the express intention of alerting the British authorities to potential asylum seekers of 
                                                                 
160 This operation took place in the Canary Islands region in 2007. The participating Member States were 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal. The aim of the operation was to coordinate operational 
cooperation between Members States in the field of management of external borders through the 
organisation of joint patrols of the assets provided by the Member States in the predefined areas in order to 
combat illegal migration across the external maritime borders of the EU from West African countries 
disembarking in Canary Islands. 
161 Den Heijer. M., Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (2011) PhD Thesis, Leiden University . Page 225. 
162 Trevisanut. S., Maritime Border Control and the Protection of Asylum-Seekers in the European Union 
(2009) Touro International Law Review, vol. 12, 157. 
163 The facts here are taken from a case which examined the work of these ILOs. The case will be further 
examined in Chapter III (3.4.3). See: Regina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another ex parte 
European Roma Rights Centre and others [2004] UKHL 55. 
164 Council of Europe Report. Restrictions on Asylum in the Member States of the Council of Europe and 
the European Union. Parliamentary Assembly (1999) Doc. 8598. 
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Roma origin.165 The case shows how airlines and ILOs, acting together can form a very 
significant boundary to protection for more vulnerable migrants and only came to light 
because of a tremendous amount of research done by NGOs and civil society. 
2.4.2.1 Background 
In reality, the tasks of ILOs vary massively according to their location and their instruct ions 
but can generally be defined as being representatives of a State who are posted abroad by 
that State in order to contribute to the prevention of illegal immigration. The primary tasks 
of ILOs tend to be in cooperating with local authorities and in advising carriers as to 
whether a person is adequately documented or not. 
The Seville European Council166 of 2002 called for the creation of a network of 
ILOs and Council Regulation 377/2004167 (‘the founding Regulation’) created such a 
network but the genesis of ILOs in a European wide context can be traced back to the 
Schengen Convention.168 A Council decision169 in 2005 created ICONET, an information 
and coordination network for Member States’ migration services, designed to enhance co-
operation among immigration liaison officers posted abroad by the Member States. Neither 
the founding Regulation, nor Regulation 493/2011,170 is specific or exhaustive as to the 
tasks of ILOs.171 The founding Regulation states that “This Regulation is without prejudice 
to the tasks of immigration liaison officers within the framework of their responsibilities 
under national law…”172 The Member States, with the UK opting-in for both the founding 
and the amending Regulations, are free to add additional tasks to the basic modus operandi 
                                                                 
165 Scholten. S., The Privatisation of Immigration Control through Carrier Sanctions: The Role of Private 
Transport Companies in Dutch and British Immigration Control (2015). Page 263. 
166 Seville European Council Conclusions, 21 and 22 of June 2002. Page 10. 
167 Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 of 19 February 2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison 
officers network. 
168 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. Articles 7, 47, 125. 
169 Council Decision of 16 March 2005 establishing a secure web-based Information and Coordination 
Network for Member States’ Migration Management Services (2005/267/EC). 
170 Regulation (EU) No 493/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison officers ne twork. 
171 An interesting question raised by Den Heijer is as to whether if ILOs carry out tasks which amount to 
‘border control’ or ‘border checks’ in the meaning of the Schengen Borders Code, should those officers not 
also then be regarded as ‘border guards’ under the Borders Code and/or be required to comply with all 
procedural and other standards laid down in the Code? See: Den Heijer. M., Europe and Extraterritorial 
Asylum (2011) PhD Thesis, Leiden University. Page 189. 
172 Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 of 19 February 2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison 
officers network. Article 1(4). 
70 | P a g e  
 
of ILOs as set out in the Regulations. The Frontex Regulation provides for the Agency 
having its own ILOs deployed “to third countries in which border management practices 
comply with minimum human rights standards.”173 European Border and Coast Guard 
Regulation provides for the deployment of those officers to third countries.174 The Union’s 
ILO network has now evolved to the extent that the first European Migration Liaison 
Officers were deployed as a matter of priority to Ethiopia, Niger, Pakistan and Serbia in 
January 2016.175 
The UK has invested heavily in ILOs within the framework of the Risk and Liaison 
Overseas Network.  That investment has had a serious impact on preventing passage. There 
are no readily available statistics on the true impact of ILOs but the UK Immigra t ion 
Minister stated that in the five years to 2009, the UK’s ILO network had assisted in 
preventing nearly 210,000 people from boarding planes on their way to the UK.176 British 
ILOs177 do not have the powers of a ‘regular’ British immigration officer. A ‘regular’ 
officer can take the decision to refuse leave to enter and make this decision at any point in 
the journey.178 “Leave may be given before or during travel, and the immigration officer 
need not be based at the port.”179 By contrast, British ILOs are limited to offering ‘advice’ 
                                                                 
173 Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. Article 
14(3) and (4). 
174 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. Article 55. 
175 Press Release – JHA Council. Council Conclusions on Measures to handle the refugee and migration 
crisis. Brussels, 9 November 2015. 
A vacancy notice for positions in a further ten locations were advertised by the Commission for seconded 
national officials in March of 2016. Available at: 
http://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/endtemp/2016/03/com_-_notice_of_vacancy_-_migration_10_posts_-
_mar16.pdf 
176 Clayton. G., Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law (2014). Page 173. 
177 They are known as Immigration Liaison Managers in the UK. 
178 Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) Order 2000, SI 2000/1161. Article 7. 
179 Clayton. G., Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law (2014). Page 171. 
It should also be noted that the Immigration Act 2014 drastically reduces the ability of migrants to appeal 
decisions of Immigration Officers including the decisions of those officers who give travelers entry 
clearance. See: Immigration Act 2014. 
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to carriers on passengers and liaising with local authorities. British ILOs conduct this work 
in over 120 States across the world.180 
2.4.2.2 In Practice 
The founding Regulation lists maintaining contacts with local authorities, the management 
of ‘legal’ migration, the prevention of ‘illegal’ immigration and organising returns as being 
the main tasks of an ILO.181 As officials of a State, ILOs represent an organ of the State 
and so that State is able to control the work of its ILOs by issuing them with instruct ions 
as to how to cooperate with carriers or local authorities. They are not limited in this regard 
by the terms of the founding or amending Regulations. The terms of reference for any 
particular mission is responsive to changing policy priorities of the State.  
ILOs lack all of the traditional compulsory powers – arrest, detention, restraint etc. 
As noted above (2.4.2.1), ILOs, at least in the UK, are not even granted the ordinary power 
associated with immigration officials of making a decision as to access. Instead, State 
control over migrants through ILOs extends only so far as giving ‘advice’ to carriers as to 
whether a passenger should be boarded or not on the basis of that passenger’s travel 
documentation and any other intelligence available to the ILO. This all important role as 
an ‘adviser’ cannot be found in either the founding Regulation nor in the amending 
Regulation. The role of ILOs is controversial because question marks have been raised as 
to the role that they play in either directly prohibiting persons from entering a plane or in 
circumstances where they indirectly recommend to a carrier or a foreign border authority 
not to allow boarding or exiting the country.182 The ILOs’ usual role in the crucial access 
decision has been in ‘advising’ the airlines as to the boarding of passengers who possess 
suspect documentation or are perceived as representing a risk. The actual decision as to 
whether to board a passenger or not remains one to be made by the airline. 
The context in which advice is conveyed is all important. ILOs advise a carrier’s 
staff about a matter of which that staff has little knowledge. However, those staff are aware 
that their employer will be fined should an individual be afforded passage if that person 
                                                                 
180 A useful map has been produced by the UK’s Risk and Liaison Overseas Network. It is available here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/278158/ralon -map.pdf 
181 Council Regulation (EC) 377/2004 of 19 February 2004 on the Creation of an Immigration Liaison Officer 
Network. Articles 1 and 2.  
182 Den Heijer. M., Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (2011) PhD Thesis, Leiden University. Page 188. 
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has been highlighted as being inadmissible by an ILO. The staff is also aware that in the 
unlikely event that they decide to board the person, despite advice to the contrary received 
from ILOs, the authorities at the receiving State will be alerted to this and a gate check will 
be conducted upon arrival.183 In such circumstances, is the opinion expressed by an ILO 
still just advice or does it become something more? The weight given to ILO ‘advice’ by 
carriers was made clear by the then Dutch Minister for Alien Affairs and Integration who 
stated that in over 99% of cases, that advice was followed by Dutch airlines.184 Certainly, 
the State is capable of directing, steering and influencing the work of ILOs and the all-
important decision as to access. While more powers may be added at the behest of the 
Member State from which the ILO originates, there has been no indication as of yet, that 
any Member State has given any wider ranging powers to its ILOs than that of advising the 
carrier. Certainly, no State has afforded them any kind of compulsory power. The work of 
ILOs is not transparent and this impacts upon any proper assessment of the control that  
they hold over the decision to provide access to a migrant. Their activities are not monitored 
apart from the report, which each Member State that has ILOs must submit to the Council. 
That completed report is not made public but a blank version of that report is publicly 
available.185 
 Mr Barrot, a Commission official, answered questions in the European Parliament 
as to the use and power of ILOs and specifically: To what extent do airlines act on the 
recommendation of ILOs as to whether or not to carry a passenger? In Answer Mr Barrot 
stated that it was not possible to precisely gauge the impact of ILO advice on airlines 
decisions to enable or deny passage to passengers but went on to say that “The ILOs can 
give advice to airline staff on the verification of travel documents and entry conditions 
upon arrival in the EU, but the company and the national authorities of the third-country 
                                                                 
183 Scholten S., Minderhoud. P., Regulating Immigration Control: Carrier Sanctions in the Netherlands (2008) 
European Journal of Migration and Law 10,123. Page 140. 
184 Scholten S., Minderhoud. P., Regulating Immigration Control: Carrier Sanctions in the Netherlands (2008) 
European Journal of Migration and Law 10,123. Page 138. 
185 Commission Decision of 29 September 2005 on the format for the report on the activities of 
immigration liaison officers networks and on the situation in the host country in matters relating to illegal 
immigration (2005/687/EC). 
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are responsible for denying boarding.”186 Likewise, according to the Council, ILOs “do 
not carry out any tasks relating to the sovereignty of States.”187  
2.4.3 The Nature of Control through Externalisation 
The procedures taken in externalisation provide a contrast between a procedure that 
depends upon compulsory powers for its success and a procedure in which compulsory 
powers are conspicuous in their absence. For the latter procedure, Immigration Liaison 
Officers, the EU and the Member States have repeatedly underlined the fact that the 
decision on access is not within the procedure’s purview let alone any kind of compulsory 
power. The fact that ILOs are not directly empowered to take the decision to grant access 
could be argued as betraying a recognition on the part of the State that making that decision 
directly is indicative of control. The question stands: “Why cannot the authorities, the 
ALO’s posted overseas, be granted these powers?”188 There is no such issue with maritime 
interdiction. However, compulsory powers being so central to the implementation of a 
procedure brings its own set of challenges. 
 The act of stopping a ship can, in and of itself, be taken as a compulsory power but 
interdiction can involve very different types and levels of compulsory powers. Such 
variables notwithstanding, the kind of physical force and control exercised by the State 
during a procedure will be crucially important for a court to understand whether the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the State has been engaged or not. 
 The contrast between maritime interdiction and ILOs in terms of the use of 
compulsory powers is also manifested in the types of rights that are violated in the 
implementation of each procedure. By incorporating compulsory powers, marit ime 
interdiction puts rights at risk whose violation are more obvious because they are often 
manifested in physical injury. Most notably and not exhaustive ly, these rights include right 
to life and the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Maritime interdic t ion 
though also places at risk certain other rights such as the right to asylum or the prohibit ion 
                                                                 
186 Answer to Parliamentary questions E-3228/2008. 18th July 2008. Mr Barrot on behalf of the 
Commission. 
187 JHA Council Conclusions, 27 February 2002. Paragraph 67. 
188 Roundtable on Carriers’ Liability Related to Illegal Immigration . Minutes of the Meeting. Brussels, 
30th November 2001. Page 30.  
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on refoulement which do not necessarily include such an overtly obvious physical result. 
ILOs, not equipped with compulsory powers, also put these latter rights at risk and so, in 
many cases may not be as visible in their violation. 
Both maritime interdiction and ILOs, unlike privatised procedures, involve an 
organ of the State implementing the procedure directly. As opposed to its counterpart 
procedures of privatisation, the State does not have to delegate its control in order to 
externalise, it can control procedures directly. That organ is placed in a position by which 
it can direct, steer and influence the implementation of an externalised procedure. The 
capability of the migrant to attach legal responsibility to the State for externalised 
procedures is predicated upon being able to access justice and, upon doing so, being able 
to vindicate their rights in court. The primary legal hurdle faced in doing so is 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The State must be shown to have engaged its rights obligat ions 
by having exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction. Potentially, extraterritorial jurisdiction can 
trigger State extraterritorial legal responsibility.189 As has been noted in the Strasbourg 
court: “The exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be 
able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it…”190  
Maritime interdiction and Immigration Liaison Officers provide the courts with 
different challenges to the courts’ approach. An approach which takes compulsory powers 
as being the trigger of when a State has exerted control is difficult to reconcile with a 
procedure such as ILOs, which provide the State with a different type of control. However, 
such a procedure still affords the State a very significant power to decide outcomes 
according to State preferences in the “problem airports”191 of third States. Yet, the mere 
presence of an organ of the State at the time of making a decision on entry surely cannot 
                                                                 
189 Brouwer. E., Extraterritorial Migration Control and Human Rights: Preserving the Responsibility of the 
EU and its Member States . Page 216. In Ryan. B., & Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control 
(2010). 
190 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 27765/09, [GC]. Paragraph 70. 
191 To use a phrase coined by a recommendation of the German Presidency in 1999 proposing the 
establishment of round-the-clock document adviser bureaus in ‘problem’ airports with alternate 
participation of all EU Member States. See: Council Document 5529/99, Establishment of round-the-clock 
document adviser bureaus at problem airports with alternate participation of all EU Member States. 
Recommendation of the German Presidency. See also: Scholten S., Minderhoud. P., Regulating 
Immigration Control: Carrier Sanctions in the Netherlands (2008) European Journal of Migration and Law 
10,123. Page 138. 
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impact upon the legal responsibility of the State. The UK provides a twenty-four-hour 
telephone helpline which gives on the spot ‘advice’ to carriers should their advice on the 
ground be unavailable or extra expertise be needed.192 Prima facie, that phone line provides 
just as much input into a boarding decision as an ILO would do if he/she were present on 
the ground. The challenge facing the courts is finding an appropriate test which adequately 
holds the State to account without making it liable for all and every trivial involvement in 
a third State. This is a little easier said, than done. 
2.5 Conclusion – Nature of Control 
This chapter has examined a range of different procedures which have externalised or 
privatised the implementation of EU Member State policy. The chapter briefly set out how 
each procedure is implemented and considered the nature of the control exerted by the State 
in that implementation. Across the procedures, Member States retain certain control but 
the nature of that control varies. In privatisation, the State is still able to control 
implementation of procedures despite working through delegation. This is true for both 
sides of the privatisation distinction – by contract and by threat of sanction. Privatisa t ion 
through contract and certain externalisation incorporate the use of compulsory powers. 
Enforced privatisation does not incorporate compulsory powers. Likewise, the powers 
afforded to Immigration Liaison Officers do not include the use of detention, restraint or 
any other such power. Compulsory powers are closely associated with the State and the 
courts, as will be examined (Chapters III and IV), are more inclined to find that the State 
has legal responsibility where they are present. Obviously, it is also possible for non-
compulsory powered procedures to be found as having engaged a State’s legal 
responsibility. However, the courts have been markedly less inclined to find procedures 
that involve a somewhat removed influence or the exercise of so-called soft powers 
orientated around coordination and organisation, as being significant enough to engage the 
legal responsibility of the State. There is therefore, a significant deviation between control 
as it has been defined here (1.2.1) and control which entails legal responsibility in the eyes 
of the courts. 
                                                                 
192 Reynolds. S., Muggeridge. H., Remote Controls: How UK Border Controls are Endangering the Lives of 
Refugees (2008) UK Refugee Council Report. Page 45. 
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Common to all externalisation and privatisation procedures is the fact that the State 
retains the ability to quickly change the terms of the relationship. Externalisation affords 
the State the opportunity to simply change the terms of reference for its immigra t ion 
officials acting in an external setting. Privatisation allows the State to set the terms of a 
contract or to change the reasons for sanction as required. 
 Privatisation and externalisation are by no means limited to the instruments 
explored in this chapter. These phenomena have touched a diverse and important range of 
services and facilities upon which irregular migrants depend. From the growing flirta t ion 
with the external processing of refugees193 to the privatised migration control through 
health care systems,194 education195 and landlords,196 these phenomena are becoming 
increasingly intrinsic to migration control and border management in the Member States 
of the EU. The crucial question for each procedure is whether the nature of the control 
exerted is such that it engages the State’s legal responsibility – an area of law in which 
certainty is required has been left somewhat ambiguous. 
  
                                                                 
193 German minister urges processing migrants outside of the EU. EBL News, 26 January 2017. Available 
at: https://eblnews.com/news/europe/german-minister-urges-processing-migrants-outside-eu-53762 
194 Nason. N., NHS shares patient data of suspected immigration offenders with Home Office (2017) Free 
Movement Blog. Available at: 
https://www.freemovement.org.uk/nhs-shares-patient-data-suspected-immigration-offenders-home-office/ 
195 El-Enany. N., London Metropolitan University is there to educate, not police. The Guardian, 31st August 
2012. 
196 Immigration Act 2014. Chapter 1, penalty notices, section 23. 
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III. Externalisation’s Trigger – Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction 
3.1 Introduction – Externalised Control 
In participating in the debate as to external processing, the then German Interior Minister, 
Mr. Otto Schily, made an extreme proposal.1 Schily proposed that there should be external 
processing for those asylum seekers who are intercepted by the Member States in 
international waters. Mr. Schily explicitly argued that such people could lawfully be 
brought to other (third) countries for processing of their asylum claims because they were 
not the responsibility of the intercepting Member State as that Member State was acting 
outside of its territory.2 Territoriality has oftentimes been understood thusly – as being the 
crucial factor in deciding whether State responsibility has or has not been engaged. This 
chapter considers the old assumption that jurisdiction, and consequently a State’s legal 
responsibility, is in some way tied to territory. This chapter also examines migrant’s ability 
to attach legal responsibility to the State for a rights violation experienced during the 
implementation of an externalised procedure. The crucial legal impediment to a migrant’s 
access to justice when he/she experiences a rights violation at the hands of an externalised 
procedure is extraterritorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction and state responsibility are different 
concepts, which address separate legal questions.3 The two concepts cannot be equated but 
that does not compromise jurisdiction’s role as a trigger of legal responsibility.4 A 
migrant’s ability to access justice and to vindicate his or her rights before the UK Courts, 
the CJEU or the ECtHR, thereby attaching legal responsibility to the State, may be 
frustrated by a court’s narrow approach to extraterrito rial jurisdiction. 
                                                                 
1 For an analysis of the original UK proposal, the Commission Communication in res ponse and the German 
elaboration, see: Noll. G., Visions  of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit 
Processing Centres and Protection Zones  (2003) European Journal of Migration and Law 5, 303.  
See also: Haun. E., The Externalisation of Asylum Procedures: An Adequate EU Refugee Burden Sharing 
System? (2007). 
2 Garlick. M., ED “Regional Protection Programmes:” Development and Prospects. Page 375. In Maes. M., 
Foblets. MC., De Bruycker. P., Venheule. D., Wouters. J., The External Dimensions of EU Asylum and 
Immigration Policy (2011). 
3 Milanovic. M., Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (2011).  Page 41. 
See also: Besson. S., The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human 
Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to (2012) Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 25, 857. Page 867. 
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This chapter first turns to consider the extraterritorial application of the Charter (3.2). 
The role of the ECtHR (3.3) and the UK’s domestic courts (3.4) represent the other two 
chief sections of this chapter. However, such has been the interaction on extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction between these later two fora that they may be conceived as one overarching 
conversation as to how extraterritorial jurisdiction is engaged. While the UK’s actions 
abroad have given rise to seminal case-law in consideration of extraterritorial jurisdic t ion 
by the Strasbourg court, its domestic courts also have the capability in their own right to 
pass influential judgments as to where the UK’s fundamental rights obligations begin and 
end. The final section (3.5) concludes by proffering some conclusions on the role of the 
CJEU and its potential for a greater role; while also synopsizing the challenges jointly faced 
by the UK domestic courts and the ECtHR in attaching legal responsibility to States which 
exercise de facto control. 
3.2 Application of EU Fundamental Rights Law to 
Externalisation 
This section considers the legal responsibility of EU Member States for fundamental rights 
violations which occur in the implementation of an externalised procedure of migrat ion 
control and border management. The EU is supposed to become a full contracting party to 
the ECHR and should thus itself one day be subject to its Article 1.5 However, as Costello 
and Moreno-Lax point out this is “not relevant to the question of the scope of application 
of EU fundamental rights and the Charter within the EU legal context as a matter of EU 
                                                                 
4 “Jurisdiction only triggers the applicability of human rights law, whereas State responsibility examines 
whether the State is liable for the violation of a specific human right.” See: Klug. A., & Howe. T., The 
Concept of State Jurisdiction and the Applicability of the Non-Refoulement Principle To Extraterritorial 
Interception Measures. Page 100. In Ryan. B., and Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control 
(2010).  
“The concept of jurisdiction… remains important as a threshold criterion of responsibility for human 
rights violations…” See: Goodwin-Gill. G., The Right to Seek Asylum: Interception at Sea and the 
Principle of Non-Refoulement, International Journal of Refugee Law (2011) Vol. 23 No. 3, 443. Page 452. 
See also: Scheinin. M., Just Another Word? Jurisdiction in the Roadmaps of State Responsibility and 
Human Rights. In Langford. M., Vandehole. W., Scheinin. M., & Van Genugten. W ., Global Justice, 
States’ Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law 
(2013). 
For Gammeltoft-Hansen’s position as to the relationship between extraterritorial jurisdiction and State legal 
responsibility, see: Gammeltoft-Hansen. T., Access to Asylum (2013). Page 146. 
5 Important to note here the CJEU’s finding that the EU could not accede to the ECHR under the draft 
agreement proposed. See: Opinion 2/13 
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law.”6 Notwithstanding the territorial limitations in place in the Treaties,7 CJEU case-law 
has confirmed that Union law can have effect “outside the territory of the Community.”8 
It is left to examine the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ways in 
which the Member States may be held liable for rights violations that occur in the 
implementation of externalised migration control and border management procedures. 
The ECtHR and EU Member States’ domestic courts have a long and storied history of 
considering externalised procedures and actions which could possibly give rise to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. What is sometimes overlooked is the potential for the CJEU 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights to play a key part in ensuring that EU Member State 
fundamental rights obligations are observed extraterritorially and that key fundamenta l 
rights, for asylum seekers especially, are protected. Extraterritorial jurisdiction represents 
the principle legal obstacle vis-à-vis a migrant being able to vindicate the rights contained 
in the Charter which have allegedly been violated beyond Convention territory (espace 
juridique). The Charter does not define its extraterritorial reach and so there has been a 
discussion as to whether or not it can be applied extraterritorially. That discussion is 
addressed in the following subsection (3.2.1). What emerges as being crucial to engaging 
the Charter is the CJEU’s interpretation of when is the Member State “implementing” EU 
law.9 This is subject matter of the subsequent subsection (3.2.2).  
3.2.1 Extraterritorial Application of the Charter 
Unlike the ECHR, the Charter does not possess a jurisdiction based clause which delimits 
its scope of application.10 The Charter certainly does not, either implicitly or explicitly, 
delimit its own application according to any territorial understanding of its field of 
application. Neither has the CJEU ruled that a territorially restricted interpretation of 
                                                                 
6 Costello. C., and Moreno-Lax. V., The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model. Page 1675.  In Peers. S., Hervey. T., 
Kenner. J., & Ward. A., The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2014). 
7 Article 52, TEU. Article 355, TFEU. 
8 C-214/94, Boukhalfa v Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Paragraph 14. 
9 Article 51, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
In the current context, see: Moreno-Lax. V., Chapter 7, The Fundamental Rights Acquis in Moreno-Lax. 
V., Seeking Asylum in Europe – Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law (2012) 
PhD Thesis, Université Catholique de Louvain. 
10 Costello. C., and Moreno-Lax. V., The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model. Page 1658. In Peers. S., Hervey. T., 
Kenner. J., & Ward. A., The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2014). 
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jurisdiction is its preferred approach. Consideration of the extraterritorial application of the 
Charter has so far been almost exclusively the preserve of legal academics and even they 
have hitherto been somewhat unforthcoming. One important exception to that reserved 
reaction has been the contribution of Costello and Moreno-Lax.11 Those authors argued 
convincingly that the Charter’s only requirement for application is the question of whether 
EU law applies to the particular circumstances in question. Article 51(1) of the Charter 
states that the provisions of the Charter “are addressed …to the Member States only when 
they are implementing Union law.” In other words, the Charter applies to the acts of the 
Member States when they are implementing EU law or when they act within the scope of 
Union law.12 
A Member State is implementing EU law when it adopts measures with the 
intention of applying an EU act – for example a directive13 or a regulation.14  The adoption 
of such measures represents the implementation of Union law as per Article 51(1) of the 
Charter.15 However, it is not absolutely necessary for national legislation to have been 
adopted for the implementation of EU law, it’s sufficient that the situation falls within the 
scope of EU law for application of the Charter.16 It is thus also applicable when a Member 
State adopts measures whose subject matter is already governed by provisions of EU 
primary or secondary legislation.17 The Charter being applicable when an instrument lay 
                                                                 
11 Costello. C., and Moreno-Lax. V., The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model. In Peers. S., Hervey. T., Kenner. J., & 
Ward. A., The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2014). 
12 See: Lenaerts. K., Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights  (2012) 
 European Constitutional Law Review Vol. 8(3), 375. 
See also: Sarmiento. D., Who’s afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, national courts and the new 
framework of fundamental rights protection in Europe (2013) Common Market Law Review Vol. 50(5), 
1267. 
Finally, see: Safjan. M., Areas of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: 
fields of conflict? (2011) Working Paper No. 22, European University Institute 
13 See: C442/00, Cabellero. 
14 Groussot. X., Pech. L., & Thor Petursson. G., The Scope of Application of Fundamental Rights on 
Member States Action: In Search of Certainty in EU Adjudication (2011) Working Paper No 1, Eric Stein . 
Page 5. 
15 C-309/96, Annibaldi. Paragraphs 21-23. 
C-40/11, Iida. Paragraph 79. 
C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, [GC]. Paragraphs 19-20. 
C-400/10 PPU J McB v. LE. Paragraph 51. 
16 C617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, [GC]. 
17 Those measures adopted by a Member State with the intention of implementing an EU act, see: C-5/88, 
Wachauf. 
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within the scope of EU law lends credence to the argument that a Member State cannot 
evade engagement of the Charter for certain procedures by way of a simple opt-out from 
EU legislation. Article 51(2) provides that the Charter “does not extend the field of 
application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or 
task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.” That restriction 
has no material impact on when Union law is being implemented. 
The above-mentioned criteria serve as a guide in applying the Charter but the CJEU 
has not espoused a “specific test”, the application of which would provide an answer as to 
whether a certain measure represented the implementation of Union law by the Member 
State or not. 18 The CJEU has a burgeoning jurisprudence as to what constitutes a Member 
State implementing Union law and thus what engages the Charter.19  The cases of 
Mangold20 and Kücükdeveci21 have been important in exploring just how expansive the 
application of EU law can be and therefore how expansively the Charter may be applied. 
In both cases, national rules were deemed to come within the scope of EU law by virtue of 
dealing with substantive matters that were already governed by EU directives, trigger ing 
the application of EU fundamental rights law.22 The case of Fransson23 sets the high water 
mark for a wide approach being taken by the Court in this context. The impression may be 
that Article 51 can be all encompassing and that almost everything can be considered to 
                                                                 
Those measures adopted by a Member State whose subject matter is governed by provisions of Union law, 
see: C‐465/00, C‐138/01 and C-139/01, Rundfunk. C‐101/01, Lindqvist. 
Those circumstances in which the State derogating from Union law, especially free movement, can result in 
a breach of the Charter, see: C‐260/89, ERT. 
See: Groussot. X., Pech. L., & Thor Petursson. G., The Scope of Application of Fundamental Rights on 
Member States Action: In Search of Certainty in EU Adjudication (2011) Working Paper No 1, Eric Stein. 
Page 14. 
18 Groussot. X., Pech. L., & Thor Petursson. G., The Scope of Application of Fundamental Rights on 
Member States Action: In Search of Certainty in EU Adjudication (2011) Working Paper No 1, Eric Stein . 
Page 1-2. 
19 Discretion in NS is given as example by Spaventa of just how broad “the application” has become. 
See: C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS and ME, [GC]. 
See: Spaventa. E., Fundamental Rights in the European Union, Chapter 9, page 233. In Barnard. C., & 
Peers. C., European Union Law (2014). 
20 C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, [GC]. 
21 C‑555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, [GC]. 
22 Costello. C., & Moreno-Lax. V., The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model. Page 1681. In Peers. S., Hervey. T., 
Kenner. J., Ward. A., The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2014). 
23 C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [GC]. 
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have been already touched by EU acts but the CJEU has shown itself to be resistant to such 
a reading and is precise rather than general in applying Article 51.24  
The CJEU is still feeling its way on what constitutes “implementing Union law” 
and so, what engages the Charter. What is clear is that a person cannot invoke the Charter 
against the State in all and every circumstance simply on the basis of an exclusive or shared 
EU competence. Nevertheless, the CJEU has overseen the steady erosion of areas of State 
action which are exempt from being required to respect EU fundamental rights.25 In other 
words, the Court has found a growing and an increasingly diversified field of application 
for the Charter because the fields in which Member States are not “implementing Union 
law” have been found by the Court to have shrunk in number and in scope. This significant 
shrinkage has meant that the Charter has potential for application in ways which other 
fundamental rights fora may not have because it is not subject to any debate as to 
jurisdiction in a territorial sense. Costello and Moreno-Lax’s contribution argues 
convincingly in favour of the CJEU’s approach to the application of the Charter being 
orientated around competences rather than adopting a concept of jurisdiction which 
revolves around territory.26 
3.2.2 The Charter’s Requirement – “…implementing Union law” 
Intense consideration of the still-evolving trigger for application (“…implementing Union 
law”) is beyond the scope of this work27 but a relatively straightforward application may 
be made as to externalised migration control and border management. The EU’s external 
                                                                 
24 See: C-370/12, Thomas Pringle. 
See also: Lenaerts. K., Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2012) European 
Constitutional Law Review, 8, 375. 
See also: C-106/13, Fierro and Marmorale v Ronchi and Scocozza.  
Finally, see also: C-14/13, Gena Ivanova Cholakova. 
25 Especially important in this regard have been: C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, [GC]; C‑
555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, [GC]; C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, [GC]. 
26 Costello. C., and Moreno-Lax. V., The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model. Page 1682. In Peers. S., Hervey. T., 
Kenner. J., & Ward. A., The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2014). 
27 See: Hancox. E., The Scope of EU Fundamental Rights: An Analytical Approach (2012) LL.M thesis, 
European University Institute. 
See also: Lenaerts. K., Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2012) European 
Constitutional Law Review, 8, 375. 
84 | P a g e  
 
competence with regard to the AFSJ28 is a shared competence.29 The EU’s competence in 
this context stems from Article 79(3) TFEU which provides the Union with the competence 
to conclude readmission agreements and Article 78 TFEU which gives the Union the 
competence to adopt measures promoting “partnership and cooperation with third 
countries for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary 
or temporary protection.”30 These two provisions set out the Union’s external competence 
for the AFSJ. Beyond these, “the external AFSJ remains a field of largely implied external 
competence.”31 This also means that Member States can continue to exercise their 
competence on AFSJ matters to the extent that the EU has not exercised its competence.32  
With externalised procedures Member States are oftentimes implementing 
domestic law which finds its substantive roots in acts of the Union. A Member State which 
has created domestic law on the basis of the Immigration Liaison Officer regulations33 is, 
in effect, implementing Union law. With regard to maritime interdiction, Italian push-backs 
to Libya34 which led to the Hirsi35 case at the ECtHR, were undertaken before the EU began 
providing for surveillance and interception of migrants at sea.36 The implementation of 
                                                                 
28 For a comprehensive overview, see: Eisele. K., The External Dimension of the EU’s Migration Policy 
(2014). Rijpma. J., The External Dimension of EU Border Management. In Rijpma. J., Building Borders: 
The Regulatory Framework for the Management of the External Borders of the European Union (2009) 
PhD Thesis, European University Institute. Van Vooren. B., Chapter 14, The External Dimension of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. In Van Vooren. B., & Wessel. RA., EU External Relations Law: Text, 
Cases and Materials (2014). Monar. J., The EU’s growing external role in the AFSJ domain: factors, 
framework and forms of action (2013) Cambridge Review of International Affairs  27 (1), 147. 
29 Article 4(2) (j) TFEU. 
30 Article 78(2)(g), Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. 
31 Cremona. M., EU External Action in the JHA Domain: A Legal Perspective. In Cremona. M., Monar. J., 
& Poli. S., The External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (2011). 
32 Article 2(2) TFEU, Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. 
An example of a Member State remaining free to conclude individual agreements with third countries in 
fields that have not been wholly pre-empted by EU action is the 1 October 2008 agreement that Germany 
signed with the US on access to biometric data and the spontaneous sharing of data about known and 
suspected terrorists. 
33 See: Regulation (EU) No 493/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison officers 
network. 
34 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Co-operation by Italy and Libya (2008). 
35 Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, 27765/09, [GC]. 
36 Council Decision of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards t he surveillance 
of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union, 2010/252. 
 Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing 
rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated 
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domestic legislation applying maritime interdiction is certainly not absolutely necessary in 
order for the Charter to be applicable. The implementation of procedures largely based 
upon the External Sea Borders Regulation will in themselves represent the implementation 
of Union law. The Charter will track a competence in any case and the implementation of 
procedures that have already been materially dealt with by the Union will give rise to a 
Member State operating subject to the Charter. This means that even if a Member State has 
opted out of the relevant legislation, the Charter will still apply where that Member State 
has implemented a procedure which has already been dealt with by that legislation. 
Frontex, like other Union AFSJ Agencies, has been conferred with a limited 
external competence with specific purposes.37 In conjunction with their own governing 
legislation, maritime interdiction38 and Liaison Officers39 have both been enshrined in the 
European Border and Coast Guard Regulation and form an important element of the 
Agency’s work. In any case, the Agency is bound by the Charter in all it does.40 An alleged 
violation at the hands of Immigration Liaison Officers or maritime interdiction in a mission 
that is implemented by Frontex will automatically engage the Charter. The Agency’s 
‘hands-off’ approach could prove to be crucial in this regard as simple organisation of a 
procedure may not be enough to engage Frontex’s responsibilities under the Charter. 
The implementation of Union law is read widely by the CJEU to the extent that it 
is difficult to envisage situations whereby unilateral State action in a field such as migrat ion 
control and border management could possibly give rise to a divergence between 
                                                                 
by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union. 
37 Article 4(f). Article 54. Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 
2005/267/EC.  
38 Article 4(b). Article 8(f). Article 14(2)(e). Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council 
Decision 2005/267/EC. 
39 Article 55. Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 
2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. 
40 Article 51(1), Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
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procedures and the application of the Charter to any alleged violation arising out of the 
implementation of those procedures. The fact that this implementation takes place beyond 
the external borders of the Union, in international waters or inside third States, is 
immaterial to the application of the Charter. “The scope of the Charter is the field of 
application of the Treaties …where EU and Member State actors operate outside the 
physical or sovereign territory of the EU but within the scope of the Treaties, the 
application of the Charter is determined by the jurisdiction of the actors. The key issue is 
jurisdiction, not territory. Therefore, the Charter’s applicability applies to all actions of 
the EU institutions and bodies, wherever they are performed.”41 Together the 
implementation of Union law and falling within the scope of Union law have tremendous 
potential as qualifying criteria to ensure an all-encompassing application of the Charter 
wherever EU law is implemented. 
The impact of extraterritorial application of the Charter will be most keenly felt at 
the level of national domestic courts applying the Charter directly to the implementa t ion 
of Union law by the relevant Member State. In any case, “…even where a particular issue 
has been deemed to lie outside the scope of application of EU law and therefore to be 
unreviewable by the ECJ for compliance with EU fundamental rights, the ECJ has 
occasionally drawn the Member State’s attention to its international obligations under the 
ECHR, as it did in Metock.”42 The Charter, and by default the CJEU, have the potential to 
act as an important brake on any violations arising out of the external procedures of 
Member States, whether they are acting unilaterally or as a collective in a Frontex 
organised mission. 
In PPU X. and X,43 Advocate General Mengozzi seemed to carry questions as to 
the application of the Charter to their logical conclusion when arguing that “…the 
fundamental rights recognised by the Charter, which any authority of the Member States 
must respect when acting within the framework of EU law, are guaranteed …irrespective 
                                                                 
41 Guild. E., Carrera. S., Den Hertog. L., Parkin. J., Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and its impact on EU Home Affairs Agencies (2011). Page 48. 
42 Craig. P., & De Búrca. G., EU Law – Text  Cases and Materials 5th Ed. (2011). Page 388. Referring to 
the case of C-127/08 Metock. 
43 C-638/16, PPU X. & X. v. État Belge, [GC]. 
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of any territorial criterion.”44 Mengozzi was essentially arguing that by adopting a 
decision under the visa code,45 the authorities of a Member State are implementing EU law 
such that they are required to respect the rights guaranteed by the Charter. Such a finding 
would effectively require the Member States to issue humanitarian visas where there is a 
serious risk to Article 4. The fact that high stakes were at play was reflected by the thirteen 
Member States that submitted observations to the CJEU before it issued its judgment. 
Eventually, the Court diverged from the path beaten by the Advocate General by finding 
that a decision under the Article 1 of the Visa Code “does not fall within the scope of that 
code but, as European Union law currently stands, solely within that of national law.”46 
This Decision was taken on the basis that the situation in question fell outside the scope of 
the Visa Code as the purpose for the visa application made was to apply for internationa l 
protection and not to obtain a short-term visa and no has been adopted on the basis of 
Article 79 (2) (a) of the TFEU (the issuing of long-term visas and residence permits to 
third-country nationals on humanitarian grounds). Perhaps the case may have arrived at the 
wrong time as the Court considered the arguments on the eve of several different national 
elections where migration was playing a key role and in a climate that was hostile to the 
Advocate General’s Opinion. The degree to which the approach taken by the Court may 
have even been politically motivated is impossible to say47 but it does not bode well for the 
extraterritorial application of the Charter. However, more clarifying case-law is needed 
before a true picture emerges from the Court. 
3.3 European Convention on Human Rights – Triggering     
Responsibility 
In the case of Loizidou, in stating that the ECtHR deals with extraterritorial jurisdiction as 
a preliminary matter, the judgment declared that: “The Court …is not called upon at the 
preliminary objections stage of its procedure to examine whether Turkey is actually 
                                                                 
44 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, delivered on 7 February 2017, C-638/16, PPU X. & X. v. État 
Belge, [GC]. 
45 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code). 
46 C-638/16, PPU X. & X. v. État Belge, [GC]. Paragraph 51. 
47 Brouwer. E., The European Court of Justice on Humanitarian Visas: Legal integrity vs. political 
opportunism? (2017) CEPS Commentary. 
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responsible under the Convention for the acts which form the basis of the applicant’s 
complaints… The Court’s enquiry is limited to determining whether the matters 
complained of by the applicant are capable of falling within the “jurisdiction” of Turkey 
even though they occur outside her national territory.” 48 This is noteworthy in the present 
context for two reasons. Firstly, and by way of immediate contrast with the Charter and 
CJEU, it is obvious straightaway that territory is not irrelevant to understanding jurisdic t ion 
in the ECtHR. Secondly, it is also clear that the Strasbourg Court does not equate 
jurisdiction and legal responsibility. However, it is clear that the existence of jurisdic t ion 
is a pre-requisite for consideration of legal responsibility and thus can be considered as 
being a trigger of such responsibility. The Strasbourg court has a storied history of 
consideration of this trigger.  
Article 1 of the Convention obligates the Contracting States to secure “to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I.” Questions have 
arisen as to the reach of jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court and the basis by which the 
Court should approach determining that jurisdiction. In the travaux préparatoire, a 
proposal was made that the scope “be limited to all persons residing within the territories 
of the Member States” but this was rejected in favour of the wording based on 
jurisdiction.49 The intention was that the Convention should not be limited by geography 
but should be capable of external engagement. The ECtHR has reflected that by rejecting 
absolutely the proposition of jurisdiction ending at the geographical borders of the 
contracting States. “The question is thus not whether the ECHR can have extraterritorial 
application, but under which conditions that is the case.”50 Nevertheless, territory has still 
left an indelible mark on the evolution of how jurisdiction is approached by the Court. The 
Strasbourg court has repeatedly stressed that extraterritorial jurisdiction will only be 
engaged in ‘exceptional’ circumstances.51 A debate has raged as to what circumstances 
                                                                 
48 See: Loizidou v. Turkey, 15318/89. Paragraph 61. 
49 Guild. E., Security and European Human Rights: Protecting Individual Rights in Times of Exception and 
Military Action (2007). Page 18. 
50 Guild. E., Carrera. S., Den Hertog. L., & Parkin. J., Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and its Impact on EU Home Affairs Agencies Frontex, Europol and EASO (2011) Centre for European 
Policy Studies. Page 48. 
51 Extraterritorial jurisdiction only occurs in ‘exceptional’ circumstances. See: Banković and Others v. 
Belgium and Others, 52207/99, [GC]. Paragraph 61. Also mentioned in: Al-Skeini and Others v UK, 
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should qualify the actions of the State as representing such ‘exceptional’ circumstances. 
The Strasbourg Court’s road to refining this ‘exceptionality’ has been paved with 
obfuscation rather than clarification. 
3.3.1 The Banković Case – Prelude and Legacy 
There are two main models that have formed the framework by which ‘exceptionality’ has 
been approached by the ECtHR.52 Firstly, there is the spatial model which is the State’s 
effective overall control of an area. Secondly, there is the personal model which is the 
State’s effective control of an individual. This second model has been particularly fraught 
with difficulty.53 The case of Loizidou54 established that effective control of a territoria l 
area could qualify as engaging extraterritorial jurisdiction. Effective control of an area by 
the State in Loizidou was through its military and was within the espace juridique of the 
ECHR i.e. within the legal space of the contracting States. The Cyprus v Turkey joint case 
recognised that authorised agents of a State, including diplomatic and consular agents and 
armed forces, not only remain under its jurisdiction when abroad but can also bring any 
other persons or property into the jurisdiction of that State, insofar as they exercise effective 
control over such persons or property.55 The crucial criterion in engaging a State’s 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in either model has thus been the control that it has exercised in 
the implementation of a procedure. 
The infamous Banković56 decision of 2001 was the pivotal moment in ECtHR 
consideration of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Court in that case found that the aerial 
bombardment of Belgrade did not represent an engagement of the contracting States’ 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Court stated that Article 1 of the Convention must “be 
considered to reflect the ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other 
bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular 
circumstances of each case.”57 The ECtHR held that the ECHR was essentially to be 
                                                                 
55721/07, [GC].  Paragraph 149. And finally, in: Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 27765/09, [GC]. Paragraph 
72. 
52 Set out in: Milanovic. M., Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (2011).   
53 Milanovic. M., Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (2011).  Page 173. 
54 Loizidou v. Turkey, 15318/89. 
55 Cyprus v Turkey, 6780/74 and 6950/75. Paragraph 8. 
56 Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States , 52207/99, [GC]. 
57 Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, 52207/99. Paragraph 61. 
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applied within the espace juridique.58 The Court rejected the applicants’ argument that 
Convention obligations “adhere proportionally to the level of control exerted by a state 
party.”59 This was the context of Banković’s famed declaration that Convention rights 
cannot be “divided and tailored” to suit the specific circumstances relevant in each case.60 
By not being ‘divided and tailored’ the Court meant that a State must be able to secure all 
of the Convention’s rights in order to have jurisdiction. 
 The Court in Banković outlined four exceptional circumstances in which a 
contracting State could possibly exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.61 These four 
exceptions themselves having already being set out in Loizidou62 and having been inspired 
by disparate case law from the Court. However, it should be added that these four 
exceptions to the strictly territorial understanding of jurisdiction were only set out in 
Loizidou as being examples of exceptions and the Court in that case didn’t list them as 
being an exhaustive list but the Court in Banković implied they were. The four exceptions 
are: Cases which concern the extradition or expulsion of a person by a Contracting State;63 
cases where the acts of the State, whether performed inside or outside national borders, 
produce effects outside their own national territory;64 cases which involve an ‘effective’ 
control of an area outside its own national territory; and finally, cases concerning consular 
or diplomatic actions and cases in which the actions of a vessel flying the flag of the 
contracting State are in question.65  
The ECtHR, in Banković, therefore rejected the personal model developed in the 
Cyprus v Turkey joint case (although did not expressly do so) in favour of a stringent 
interpretation of the Loizidou case which set out strictly defined strands of the spatial 
                                                                 
58 Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, 52207/99. Paragraph 80. 
59 Miltner. B., Revisiting Extraterritoriality after Al-Skeini: the ECHR and its Lessons (2012) Michigan 
Journal of International Law Vol. 33(4), 693. Page 696. 
60 Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, 52207/99. Paragraph 75. 
61 Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, 52207/99. Paragraph 68-73. 
62 Loizidou v Turkey, 15318/89. Paragraph 62. 
63 Soering v UK, 14038/88; Cruz Vara and Others v Sweden, 15576/89; Vilvarajah and Others v UK, 
13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87; 13447/87; 13448/87. 
64 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, 12747/87. 
65 Miller. S., Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction under the European Convention (2010) European Journal of International Law Vol. 20 no. 4.  
Page 1227. 
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model.66 Banković rejected an expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction so as to include a 
personal model67 because it feared what has come to be called the ‘cause and effect notion’ 
of jurisdiction. Essentially, the Court felt that the personal model would open the door to 
the possibility that contracting States engaged their jurisdiction in any situation whereby 
they had the power to violate a person’s rights anywhere in the world. However, the Court 
would soon find out that it was incapable of performing its duties without some form of 
personal model. The Court would have to reassess its refusal to accept that “a state has 
obligations under human rights treaties towards all individuals whose human rights it is 
able to violate.”68 The reason why the Banković judgment became ‘infamous’ is that it has 
never been categorically rejected and there has instead been an awkward integration of the 
case into seemingly opposing paths which the Court has taken. 
3.3.2 Subsequent Jurisprudence – Tacit Dissent to Banković 
Post Banković, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has not moved to clarify the scope of and 
rationale for the exceptions listed in the Banković case but has instead undermined that 
decision.69 However, rather than a progressive move away from Banković reasoning, there 
has been a series of confused deviations from that key decision. These judgments have 
fallen badly short of the outright rejection of Banković that was needed and have actually 
attempted to adhere to that decision while dismantling key parts of its reasoning. The case-
law post-Banković has also often seen the Court neatly avoiding any reference to that case 
at all and instead returning to the earlier practice in which extraterritor ial jurisdiction was 
recognised seemingly on an ad hoc basis.70 
Already in 2005, in Issa v Turkey,71 in finding that the State had not established an 
‘effective’ control, the Court put forward a broader interpretation of extraterritor ia l 
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jurisdiction which flew in the face of the reasoning of the court in Banković. The case 
involved a targeted killing by the Turkish State and there was disagreement over whether 
it actually occurred on Turkish soil or outside of the espace juridique, in northern Iraq. The 
Court applied both a spatial model (control of an area) and the personal model (control of 
an individual through an agent)72 thus making the question of where exactly it happened 
irrelevant. Issa did not reject Banković outright but it can only be seen as an important 
deviation away from that case and back toward application of the personal model which 
had been rejected in Banković. Issa was also directly contrary to the proposition that the 
spatial model can apply only within ECHR territory – the so-called espace juridique.73 
Case-law subsequent to Issa has followed its lead in applying the personal model74 yet 
none of this jurisprudence has moved to expressly reject the Grand Chamber decision in 
Banković. At the same time, a host of case-law has explicitly restated the exceptionality 
principle with explicit approval of Banković.75 There has also sometimes been reference 
made to the spatial model without any accompanying mention being made of the existence 
and application of a personal model.76 
In another decision from 2005, Öcalan v. Turkey,77 the Court again made implic it 
moves away from Banković. With next to no reference being made to the Banković 
decision, in Öcalan the Court found that extraterritorial jurisdiction could be established 
on the basis of control held by a contracting State over any single individual through the 
actions of the contracting State’s officials. The case concerned the kidnapping of Abdullah 
Öcalan, the Kurdish nationalist, and underlined the continued relevance of the personal 
model: “…the responsibility of Member States also applies in situations where the State is 
not in effective control of a certain area, but in the individual case exercises authority and 
control over a person or a group of persons.”78 The Öcalan case is illustrative of the fact 
that the Court needs the personal model and adoption of same despite its earlier rejection 
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in Banković. The extraterritorial acts of State officials engaging that State’s jurisdic t ion 
clearly goes beyond the understanding of jurisdiction being established purely on the basis 
of effective control over a specific area. It considerably widens the ambit by which an 
individual may have their Convention rights vindicated despite not being present on the 
territory of a contracting State. So, were Issa and Öcalan simply “an aberration” 79 or a 
sign of things to come? 
3.3.3 Al-Skeini – Long Awaited Clarification or Awkward Merger? 
The next really crucial instalment of guidance from the Court as to extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction came in 2011 with the cases of Al-Skeini80 and Al-Jedda.81 Al-Skeini concerned 
the killing of civilians (one applicant was killed in custody; five others were killed by 
soldiers on patrol) by British forces during the war in Iraq. Al-Jedda dealt with the 
internment of an Iraqi civilian for more than three years in a British army run detention 
centre in Basrah, Iraq. The internment in Al-Jedda was found to engage the UK’s 
jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. The Court found that: “The 
internment took place within a detention facility… controlled exclusively by British forces, 
and the applicant was therefore within the authority and control of the United Kingdom 
throughout.”82 Much of the Court’s assessment was spent considering whether the actions 
of the UN Multi-National Force were attributable to the UN or, more importantly, had 
ceased to be attributable to the troop-contributing nations.83 The Court found that those 
troop-contributing States were still obligated by the Convention. 
In Al-Skeini, the Court referenced a number of cases84 in restating what it termed the 
territorial principle: “A State's jurisdictional competence under Article 1 is primarily 
territorial. …acts of the Contracting States performed, or producing effects, outside their 
territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 only in 
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exceptional cases.”85 It then went on to somewhat awkwardly co-opt the personal model 
into the mainstream of exceptionality. The finding that the use of force by a State’s agents 
within a third State’s territory in Al-Skeini engaged that State’s jurisdiction amounted to a 
rejection of the Banković notion that the Convention’s rights could not be “divided and 
tailored.”86 The Court has therefore approved the ability of applicants to rely on certain 
Convention rights when a State agent breaches a Convention right of those applicants. This 
can be true of a single right obligation or of the whole Convention and applies even if the 
violation occurs in a (non-contracting State – beyond the espace juridique) third State.87 
The Court in Al-Skeini considered the exceptions of extraterritorial jurisdiction88 which 
were broadly in accordance with the four exceptions espoused in Loizidou89  and 
Banković,90 but broadened them by stating that “the Court's case-law demonstrates”, that 
the “use of force” by a State’s agents operating in a third State “may bring the individual 
…brought under the control of the State's authorities into the State's Article 1 jurisdiction.”  
91 This exception referenced the Öcalan case. The Court went on to say that it did not 
consider jurisdiction to arise solely on the basis of control exerted by the contracting State 
over buildings, aircraft or ships, control over individuals can also engage the Court’s 
jurisdiction but “What is decisive …is the exercise of physical power and control over the 
person in question.”92 Al-Skeini rejected the Banković contention that Convention rights 
could not be “divided and tailored.” 93 Instead the Court recognised that the positive 
obligation in Article 1 to secure “the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention” can be cut to fit the need of the particular circumstances of the extraterritor ia l 
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act in question.94 Thus the ECtHR’s “jurisdiction is relative to the human rights the state 
is able to protect in the specific situation.”95  
The UK’s soldiers in Al-Skeini, in the course of their security operations in Iraq during 
the period in question, exercised authority and control over the individuals killed such that 
a jurisdictional link could be established between the deceased and the United Kingdom 
for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.96 Al-Skeini still did not completely abandon 
the territorial based approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Instead, the Court argued that 
the actions of the agents of a contracting State within a third State, in which that contracting 
State is exercising some public powers, can represent the engagement of Convention 
obligations.97 It is the retention of this prerequisite, that the State is exercising some public 
powers, that has been the cause of most of Al-Skeini’s criticism but this has been 
overshadowed by the welcome given to Al-Skeini’s outright rejection of the Banković 
requirement that the State must be able to secure all Convention rights in order to have 
jurisdiction as well as the rejection of the espace juridique concept. While Al-Skeini did 
not reject Banković outright, it has confirmed earlier agency case-law, the so-called 
personal model,98 most notably espoused in the case of Öcalan. ‘Effective’ control through 
the exercise of “physical power and control” 99 over a person alongside the exercise of 
some public powers on the territory of the third State – what Milanovic calls a “bizarre 
mix of the personal model with the spatial one”100 – work together to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Al-Skeini does not represent as expansive a divergence from 
Banković as many scholars had proposed101 but it nonetheless represents an important 
further shift away from that wholly restrictive regime.  
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It has been argued that the ECtHR may be most effective in how it protects the 
rights contained in the Convention by abandoning any territorial-based requirement for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and instead focussing on the control exerted by the contracting 
State inside a third State, whether that control is over a territorial area or over an 
individual.102 Lawson has stated that “the extent to which Contracting parties must secure 
the rights and freedoms of individuals outside their borders is commensurate with their 
ability to do so – that is: the scope of their obligations depend on the degree of control and 
authority that they exercise.”103 Lawson saw Banković as being the exception to a line of 
case law which placed the emphasis on control more generally rather than being a case 
which was a restatement of some long-standing spatial model rule which itself only has 
certain exceptions. At the moment, in light of Al-Skeini, the Court’s preference is to attach 
a territorial to any exception which arises through an agent’s control over an individua l 
within a third State. In not wanting to explicitly reject the Banković ruling, the Court in Al-
Skeini was forced to include this requirement – the exercise of public powers. Writing 
before the Al-Skeini judgment, Miller argued against Lawson’s openness to the personal 
model and stated that the Strasbourg Court had “never found jurisdiction in cases involving 
a state’s extraterritorial actions absent some preceding or subsequent nexus to the state’s 
physical territory.”104 It seems the Court still didn’t have a desire to set such a precedent. 
 The academic reaction to Al-Skeini has generally been that it represents a positive 
departure from Banković. However, as noted above, the retention of a need for a territoria l 
element in consideration of effective control has brought continued confusion as to what 
this requirement will mean into the future. On this point Milanovic points out that the scope 
of positive obligations of rights such as the right to life remain unclear – would the UK 
have had the positive obligation to protect the right to life of applicants in Al-Skeini even 
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from purely private violence as it would have on its own territory?105 Likewise, what of a 
less obvious or joint role106 for the local (third) State in the breach in question or 
extraterritorial complicity scenarios as Milanovic calls them – if a UK agent were to feed 
questions to a coercive interrogation of a terrorist suspect in Pakistan for example?107 The 
Court had a good opportunity to clarify its position in the case of Jaloud.108 The case 
concerned the fall-out from the killing of Mr Jaloud by a Dutch led military detachment 
which was largely made up of Iraqi army soldiers and which was located in the south-east 
of Iraq in a British army controlled area.109 One might imagine that the Court’s discussion 
might take the opportunity to further refine Al-Skeini and to lay out whether the British 
exercise of public powers could contribute to establishing Dutch extraterritorial jurisdic t ion 
under the personal model. However, the Court does not actually specify which model it is 
applying in the Jaloud decision and so the Court did not consider the necessity of public 
powers in that case. 
More practical questions also exist. The acceptance of the personal model by the 
ECtHR has not coincided with any strict explanation as to how the State’s control in either 
model is to be delineated. What exactly makes a State’s control an ‘effective’ control either 
over an area or a person? More especially, and considering the case-law that has set out the 
personal model thus far, is this ‘effective’ control to be understood as requiring the exercise 
of compulsory powers by the contracting State? Certainly Al-Skeini hints toward their 
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presence being a crucial prerequisite.110 For now, each case remains to be examined on the 
basis of the facts of that particular case.111  
3.3.4 Maritime Interdiction and Hirsi 
The Strasbourg Court has most famously considered externalised procedures in the context 
of maritime interdiction in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy.112 However, 
previous to that decision the Court delivered several pertinent decisions which are also 
worth consideration here. 
In 1997, an Italian naval vessel collided with an Albanian ship on the Straits of 
Otranto in Albanian territorial waters. The Italian vessel was attempting to interdict 
migrants from Albania and was acting on the basis of an Italian/Albanian bilateral treaty 
which allowed the Italians to interdict boats flying the Albanian flag. Xhavara v Albania 
and Italy113was considered inadmissible because national remedies had not been exhausted 
but the case is worth noting on the basis of the questions of jurisdiction which arose in the 
case and which were considered by the Court.114 The Court found that Italy, as the flag 
State of the patrol boat, was responsible for the human rights violations caused by its vessel 
to persons not on board of its vessel.115 The Italian military vessel colliding with the 
boatload of migrants resulted in the death by drowning of 58 individuals. The case fits 
neatly into one of the four exceptions to territorial jurisdiction listed by the court in 
Banković – consular actions and actions by a vessel flying a contracting State’s flag. In any 
case, that the Albanian migrants were not physically on board the Italian vessel or that 
Italian officials were not on the Albanian vessel was not prohibitive to establishing 
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jurisdiction.116 Mention may also be made here of a non-migration case, that of Medvedyev 
and others v France.117 That case didn’t involve migrants but instead concerned 
Cambodian drug smugglers intercepted by the French navy on the high seas. The ECtHR 
found that the actions of the French coastguard in international waters had engaged 
France’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. Thus the case made clear that contracting States 
engage ECHR jurisdiction for actions exercised on the high seas when those actions are 
carried out in the framework of an agreement which gives enforcement powers and/or when 
State authorities exercise effective control on vessels and their passengers.118 
 The Hirsi case was decided in early 2012 – eight months after Al-Skeini. The case 
examined whether an interception by the Guardia di Finanza in international waters 
constituted effective control and therefore an exercise of jurisdiction by Italy. The 
interception resulted in the Italian authorities returning migrants to Libya under the terms 
of a bilateral treaty between Italy and Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya as it then was.119 This 
consisted of taking the migrants on board a vessel flying the Italian flag, sailing it to Libya 
and disembarking those migrants there. The question was thus raised whether or not the 
ECtHR’s jurisdiction was engaged by Italy’s actions in controlling migrants in this way. 
Al-Skeini did not do anything to dilute the understanding that jurisdiction for the ECtHR is 
primarily territorial; Hirsi again confirmed this as still being the Court’s perspective. 120 
The Grand Chamber did not revisit the delicate balance made in Al-Skeini of establishing 
whether or not an ‘effective’ control existed through the exercise of physical power and 
control over a person alongside the exercise of some public powers. Instead, in applying 
the general principles that govern jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
Convention to the facts of the Hirsi case, the Court made reference to the exception to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction which was made in Banković and which was referenced above 
in the context of the Xhavara case. The exception is as to the actions of vessels that are 
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flying a contracting State’s flag. The exception is based upon “customary international 
law and treaty provisions.”121 
Some have argued that in the Hirsi case “…the Grand Chamber continues its 
progress away from a territorial approach to jurisdiction by extending it to interceptions 
on the high seas… [and] Thus the Hirsi case continues to challenge the traditional stance 
that the responsibility to protect human rights is essentially territorial.”122 However, it has 
already argued here that the ECtHR is not in fact moving away from a territoria l 
understanding of jurisdiction at all. It is simply that the framework of exceptions to that the 
territorial-based understanding is evolving. In any case, the maritime interdiction of 
migrants representing extraterritorial jurisdiction had already been dealt with by the ECtHR 
in Xhavara. Hirsi does not represent any substantial shift away from the essentially 
territorially based understanding of jurisdiction. Hirsi adds nothing to the shift away from 
Banković that Al-Skeini represented. The fact that Hirsi relied upon an exception already 
enumerated as such in the Banković case means that in extraterritorial jurisdiction terms, 
Hirsi was not a ground-breaking case. What Hirsi did do was to further clarify the 
precedent already handed down by the admissibility case of Xhavara, that marit ime 
interdiction of migrants can and will engage a contracting State’s jurisdiction. In making 
this finding the ECtHR made reference to “the exclusive de jure and de facto control of the 
Italian authorities” from the time the migrants boarded the Italian vessel to the time of 
their disembarkation.123 The Court felt that it was worth its while commenting upon the 
composition of the crew and the ownership of the vessels involved. The Court noted that 
the vessels in question were ships of the Italian armed forces, the crews of which were 
composed exclusively of Italian military personnel.124 This is interesting in the context of 
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States sharing duties of maritime interdiction in instances such as Mauritanian crews on 
board Spanish ships and with a Spanish presence on board.125 
On this basis it is difficult to sustain the argument that “The Hirsi case could set a 
critical precedent for those European States that are attempting to shift the burden of 
responsibility for examining asylum applications to third countries…”126 The Hirsi case 
can be taken as a further signal of resolve from the ECtHR that contracting States are to be 
made legally responsible for maritime interdiction. It is an affirmation of foregoing case-
law rather than itself setting a crucial precedent which in any way builds upon Al-Skeini. 
However, the case cannot be taken as the death knell to extraterritorial migration control 
and border management procedures in all its guises. Question marks remain especially over 
such procedures if they do not incorporate compulsory powers or they take place inside the 
territory of a third State. Hirsi is certainly not the game-changing moment for externalised 
migration control and border management.127 
3.3.5 Agent Exceptionality Based on Two Criteria 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction will still only be established as an exception to the prevailing 
territorial understanding of jurisdiction. The territorial-bound understanding of jurisdic t ion 
is still the rule albeit with a seemingly increasing framework, in terms of quantity and 
scope, of exceptions that are accepted by the ECtHR. Beyond maritime interdiction lay a 
patchwork of migration control and border management procedures whose implementa t ion 
relies upon the presence of an organ of the contracting State on the territory of third States. 
Such procedures represent a “final frontier” for the Strasbourg court in the context of 
migration control and border management. 128 It is a “final frontier” in the sense that the 
ECtHR has never considered extraterritorial jurisdiction in the context of migration control 
and border management of a contracting State, inside the territory of a third State. 
Immigration Liaison Officers represent one such procedure and are doubly interesting to 
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contemplate because they do not incorporate compulsory powers. The spatial and personal 
models have thus far both relied upon physical expressions of control in order to understand 
how ‘effective control’ is engaged. 
 In general, the continued piecemeal approach of the Strasbourg court to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction has an impact on the legal certainty and predictability involved 
in this area of law. Non-compulsory powered externalised migration control and border 
management are especially impacted upon in this regard. The scope of the exceptions to 
the territorial understanding of jurisdiction is in question. Immigration Liaison Officers, 
acting as agents of the State, do not utilise compulsory powers as the Turkish agents 
involved in the kidnapping of Abdullah Öcalan did in the Öcalan case. Immigra t ion 
Liaison Officers work within the massive emigration bureaucracy of a third State, do not 
control any territory, do not exercise any compulsory powers and are not included in the 
exceptions listed in Banković129 and expanded upon in Al-Skeini vis-à-vis the personal 
model. As things stand, the actions of an agent would need quite a radical reading of the 
personal model in order to engage a contracting State’s extraterritorial jurisdiction if that 
agent has the typical job description of an Immigration Liaison Officer. An Immigra t ion 
Liaison Officer’s duties can be contrasted with the facts of the Jaloud case (supra, in the 
section 3.3.3). The nature of the “authority and control over persons passing through a 
checkpoint”130 exerted in Jaloud was vastly different from that which is exercised by 
Immigration Liaison Officers in their checkpoint. 
Al-Skeini gave rise to dual-criteria by which extraterritorial jurisdiction can be 
established by an agent of the State. Firstly, that agent must exercise physical power and 
control over the person in question.131 Secondly, the contracting State must be exercising 
“all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government.”132 The 
first criterion is unfulfilled by a procedure such as Immigration Liaison Officers. 
Immigration Liaison Officers’ crucial controlling power is the advice they provide to an 
                                                                 
129 Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, 52207/99. Paragraph 68-73. 
  Loizidou v Turkey, 15318/89. Paragraph 62. 
130 Jaloud v The Netherlands, 47708/08, [GC]. Paragraph 152. 
131 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, 55721/07, [GC]. Paragraph 136. 
132 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, 55721/07, [GC]. Paragraph 135. 
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airline which is subject to carrier sanctions.133 Arrest and detention are the classic 
conception of physical power and control over a person.134 For the purpose of externalised 
migration control this requirement is likely to be only met where asylum-seekers are taken 
into physical custody and/or detained by agents of the State.135 There is a stark difference 
in the control exercised by the typical duties of an ILO and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
on effective control over a person which features actions such as arrest and detention of the 
person.136 In general, physical force – killing,137 apprehending138 and detaining139 – has 
been persuasive to the court in finding that State jurisdiction had been engaged. The ECtHR 
itself has therefore set aside compulsory powers as a clear invocation of jurisdiction. As 
Milanovic points out, the Court, in making this demand of physical power and control, 
raises the question why should there be a limit to the personal model of jurisdiction, for 
example to physical custody?140  
An element of control over the migrant seeking to board the carrier could certainly 
be asserted as existing through the contribution, or arguably the decisive control over, to 
such a crucial decision as access to travel yet this does not represent the exercise of a 
physical power and control over the migrant. “…it remains questionable whether merely 
carrying out immigration interviews and rejecting onward passage, …will meet the test set 
by, for example …Ocalan [sic] and… Al-Skeini.”141 Procedures such as Immigration 
                                                                 
133 “…it is questionable whether it can be reasonably said that deployed document experts merely give 
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Liaison Officers further highlights the need for the Court to go further than Al-Skeini and 
reconsider the ways in which a person may be controlled beyond compulsory powers. The 
Court must do so in order to recognised so-called soft powers such as decision-mak ing 
which is capable of ensuring access to protection or denying that access. 
The satisfaction of the second criterion is, at this point in time, also suspect. 
Arguably, Immigration Liaison Officers participate in the emigration regime of the third 
State. This appears, prima facie, to represent the exercise of public powers. However, much 
of the ECtHR’s opportunity to deliberate on extraterritorial jurisdiction has come about as 
a result of military intervention of one kind or another.142 The Court in Al-Skeini stated that 
“In determining whether effective control exists, the Court will primarily have reference 
to the strength of the State's military presence in the area.”143 Loizidou was the case that 
really established control over an area (spatial model) of a third State’s territory as possibly 
giving rise to an exception to the territorial bound understanding of ECtHR jurisdict ion. 
The case involved 30,000 Turkish military personnel occupying northern Cyprus.144 Al-
Skeini likewise involved the occupation of the city of Basrah and greater southern Iraq by 
the UK army. By contrast, Banković was limited to intervention from the sky through a 
NATO aerial bombardment. The Court stated its belief in Banković that the mere power to 
kill does not equal jurisdiction, effective control generally requires troops on the ground 
assuming some public powers.145 The stock placed in ‘boots on the ground’146 by the 
Strasbourg Court in showing that public powers are in the hands of a contracting State, is 
clear. Grabenwarter states: “In determining whether effective control exists, the Court will 
primarily have reference to the strength of the State's military presence in the area. Other 
indicators may also be relevant, such as the extent to which its military, economic and 
political support for the local subordinate administration provides it with influence and 
                                                                 
142 For example: Cyprus v. Turkey, 25781/94; Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 48787/99; Al-
Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, 55721/07, [GC]; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United 
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control over the region.”147 The level of control of an area that is achieved through military 
occupation cannot be reproduced by any kind of involvement in a third State’s migrat ion 
control and border management procedures. The control exerted by Immigration Liaison 
Officers is exercised in a civilian context and may struggle to engage the vague Al-Skeini 
requirement of exercising “all or some” of the public powers normally that are normally 
exercised by the third State. It falls well short of being as clear-cut and definable as the 
State assuming military control over a territory or even just exercising consular activities148 
within a third State. Subsequent opportunities by the Court to further refine the Al-Skeini 
approach have been scorned by the Court in Jaloud and in Hassan.149 The latter case’s 
ignoring of whether the contracting State was implementing public powers at the material 
time is especially puzzling as the Grand Chamber in that case was applying the personal 
model of jurisdiction.150 
It is debateable whether or not the ECtHR, with regard to control over territory, 
enforce an “all-or-nothing approach: Effective control over foreign territory remains a 
precondition to the full applicability of the ECHR, while less than effective control seems 
to entail no responsibility whatsoever.”151 The Al-Skeini case, instead of breaking cleanly 
from the strict interpretation of Banković, attempted to paint that case as part of a coherent 
evolution which necessitated retention of a territorial aspect to jurisdiction. The resulting 
framework of exceptions does not provide enough leeway to certain migration control and 
border management procedures. Paradoxically, for a case which has been widely welcomed 
in commentary, Al-Skeini also represents an opportunity lost for the ECtHR to develop a 
new set of principles which could represent an unequivocal invocation of legal 
responsibility for a contracting State wherever, whenever and however it expressed an 
effective control. The next section (3.4) will consider jurisprudence from the UK Supreme 
Court. That case-law suggests that there is a better way such that extraterritorial jurisdic t ion 
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becomes a less unwieldy force with which to regulate the externalised procedures of 
contracting States. 
3.4 UK Domestic Courts as a Clarifying Force 
The UK has remained deeply interested in the externalisation of migration control and 
border management. As a 2007 Home Office policy document on immigration control put 
it: “off-shoring our border control is the keystone of our border defence.”152 The UK has 
often argued for the expansion of externalised procedures, most notably by arguing in 
favour of expanded entry clearance and for exploring opportunities for external processing. 
The UK also boasts a massive network of Immigration Liaison Officers and it has taken a 
controversial approach to maritime interdiction in the Mediterranean under Home 
Secretary Theresa May.153 The House of Lords, and its successor the Supreme Court of the 
UK, have interpreted how far the UK’s fundamental rights obligations extend when it 
implements procedures beyond its borders. That interpretation has been marked by a frank 
exchange of views between that Court and the Strasbourg court. That exchange has 
revolved around the fundamental rights fall-out arising out of British military intervention 
abroad rather than being based upon migration control and border management. The 
illuminating case-law from other fields can be applied to migration control and border 
management and also serves as a useful rejoinder to the examination already made as to 
the jurisprudence on extraterritorial jurisdiction in the ECtHR (3.3). It is important to recall 
the important influence that the decisions of Justices in the UK Supreme Court can have 
on their colleagues in the Strasbourg Court.154  
While oftentimes overshadowed by consideration of Strasbourg jurisprudence, this 
section will also show that the UK Supreme Court has provided far-sighted and crucial 
guidance as to an alternative direction for ECtHR case-law. The opportunity that has been 
argued above (3.3) as having been missed by the ECtHR in Al-Skeini155 was arguably 
                                                                 
152 Ryan. B., Extraterritorial Immigration Control: What Role for Legal Guarantees? Page 10. In Ryan. B., 
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grasped with both hands by the UK Supreme Court with its decision in Smith and others v 
MoD (Smith (No. 2)).156 This section first makes a short reference to the relationship which 
exists between UK domestic courts (the UK Supreme Court especially) and the ECtHR 
(3.4.1). It then considers the case-history of Smith (No.2) and how that case impacts upon 
the examination made of the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence (3.4.2). This section will 
next turn to migration specific case-law which includes examination of the infamous 
Regina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport (the “Prague Airport case”)157 (3.4.3). 
Finally, this section considers the fact that the military context continues to be most prolific 
in providing guidance vis-à-vis extraterritorial jurisdiction (3.4.4). 
3.4.1 The ECtHR and the Human Rights Act - “…must take into 
account…” 
It is sometimes forgotten that the Human Rights Act did not create a situation whereby UK 
domestic courts were bound by the Strasbourg Court. It is not a piece of legisla t ion 
designed to incorporate the ECHR into English law; it is an Act that gives ‘further effect’ 
to the Convention. UK domestic courts “must take into account”158 the judgments of the 
ECtHR but are not bound by them. The degree to which UK Courts must do so is the cause 
of some controversy in UK legal scholarship.159 Lord Irvine has pointed to the case of AF 
v SSHD160 as capturing the essence of this controversy.161 AF was decided after the 
ECtHR’s decision in A v UK162 which held that the right to a fair trial contained in the 
Convention required that a terrorist suspect be informed of the “essence of the case against 
him.”163 The UK Court came to its decision in AF on the basis that it was prohibited from 
straying from the course set out by the Strasbourg court in A and so, rather than there being 
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See also: Goodwin-Gill. G., R (ex parte European Roma Rights Centre et al) v. Immigration Officer at 
Prague Airport and another (2005) amicus curiae brief filed by UNHCR. 
158 Section 2(1), Human Rights Act, 1998. 
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162 A v UK, 3455/05, [GC]. 
163 Irvine. L., A British Interpretation of Convention Rights (2011). A lecture delivered under the auspices 
of the Bingham Centre hosted by UCL’s Judicial Institute. Page 4. 
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a judicial dialogue between the courts, it seemed there existed instruction from Strasbourg. 
Lord Hoffmann stated his regret that the appeals in AF were required to be allowed on the 
basis of the Strasbourg court’s findings in A, and stated that he was allowing the appeals 
with a heavy heart. On this basis Lord Hoffman stated “that the decision of the ECtHR [in 
A] was wrong… [but] To reject such a decision would almost certainly put this country in 
breach of the international obligation it accepted when it acceded to the Convention.”164 
Lord Roger put it rather more bluntly by stating that “Strasbourg has spoken, the case is 
closed.”165  
Opposition has arisen as to this yielding approach of the UK domestic courts. The 
President of the UK Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, hit the headlines in 2014 when he 
stated that UK judges were “too ready” to follow ECtHR decisions.166 Neuberger put this 
down to the importance of precedent in the common law tradition which he argued moved 
domestic judges to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence without question. The degree to which 
UK domestic courts perceive themselves bound to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence 
remains somewhat unclear. The dialogue between Strasbourg and UK domestic courts is 
crucial to how extraterritorial jurisdiction has come to be interpreted. 
Unanimous decisions of the UK Supreme Court (or House of Lords as it was)167 
continue to be overturned by the ECtHR on occasion.168 However, influence does flow 
both ways as was noted recently by the President of the ECHR when he stated that 
judgments of the UK’s domestic courts can be very persuasive in illuminating the 
Strasbourg Court as to the inner-workings of the UK’s legal system and thereby influenc ing 
his colleagues.169 Lord Irvine stated on this point that “It is not difficult to point to examples 
where the powerful reasoning of the UK’s domestic Courts has proved influential in 
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Strasbourg concluding that our domestic law is Convention compliant.”170 It should also 
be noted that the UK Supreme Court can sometimes also take a more rights concentrated 
approach than the Strasbourg court. An example of one such subject matter in asylum law 
is the duty of discretion – the degree to which it can be expected that a person should 
practise whatever issue that has given rise to persecution discretely. The duty has often 
arisen with regard to whether a refugee can possibility be expected to be discrete in the 
context of their sexuality. The UK Supreme Court has found that people cannot be expected 
to exercise discretion in this sense whereas the traditional ECtHR approach had been that 
people can be expected to do so.171 Therefore the UK domestic courts are capable of 
informing and leading the way in terms of innovative readings of fundamental rights law. 
Their example can be extremely informative for the ‘correct’ reading of particular ly 
complex areas of law. 
3.4.2 Pre Al-Skeini (Smith No.1) v Post Al-Skeini (Smith No. 2) 
The UK has been a source of crucial case-law for the evolution of the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence on extraterritorial jurisdiction. Britain’s invasion of, subsequent occupation 
of, and eventual withdrawal from Iraq gave rise to case-law which has been enlightening 
as to the state of play for the Strasbourg Court with regard to extraterritorial jurisdict ion. 
The High Court decision in Al-Skeini172 was an indication of the confused state of play of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the aftermath of the Banković decision. Rather than pursuing 
and refining the path passed by Issa, as discussed above, the High Court instead rejected 
that decision as an “improbable interpretation of Banković.”173 The House of Lords 
decision in Al-Skeini174 instead stuck with the Banković rationale for extraterritoria l 
jurisdiction.175 In so doing, the House of Lords made a distinction between a situation of 
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complete and physical control over an individual (detention) for a certain applicant and 
more momentary instances of control for the applicants that were encountered while 
soldiers were on patrol.176 According to the Court these latter occurrences were insufficient 
to engage extraterritorial jurisdiction while the former was enough to engage it. 
The Strasbourg Court’s decision in Al-Skeini changed the complexion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The impact of the ECtHR’s decision in Al-Skeini is 
encapsulated by the story of one case. The case illustrates the common position pre Al-
Skeini (Smith (No. 1) 177) and the position post Al-Skeini (Smith (No.2)178). The ground-
breaking 2013 case of Smith (no. 2) from the UK Supreme Court dealt with the same set 
of facts as an earlier UK Supreme Court decision – Smith (No. 1) – but involved a different 
set of plaintiffs. The Smith series of cases concerned a positive obligation to protect the 
lives of British soldiers serving in Iraq by providing adequate equipment. Both Al-Skeini 
and Smith involved military operations abroad but two important distinctions must be made 
between the situation in Smith and the set of circumstances at play in Al-Skeini. Firstly, Al-
Skeini concerned establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction over local inhabitants while Smith 
was with regard to the engagement of UK extraterritorial jurisdiction over British military 
personal. Secondly, contrary to Al-Skeini, at the time of the alleged right violations which 
were under examination in the Smith series of cases, the UK was no longer exercising 
public powers in the region. The Coalition Provisional Authority had ceased to exercise 
such powers and local administration had passed to the interim Iraqi government.179 
The UK Supreme Court 2010 decision in Smith (No. 1) based itself on the ECtHR’s 
Banković judgment and upon the House of Lords’ Al-Skeini judgment but was without the 
benefit of the ECtHR’s ruling in Al-Skeini. In Smith (No. 1) the Supreme Court found that 
British soldiers did not engage the UK’s extraterritorial jurisdiction for the sake of Article 
1 ECHR when they operated in areas outside of UK control.180 The Supreme Court in Smith 
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(No.1) ruled (by a majority of 4-3) that the claims under Article 2 should be struck out on 
the basis that the Convention had no application to soldiers serving abroad. In Smith (No.2), 
the Supreme Court, now having the guidance of the Strasbourg Court’s ruling in Al-Skeini, 
unanimously rejected its earlier findings on extraterritorial jurisdiction in Smith (No. 1) and 
found that the UK’s jurisdiction had indeed been engaged. Smith (No. 2) endorsed Al-
Skeini’s implicit move away from the Banković approach by agreeing that ECHR rights 
can indeed be divided and tailored and so the Convention should not be thought as being 
an indivisible package of rights.181 The Supreme Court also unanimously found in Smith 
(no. 2) that the UK, even in the absence of the exercise of any public powers, had still 
engaged its jurisdiction on the basis of the authority and control which the UK, through the 
chain of military command, had over the individuals involved – British soldiers.182 With 
Smith (No. 2) the Supreme Court thus delivered a wider understanding of extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction than the guiding jurisprudence from Strasbourg. This can be said on the basis 
that the Supreme Court did so by omitting Al-Skeini’s requirement that the State must be 
exercising public powers. Smith (No. 2) found that authority and control over an individua l, 
in and of itself, can engage a contracting State’s jurisdiction. The UK Supreme Court thus 
broadened the scope of the ECtHR’s rationale for application of the personal model of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
In Smith (No. 2), Lord Hope spoke for the Supreme Court on jurisdiction. Lord 
Hope stated that extraterritorial jurisdiction over local inhabitants can only exist because 
of the authority and control that the State exercises over its own armed forces in the first 
place. It is from that basic premise, he argued, that extraterritorial jurisdiction based on 
State agent authority and control has evolved.183 Lord Hope also stated that the control and 
authority over a person exception as set out in Al-Skeini was primarily to be seen in the 
context of the words from Al-Skeini: “whenever the state through its agents exercises 
control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction…”184 The Court, through 
Lord Hope, argued that jurisdiction follows naturally from the exercise of control and 
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authority alone. Lord Hope also quotes a famous passage from the earlier case of Cyprus 
v Turkey in this regard: “authorised agents of a state, …not only remain under its 
jurisdiction when abroad but bring other persons or property ‘within the jurisdiction’ of 
that state to the extent that they exercise authority over such person or property.”185 Cyprus 
v Turkey was a formative case for the development of the personal model. The Supreme 
Court, in Smith (No. 2), departed from the Strasbourg court’s guidance by returning to the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction case-law roots of that same court. In any case, the UK Supreme 
Court has taken an important next step in re-establishing the personal model once and for 
all and thereby contributing to a more inclusive and flexible rationale for extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction. Important questions abound as to how this may impact upon externalised 
procedures of migration control and border management. 
It is now possible to add to the definition of the personal model made supra (3.3.1) 
on the basis of the Smith (No. 2) decision. The personal model is where an agent of a 
contracting State engages the extraterritorial jurisdiction of that State by exercising 
authority and control over an individual or group of individuals beyond the territory of the 
contracting State.  
3.4.3 Immigration Liaison Officers and Smith (No. 2) 
The leading UK precedent with regard to externalised migration control and border 
management is the Prague Airport case.186 The Prague Airport case concerned the work 
of British Immigration Liaison Officers in the airport of the Czech capital. The Czech 
Republic was yet to become a Member State of the EU at this point but was already a 
contracting State of the ECHR. Those officers had been placed there with the objective of 
stemming the flow of Roma people who were flying to the UK from Prague and 
subsequently claiming asylum. The House of Lords, as it then was, was presented with two 
questions. Firstly, did the refusal to allow boarding in Prague airport represent a violat ion 
of the principle of non-refoulement according to the Refugee Convention and customary 
international law? Secondly, did the work of the British Immigration Officials in Prague 
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airport represent unlawful discrimination against Roma on racial grounds? The first 
question was answered in the negative. The second question was answered positively. 
In considering the first question, the Court only considered extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction of the ECHR very briefly and rejected the contention that the work of the 
British Immigration Liaison Officers could possibly be construed as an exercise of 
jurisdiction. Of crucial importance in the eyes of Lord Bingham, speaking for the Court, 
was that the applicants were not outside of their country of origin and had not presented 
themselves at the UK border except in a “highly metaphorical sense.”187 It was adjudged 
that the presence of a State official only represented a border in a figurative sense which 
was not capable of engaging the obligations of the UK. In this way the actions of 
Immigration Liaison Officers represent “une frontière virtuelle.”188 The Court agreed on 
the one hand with the principle that an individual who leaves his/her country of origin and 
applies for asylum from another State, whether inside that State or at its borders, cannot be 
rejected or returned to their country of origin without proper consideration of their request 
for international protection.189 On the other hand however, the House of Lords stuck rigidly 
to the traditional understanding of borders – the territorial frontier as being where the 
border lay.190  
The House of Lords only referred in passing to Banković and then only with regard 
to the territorial principle – that jurisdiction is primarily territorial and anything beyond 
that was exceptional.191 The Court did not go into detail in considering exceptions to the 
territorial understanding of jurisdiction and it seemed to be more of an afterthought to Lord 
Bingham. Lord Bingham stated that in any case Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, which were 
evidently the key provisions to be potentially threatened by the work of the Immigra t ion 
Liaison Officers in the eyes of the Court, were not in danger of being violated on the basis 
                                                                 
187 Regina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another ex parte European Roma Rights Centre and 
others [2004] UKHL 55. Paragraph 26. 
188 Dumas. P., L’Accès des Ressortissants des Pays Tiers au Territoire des États Membres de l’Union 
Européenne (2013). Page 124. 
189 Kesby. A., The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law (2007) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 27, 101. 
190 Kesby. A., The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law (2007) Oxford Journal of Legal 
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191 Regina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another ex parte European Roma Rights Centre and 
others [2004] UKHL 55. Paragraph 21. 
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of the facts of the case.192 Despite Immigration Liaison Officers having elsewhere been 
found to be consular officials,193 the House of Lords failed to examine these Officers in the 
context of the diplomatic exception espoused in the Banković case.194 The Prague Airport 
case was decided on the 9th of December 2004. No reference was made to the Issa case 
which had been decided only three weeks previously (16th November 2004). Therefore, the 
House of Lords didn’t consider any potential application of the personal model either in 
and of itself (like the UK Supreme Court in Smith (No. 2)) or alongside some variation of 
the spatial model (like the ECtHR in Al-Skeini). 
Clayton seems to infer that Lord Bingham in the Prague Airport case argued, obiter 
dictum, that the Human Rights Act did not apply to immigration officers acting abroad but 
this comment was not binding as it did not form part of the reason for the judgment.195 It 
is unclear where exactly in the judgment that Clayton reads Bingham as inferring such but 
in any case Clayton goes on to say that such an argument “sits uncomfortably with the 
trend of authority since” and that a statutory appeal applies to any decision of entry 
clearances officers.196 Clayton’s argument that the trend of authority points toward the 
Human Rights Act applying to extraterritorial procedures is based on the Al-Skeini 
judgment. Al-Skeini and Smith (No.2) do indeed give cause for reading the work of ILOs 
as potentially giving rise to the State engaging its extraterritorial jurisdiction. ILOs, in their 
work, can even be argued as satisfying Al-Skeini’s higher threshold of also exercising a 
public power. They could certainly be interpreted as exercising control and authority over 
individuals despite not exercising compulsory powers. Hurdles do persist. Recent 
jurisprudence, especially that which represents a broadening of how extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction should be interpreted, has occurred in the context of military operations. The 
nature of control exercised by soldiers can be contrasted with that of ILOs. The presence 
of compulsory powers in the former is certainly persuasive in engaging extraterritor ia l 
                                                                 
192 Kesby. A., The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law (2007) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 27, 101. Page 106-107. 
193 R (B) v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2004] EWCA Civ 1344. 
Paragraph 60. 
194 Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, 52207/99, [GC]. Paragraph 73. 
195 Clayton. G. The UK and Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Entry Clearance and Juxtaposed Control. 
Page 423.  In Ryan. B., and Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control (2010). 
196 Clayton. G. The UK and Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Entry Clearance and Juxtaposed  Control. 
Page 423. In Ryan. B., and Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control (2010). 
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jurisdiction. The ECtHR’s leading guidance (Al-Skeini) retains the requirement that the 
contracting State is exercising some public powers in the third State. Hopes for a more all-
encompassing approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction are buoyed by the decision in Smith 
(No. 2). However, the qualifying criteria for extraterritorial jurisdiction under the personal 
model espoused in that case remains a challenging proposition in the context of 
externalised migration control and border management. 
3.4.4 The Military Context as the Guiding Light 
A contracting State’s authority and control over its own soldiers sits in contrast with the 
kind of control and authority exercise over local inhabitants or migrants on the move in a 
civilian context. “Servicemen and women relinquish almost total control over their lives 
to the state.”197 Local inhabitants or migrants do not have any such semblance of a 
relationship with the contracting State. Externalised migration control and border 
management procedures which do not represent a contracting State’s control over territory 
cannot rely upon the spatial model. Such procedures rely upon their interaction with 
individuals for their implementation and so it is only the personal model which could be 
used to engage the contracting State’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. In addition, much of the 
time these procedures do not incorporate the exercise of compulsory powers. Application 
of the personal model has almost always been used in a military context198 and has hitherto 
required the exercise of compulsory powers. Smith (No. 2)’s abandonment of the public 
powers requirement given down by the ECtHR (Al-Skeini), a remnant of the spatial model, 
adds little to the cause of externalised procedures like Immigration Liaison Officers. 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction being engaged in a non-military context and on the sole basis 
of authority and control being exercised over migrants without the use of compulsory 
powers very much remains virgin territory for the ECtHR. The fact is that as things stand 
in the jurisprudence, “de facto control over persons requires [a] certain level of physical 
constraint. This results [sic] when migrants are obstructed from continuing their journey, 
                                                                 
197 Smith and others v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41. Paragraph 52. 
198 The arrest and abduction by “Turkish Officials” of Abdullah Öcalan is an important exception to this. 
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when state vessels use their strength and physical presence to push back smaller boats with 
migrants, or when force is used to prevent migrants from reaching the border.”199 
In 2014, attempts made to limit the ECtHR’s Al-Skeini judgment to the particular 
context of Iraq in Serdar v the Ministry of Defence200 failed. The potential for further 
application, in the military context at least, is such that government policy is changing to 
address it. The new UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, intends for the UK military to ‘opt-
out’ of the ECHR during future conflicts201 in order to limit the “industry of vexatious 
claims’ against soldiers.” 202 It is indeed in the military context that the most cutting edge 
extraterritorial jurisdiction case-law continues to arise. Most recently, Al-Saadoon203 in the 
Court of Appeal again considered the exercise of force by the British army in Iraq. The 
case considered the post-Al-Skeini application of the personal model of extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction. In doing so, the crux of the case emerged. To Leggatt J, speaking for the High 
Court,204 the personal model post-Al-Skeini extended to the exercise of physical power and 
control over a non-detainee. Lloyd-Jones LJ in the Court of Appeal disagreed on this point 
and stated that the effect of Al-Skeini was not to establish that where the State uses 
compulsory powers it must do so in a way that in a way that does not violate the 
Convention.205 Rather, Lloyd-Jones LJ interpreted Al-Skeini as the Grand Chamber 
requiring “a greater degree of power and control than that represented by the use of lethal 
or potentially lethal force alone. In other words, I believe that the intention of the 
Strasbourg court was to require that there be an element of control of the individual prior 
to the use of lethal force.”206 The case will roll on to the UK Supreme Court and perhaps 
to the Strasbourg Court for review. At the moment, it is simply illustrative of the continued 
lack of clarity in the military context. However, the impact that such case-law will have 
                                                                 
199 Fundamental Rights Agency, Scope of the principle of non-refoulement in contemporary border 
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206 Al-Saadoon & Ors. v Secretary of State for Defence [2016] EWCA Civ 811. Paragraph 69. 
117 | P a g e  
 
will remain limited in the context of externalised migration control and border management 
procedures. It will still take a radical reading of extraterritorial jurisdiction in either the UK 
domestic courts or at the Strasbourg court for procedures that utilised indirect control to be 
understood as representing an exercise of jurisdiction. 
3.5 Conclusion – Effect of Externalised Control on State 
Responsibility 
The ECtHR has experienced a stunted move away from the nadir of restricted approaches 
in the Banković judgment. The progress in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has been difficult 
and oftentimes confused but those strides have been complemented by the innovative 
approach taken by the UK Supreme Court in Smith no. 2. Smith no. 2 paves the way for the 
application of a more nuanced approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction which is capable of 
being more responsive to increasingly complex externalised procedures. The Strasbourg 
court will carefully consider the “views of seven justices of the UK Supreme Court with 
some weight in coming to its own opinion on whether the Convention generally applies 
extraterritorially to the soldiers of contracting states acting abroad.”207 However, it now 
remains to be seen whether Smith (No. 2) brings anything to the table in the context of non-
compulsory powered,208 civilian implemented procedures.  
In the context of migration, the case of Hirsi provoked an enthusiastic response 
from commentators and an excited expectation of what is now possible in the context of 
externalised migration control and border management. This chapter has argued that such 
expectations are misplaced as the interdiction of migrants at sea had already been 
considered by the ECtHR (in Xhavara). More contested is the position of non-compulsory 
powered procedures such as Immigration Liaison Officers. This is reflected in the only 
judicial guidance available in the context of these officers – the failure to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Prague Airport case. Despite the widening of 
understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction in general in both by the ECtHR and the UK 
Supreme Court, it remains in question whether a decision of access or any equivalent non-
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compulsory powered control would be seen as engaging a State’s jurisdiction. Hirsi case 
did little to clarify this and so non-compulsory powered migration control and border 
management still awaits its “Hirsi moment.”209  
 Gammeltoft-Hansen states that “…outsourcing States normally want to keep a 
degree of control that necessitates hands-on involvement through the deployment of State 
officials, ships etc. Yet, exactly these kind of scenarios are very likely to trigger the 
jurisdiction and thus responsibility of the outsourcing state.”210 As the UK domestic courts 
and the ECtHR currently stand, the mere physical presence of an organ of the State in an 
extraterritorial setting does not necessarily give rise to the State engaging its rights 
obligations. Certainty in engaging extraterritorial jurisdiction for EU Member State 
migration control and border management is, for now, confined to those procedures that 
incorporate compulsory powers and even compulsory powered procedures “…cannot be 
distilled into a sweeping general principle but must instead be determined on a highly 
contextualized, case-by-case basis.”211 
 Commentators searching for the saving grace of extraterritorial jurisdiction focus 
on progressive case-law in the over-and-back judicial dialogue between the UK’s domestic 
courts and the ECtHR. However, the CJEU provides the greatest scope in dispensing 
completely with any territorial based understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
intricate approaches to control. The CJEU instead focuses on ensuring legal responsibility 
can be considered whenever and wherever implementation takes. That approach has greater 
potential to respond accordingly to the control which is afforded to the State through non-
compulsory powered procedures such as the coordination, decision-making and 
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organisation of migration control and border management and ensure that violations of 
rights do not end up “…on the wrong side of jurisdiction.”212  
  
                                                                 
212 Guild. E., The Europeanisation of Europe’s Asylum Policy (2006) International Journal of Refugee Law 
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IV. Privatisation’s Trigger – Public Liability for 
Private Action 
4.1 Introduction – Privatised Control 
States can govern in any way they wish in order to achieve their objectives so long as they 
abide by the law. The late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen privatisation become an 
increasingly important mode of governance for States. In the context of migration control 
and border management, the State’s duty to live up to its legal obligations is put in peril by 
privatisation. The private actors that implement migration control and border management 
procedures are a complex hybrid mix of the public and private. They themselves are clearly 
private but the procedure they implement is normally implemented by the State or, if it 
hasn’t previously been implemented by the State, its function has a distinctly public 
flavour. This chapter explores the approach of the UK domestic courts, the CJEU and the 
ECtHR in examining the circumstances by which State legal responsibility for fundamenta l 
rights violations persist despite the, prima facie, transfer of control for the offending 
procedure to a private actor. 
The ordinary understanding of privatisation is that the State makes a full transfer of 
sovereign power and ownership of a resource, process or function to a private actor. The 
State is, of course, inherently legally responsible for the actions of public authorit ies. 
Difficulty arises when a procedure that has been performed by public authorities is 
delegated to a private actor (privatisation by contract) or when a private actor is charged 
with implementing a procedure that has never been implemented previously but which 
represents a public function (enforced privatisation). As referred to in the introduction to 
this research, States hesitate to delegate authority for entry, exit and residence, this has 
been a constant since the advent of nation states. These powers are seen as being a 
fundamental power of statehood and for this reason “…immigration policy seems an 
unpromising place to look for evidence of privatisation, if by this one means the retraction 
of the state.”1 However, the extent to which the privatisation of migration control and 
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border management procedures do in fact actually represent such a ‘retraction’ very much 
remains in question. 
This chapter considers the ability of a migrant to attach legal responsibility to the 
State for a rights violation experienced during the implementation of a privatised 
procedure. As such, it is the courts’ capability in successfully evaluating the extent to which 
a particular privatised procedure represents a ‘retraction’ that is in question in this chapter. 
The Courts have substantial jurisprudence in considering continued State control of a 
procedure that has been privatised by contract and legal responsibility for that control. They 
have less experience in considering State control of a procedure that was never 
implemented by the State and which is now privately implemented, not on the basis of a 
contract but under the threat of sanction. The courts have pursued certain different 
approaches by which they can decipher State legal responsibility for rights violat ions 
arising out of private actions. 
This chapter beats a path through each of the selected judicial settings by first (4.2) 
turning to the treatment of privatisation by the domestic courts of the UK. It next turns to 
the treatment of such privatised procedures by the ECtHR (4.3). The penultimate section 
(4.4) turns to consideration of the CJEU’s approach to privatisation. The final section of 
this chapter (4.5) will draw together a general conclusion on privatisation from 
consideration of each of the three judicial settings examined. 
4.2 UK Domestic Courts – A Confused Application 
Chapter II touched upon how deeply invested the UK has become in privatising its 
migration control and border management procedures. Nonetheless, consideration of 
alleged fundamental rights violations at the hands of privatised migration control and 
border management in the UK’s domestic courts has been relatively rare. However, as a 
result of the UK’s enthusiastic pursuit of privatisation in a wide variety of fields other than 
migration control and border management, the UK’s courts have had ample opportunity to  
explore the legal responsibility of the State for a breach of the fundamental rights of a 
person arising out of a privatised procedure. Examination of this jurisprudence provides a 
good understanding of how the UK’s courts would approach violations arising out of 
privatised procedures of migration control and border management. 
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UK domestic courts have not taken an orthodox approach in applying the Human 
Rights Act to entities that have been privatised (4.2.1). The vindication of rights that have 
been alleged to have been violated by a private actor in the course of implementing a 
migration control or border management procedure remain of primary concern (4.2.2). 
4.2.1 The Human Rights Act – Assessing Hybrid Public/Private 
Entities 
Section 6 of the Human Rights Act provides for the acts of public authorities. Those entities 
that do not have any private element – ‘pure’ public authorities – must act compatibly with 
the European Convention on Human Rights in all that they do. In order to make the Human 
Rights Act more comprehensive and offer better protection, a provision was added which 
provided that other entities would come under this obligation when they are discharging a 
public function. Section 6(3)(b) states that a “public authority” includes “any person 
certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature.”2 It is very clear that the UK’s 
enacting parliament envisaged private actors being interpreted through  Section 6(3)(b) 
“primarily on the nature of the function being performed by a private body, rather than 
the intrinsic nature of the body itself.”3 However, instead of this functional approach, the 
courts have mainly favoured an approach based upon the nature of the entity in question. 
The courts have done so out of their concern with over-burdening the State with liability 
for procedures which are implemented by private actors. Deep-seated unease persists as to 
the implication of such an interpretation for the objective of providing individuals with 
adequate rights protection from State power as it appears in all its forms.4  
4.2.1.1 From Poplar Housing to Aston Cantlow – The Formative Case-
law 
In the Court of Appeal case of Poplar Housing5 a local authority transferred its authority 
for housing to a private-sector body which it had set up – Poplar Housing. This delegation 
                                                                 
2 Section 6(3)(b) Human Rights Act, 1998. 
3 House of Commons, House of Lords, Joint Committee on Human Rights Report: The Meaning of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act. Seventh Report of Session 2003–04. Paragraph 20. 
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under the Human Rights Act (2004) Public Law 329. 
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124 | P a g e  
 
of housing duties was done through a transfer of housing stock. The Court of Appeal held 
that Poplar Housing represented a public authority. In coming to this conclusion the Court 
rejected the application of a functional test whereby functions that had a public nature 
should be interpreted as bringing a private actor under the umbrella of Section 6(3)(b). To 
this end, the Court stated: “the fact that a body performs an activity which otherwise a 
public body would be under a duty to perform cannot mean that such performance is 
necessarily a public function.”6 The Court felt that such an interpretation would place too 
much a burden on the State with all and every function supplied to the public authorit ies 
by a private actor giving rise to potential liability for the State. The Court argued that 
Section 6(3)(b) means that hybrid bodies, who have functions of a public and private nature 
are public authorities, but not in relation to acts which are of a private nature.7 It further 
stated that the purpose of that provision was to deal with such hybrid bodies and not to 
make a private actor, which does not have responsibilities to the public, into a public 
authority “merely because it performs acts on behalf of a public body which would 
constitute public functions were such acts to be performed by the public body itself.”8 
Instead the Court stated that Poplar Housing’s role was “closely assimilated” to Tower 
Hamlets (the local council) such that, in the context of housing, it must be taken as being a 
“functional public authority.” 9 The Court acknowledged that a “combination of features” 
made an act, which would otherwise be private, public.10 
 Another Court of Appeal case, Leonard Cheshire Homes, 11 had a similar set of 
facts revolving around the provision of housing. The case also had the same judge as had 
been presiding in Poplar Housing – Lord Woolf. However, there was a different result. 
Leonard Cheshire Homes was deemed not to represent a public authority under Section 
6(3)(b). This different result came despite the Court following a similar logic to that of 
Poplar Housing. This different finding is down to the delegation to a private actor in 
Leonard Cheshire Homes having been through contract rather than through a transfer of 
                                                                 
6 Donoghue v. Poplar Housing [2001] EWCA Civ 595.Paragraph 58. 
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housing stock as had been the case in Poplar Housing: “Thus, for Lord Woolf, the 
particular technique of delegation-housing stock transfer or contract-was relevant to the 
determination of the controls on the private delegate, even though Poplar Housing and 
Leonard Cheshire were effectively performing the same function.”  12 Lord Woolf was very 
wary of widening the meaning of the State in the context of the Human Rights Act in an 
unwieldy way which would include small-time contractors. As Donnelly puts it, 
“…judicial suspicion of full horizontal rights application colours consideration of Human 
Rights in the private delegation context.”13 The key factor in both Poplar Housing and 
Leonard Cheshire Homes in deciding whether a private entity is a public authority for the 
sake of Section 6(3)(b) was the nexus between that private actor and the State, the so-called 
institutional test.14 The presence of a contract in the latter case was the crucial difference 
between the two cases. Together, the two cases, Poplar Housing and Leonard Cheshire 
Homes, have been said to represent an “unjustifiably restrictive approach”15 to defining 
public authorities. 
The House of Lords, as it then was, in Aston Cantlow,16 found that a parochial 
church council was a public authority for the sake of Section 6(3)(b). The church council 
had been attempting to have a lay rector pay to repair the chancel of a church. Despite the 
church of England’s “special links with central government”, it was found to be 
“essentially a religious organisation”17 and thus was not a public authority for the sake of 
the Act. However, the important point of this case was that in coming to this conclusion, 
the Court rejected the institutional test in favour of a functional test which considered the 
function being undertaken first and foremost. Lord Hope stated: “It is the function that the 
person is performing that is determinative of the question whether it is, for the purposes of 
                                                                 
12 Donnelly. C., Delegation of Government Power to Private Parties – A Comparative Perspective (2007) 
Page 251. 
13 Donnelly. C., Delegation of Government Power to Private Parties – A Comparative Perspective (2007) 
Page 250. 
14 Costigan. R., Determining ‘Functions of a Public Nature’ under the Human Rights Act 1998: A New 
Approach (2006) European Public Law, 12(4), 577. Page 579. 
15 Palmer. E., Judicial Review, Socio-Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (2007). Page 142. 
16 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank House of Lords 
[2003] UKHL 37. 
17 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank House of Lords 
[2003] UKHL 37. Lord Nicholls at paragraph 13. 
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that case, a ‘hybrid’ public authority.”18 The Court therefore stressed the importance for 
courts of analysing the character of the function itself rather than purely relying upon the 
institutional arrangements of the body in performing that function.19 Aston Cantlow’s 
shortcoming was that the House of Lords put forward this functional principle without 
expressly rejecting the rationale of the decisions in Poplar Housing or Leonard Cheshire 
Homes which had taken a predominantly “institutional” rather than a “functional” 
approach to interpreting a public authority.20 Aston Cantlow could have marked a 
watershed moment in the jurisprudence in which it moved toward a functional approach as 
intended by the UK parliament, but that chance was passed over.  
Perhaps more is made of Aston Cantlow’s supposed turn away from Lord Woolf’s 
reasoning in Poplar Housing and Leonard Cheshire Homes than should be. An often 
overlooked passage of Lord Nicholls' judgment rejects the possibility of any test of 
‘universal application’, (presumably including any functional one) given the “…the 
diverse nature of governmental functions and the variety of means by which these functions 
are discharged today.”21 In any case, the chance for any categorical rejection was missed. 
That was reflected in the subsequent decision in R v Hampshire Farmer’s Market.22 The 
case concerned a private company which had been set up by Hampshire County Council 
to run a local farmer’s market. In that case the Court of Appeal restricted the functiona l 
approach of Aston Cantlow because the House of Lords in that case had not expressly 
overruled the R. v Leonard Cheshire Homes and Poplar Housing.23 Aston Cantlow may be 
argued as representing a deviation from the norm of examining an entity’s institutiona l 
structure in understanding whether the State is liable for the actions of that entity. The 
status quo thus remains that “the protection of human rights is dependent not on the type 
of power being exercised, nor on its capacity to interfere with human rights, but on the 
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relatively arbitrary… criterion of the body’s administrative links with institutions of the 
State.”24 
4.2.1.2 YL and Current Reasoning 
In 2007, the seminal case of YL v Birmingham City Council25 became the leading 
jurisprudence in interpreting Section 6(3)(b). The case concerned the running of care 
homes. Birmingham City Council had contracted a private actor to run its care homes. The 
House of Lords held by a slim majority (3 to 2) that that private actor was not a public 
authority under the Human Rights Act. The duties exercised by the private actor were akin 
to those which Birmingham City Council had previously carried out. Crucially however, 
and by contrast with the city council, the private actor undertook those duties for a different 
purpose (i.e. for profit) and was not under any under any statutory duty to implement them. 
The Court in YL applied a type of functional test but one in which the function was 
considered in isolation from context.26 It was in this way that the Court in YL found that 
the actual provision of care was not an inherently governmental function, it was the 
arrangement for such care and accommodation that was a governmental function.27 Lord 
Scott, speaking as part of the majority, stated: “…it cannot be enough simply to compare 
the nature of the activities being carried out at privately owned care homes with those 
carried out at local authority owned care homes. It is necessary to look also at the reason 
why the person in question, whether an individual or corporate, is carrying out those 
activities. A local authority is doing so pursuant to public law obligations. A private 
person… is doing so pursuant to private law contractual obligations.”28 Baroness Hale, 
dissenting, characterised the distinction as being “artificial and legalistic.”29 
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26 Donnelly. C., Delegation of Government Power to Private Parties – A Comparative Perspective (2007). 
Page 269. 
27 See case comment by Disability Rights UK: http://www.disabilityrightsuk.org/yl-v-birmingham-city-
council-and-others 
YL v. Birmingham City Council and others [2007] UKHL 27. Lord Mance at paragraph 115 and Lord 
Neuberger at paragraph 141. 
28 YL v. Birmingham City Council and others [2007] UKHL 27. Lord Scott at paragraph 31. 
29 YL v. Birmingham City Council and others [2007] UKHL 27. Baroness Hale at paragraph 66. 
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 Such was the outcry in the aftermath of this case the UK government felt that a 
legislative response was needed. Within a year legislation was introduced that ensured that, 
in future, any care home that is contracted to provide care and accommodation would be 
considered to be carrying out a public function and thus covered by section 6(3)(b).30  
However, the judicial reasoning underlying the decision in YL has been left untouched and 
remains equally applicable in other contexts, including for cases in which privatisation is 
done by contract. In light of this continuing confusion, the Chair of the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights introduced the Human Rights Act 1998 (Meaning of Public Authority) 
Bill. The Bill stipulated expressly that function of a public nature should include “a 
function performed pursuant to a contract or other arrangement with a public authority 
which is under a duty to perform that function.”31 The Bill received a second reading in 
the House of Commons in July 2009 before being dropped. 
 YL means that the leading jurisprudence narrowly interprets how private acts can 
lead to public responsibility.32 The main criticism levelled at that jurisprudence is that it 
misconstrues the original intention behind the Human Rights Act i.e. to have a broad 
meaning attached to the understanding of a ‘Public Authority.’ The Joint Committee on 
Human Rights of the House of Lords and House of Commons launched two reports on 
‘The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act.’ The first was launched in 
2003-04 and the second in 2006-07. The 2003-04 (pre-YL) report concluded by stating that 
“as a matter of broad principle, a body is a functional public authority performing a public 
function under section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act where it exercises a function that 
has its origin in governmental responsibilities …in such a way as to compel individuals to 
rely on that body for realisation of their Convention human rights.”33 In its 2006/2007 
(post YL) report the Committee noted that, given the continuing narrow interpretation of a 
public authority prevalent in the jurisprudence, there is a concern that the courts may not 
                                                                 
30 See: Section 145 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008. 
31 Meaning of Public Authority Bill 
See: http://www.blackstonechambers.com/news/newsletters/public_law_focus_articles/care_homes.html 
32 See: Young. A., The Human Rights Act 1998, Horizontality and the Constitutionalisation of Private Law. 
In Ziegler. K., & Huber. P., Current Problems in the Protection of Human Rights (2013). 
33 House of Commons, House of Lords, Joint Committee on Human Rights Report: The Meaning of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act. Seventh Report of Session 2003–04. Paragraph 157. 
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return a decision which would deem a private actor engaging in contracted work as being 
a public authority.34 
 YL is clearly inconsistent with the decision in Aston Cantlow and the tension within 
current reasoning is best understood through reference to both cases. In the latter case, a 
distinction was made between a ‘core’ public authority and a hybrid authority.35 Unlike a 
hybrid authority, ‘core’ public authorities fall within section 6 without reference to section 
6(3). Lord Hope stated that in deciding whether an entity is in the ‘core’ category of public 
authorities the Court must consider “the nature of the person itself, not the functions which 
it may perform.”36 However, Lord Hope’s approach to the more controversial category of 
hybrid public authorities is that reference must primarily be made to the function that the 
entity undertakes in order to decide whether they are public authorities for the sake of the 
Human Rights Act.37 YL did not follow this more nuanced approach to hybrid authoritie s 
and instead simply applied the same test as that which Lord Hope set out for a ‘core’ 
category i.e. an examination of the actor in question (the institutional test). Therefore, YL, 
the leading judgment in this field, does not employ a functional test. 
4.2.2 Section 6(3)(b) and Migration Control and Border 
Management 
It is difficult to accurately gauge where YL leaves privatised migration control and border 
management procedures. Such procedures may be seen as being so intrinsically linked to 
the State that it is presumed that the State must be responsible for their provision. This 
assumption is made in the way that, pre-YL, it was presumed that care homes should 
obligate the State no matter how that care is delivered. Applying YL to migration control 
and border management, it could be imagined that the actual detention or the actual 
implementation of escorted return are not inherently governmental functions, it is the 
                                                                 
34 House of Commons, House of Lords, Joint Committee on Human Rights Report: The Meaning of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act. Ninth Report of Session 2006–07. 
35 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank House o f Lords 
[2003] UKHL 37. Lord Nicholls  at paragraph 8. 
36 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank House of Lords 
[2003] UKHL 37. Lord Hope at paragraph 41. 
37 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank House of Lords 
[2003] UKHL 37. Lord Hope at paragraph 41. 
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arrangement for such procedures that is a genuinely governmental function. Such a reading 
would be highly problematic and inappropriate.  
Both YL and the earlier case of Leonard Cheshire Homes found that the contracted 
private actors in question were not public authorities for the sake of section 6(3) of the 
Human Rights Act. Leonard Cheshire Homes is convincing – especially when contrasted 
with the earlier ruling in Poplar Housing – that contract as a method of delegation is 
effective in distancing the State from legal responsibility for rights violations arising from 
implementation of a migration control and border management procedure. Contract as a 
method of service delivery is not indicative of the procedure in question being a public 
function. In fact, quite the contrary is true. “It will… be difficult to maintain an action 
against the public body itself… under the HRA… where there has been contracting out… 
Claims that could have been made against the public body if it had performed the service 
in house will no longer be possible where it has contracted this out.”38 The criticism is 
thus that the courts approach is a signal to the government that it simply has to pursue 
contract as its method of service delivery in order to ensure that the procedure in question 
lay outside the scope of the Human Rights Act.39 Thankfully, the limited jurisprudence in 
the field of migration control and border management does not bear this out. 
In Yarl’s Wood Immigration Ltd and Others v Bedfordshire Police Authority40 the 
Court of Appeal examined whether the operating system in an immigration detention centre 
represented a public authority or not. A riot at Yarl’s Wood detention centre in early 2002 
caused extensive damage to the detention centre.41 The private actor running the centre and 
their insurers sought to recover the cost of the damage from the Bedfordshire police on the 
basis of the Riot (Damages) Act 1886. The argument made by the police was that Group 4 
(a private security firm) should be excluded from that 1886 Act because, in running the 
detention centre, it acted as a public authority and so was debarred from claiming against 
                                                                 
38 Craig. P., Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial review (2002) Law Quarterly 
Review 118, 551. Page 568. 
39 Donnelly. C., Delegation of Government Power to Private Parties – A Comparative Perspective (2007) 
Page 283. 
40 Yarl’s Wood Immigration Ltd; GSL UK Ltd; Creechurch Dedicated Ltd v Bedfordshire Police Authority 
[2009] EWCA Civ 1110. 
41 BBC News article on the Yarl’s Wood riots (15 February 2002). See: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1822120.stm 
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the police under that Act.42 The Court of Appeal held that Group 4’s claim was permissib le 
in principle43 despite accepting that Group 4 represented a public authority for the sake of 
section 6(3)(b). In the High Court case of R (on the application of D and K) v SSHD,44 the 
private actor contracted to run an immigration detention centre accepted that they were 
bound by the Detention Centre Rules such that they were a functional public authority for 
the purposes of the Human Rights Act.45 
Unlike many procedures in other fields though, in the context of migration control 
and border management, the medium for service delivery of compulsory powers is 
contract. Compulsory procedures, in the context of migration control and border 
management, have only been delegated through contract. The great concern is that a 
delegated procedure that includes a compulsory power is not classed as constituting a 
public function for the sake of Section 6(3)(b) of the Act.46 The danger lay in entities which 
exercise compulsory powers being made subject to an institutional test to see if they are a 
public authority under Section 6(3)(b) rather than a test which considered their function. In 
such circumstances, a private actor exercising the use of force, detention, physical restraint 
etc. may not be found to constitute a public authority for the sake of the Human Rights Act.  
The Joint Committee for Human Rights could not countenance that compulsory 
powers could be separated from the State in this way. Baroness Hale, dissenting in YL, 
stated that “it is common ground that ‘functions of a public nature’ include the exercise of 
the …coercive powers of the state.”47 The Committee had been reassured by the 
government that such powers would be read by the courts as “automatically” giving rise 
to a finding that they are public authorities for the sake of the Act. However, the Committee 
went on to say that “the status of these individual bodies, and the nature of their powers” 
                                                                 
42 Clayton. G., Immigration and Asylum Law (2014). Page 528. 
43 Clayton. G., Immigration and Asylum Law (2014). Page 528. 
44 R (on the application of D and K) v SSHD [2006] EWHC (Admin) 980, GSL UK (formerly Group 4 
Total Security). 
45 Clayton. G., Immigration and Asylum Law (2014). Page 527. 
46 House of Commons, House of Lords, Joint Committee on Human Rights Report: The Meaning  of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act. Ninth Report of Session 2006–07. Paragraph 18 of Conclusions 
and Recommendations. 
47 YL v. Birmingham City Council and others [2007] UKHL 27. Baroness Hale at paragraph 63. 
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would still need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.48 The Committee specifically 
considered the position of privatised immigration detention. It stated that “it is unlikely 
that these service providers would not be considered public bodies for the purposes of the 
HRA.”49 The Committee’s statement in this regard was based completely on the fact that 
such private actors were being entrusted with compulsory powers. Those migration control 
and border management procedures that have been privatised through contract should 
therefore ensure that the private actor involved in their implementation will be interpreted 
as being a public authority for the sake of Section 6(3)(b) on the basis of the compulsory 
powers they implement.50 
The impact that this Section 6(3)(b) jurisprudence has on those procedures that have 
been privatised through force (enforced privatisation) is not altogether clear. Those 
procedures, devoid of any compulsory powers, are mainly based around decision-mak ing, 
organisation and information gathering. Gina Clayton states that: “immigration decisions 
are acts of public authorities… and as such are required… to be compatible with the 
Convention rights derived from the ECHR.”51 In practice however, not all immigration 
decisions are reflected as being a decision of the State. In the case of Farah and Others v 
The Home Office and British Airways52 the appellants were prevented from boarding an 
aircraft as a direct result of Immigration Liaison Officers wrongly advising British Airways 
that the appellants’ travel documents were inadequate. In the private law proceedings 
which followed, the decision not to carry the passengers was treated as a decision taken by 
the private actor and thus the Home Office was not responsible and struck from the 
                                                                 
48 House of Commons, House of Lords, Joint Committee on Human Rights Report: The Meaning of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act. Ninth Report of Session 2006–07. Paragraph 72. 
49 House of Commons, House of Lords, Joint Committee on Human Rights Report: The Meaning of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act. Ninth Report of Session 2006–07. Paragraph 72. 
Furthermore, while section 6(1) HRA provides direct protection only against core public authorities, the 
Home Office White Paper, Rights Brought Home, lists the following as traditional public authorities: 
“…central government, including executive agencies; local government; the police; immigration; prisons; 
courts and tribunals themselves…” See: Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill. Presented to 
Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (1997). 
50 Elliot. M., & Thomas. R., Public Law (2014). Page 723. 
51 Clayton. G., Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law (2014). Page 98. Clayton also notes that the 
undertaking in Section 6(3) of the Human Rights Act is reinforced by section 84 (Grounds of Appeal) of 
the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002. 
52 Farah and Others v The Home Office and British Airways , Unreported, The Independent , 18 January 
2000.   
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decision. The State thus evaded legal responsibility for a private decision which was made 
as a direct result of the advice of agents of the State (ILOs) that carriage of the people in 
question would result in a fine for the airline. 
The push toward alternative avenues to access justice are important in this context. 
Rights infringements resulting out of statutory duties imposed on private actors can be 
mediated ‘horizontally’ through the common law of private obligations rather than through 
the vertical mechanism of the human rights act. There are those who believe that resort to 
the human rights act should be reserved, so far as it is possible, for the control of the State 
and its core derivative institutions.53 In the event that the public law route is pursued over 
and above avenues of private law, the institutional test to be applied may not be robust 
enough to read enforced privatisation as meaning that a private actor is a public authority 
for the sake of the particular migration control and border management function it 
performs. The groundwork is thus laid for a divide of procedures along the lines of 
compulsory powers. Compulsory powered procedures which violate a human right results 
in a (vertical) challenge through the Human Rights Act and the potential vindication of 
those rights. Procedures which do not rely upon compulsory powers will primarily result 
in a (horizontal) challenge in private law. The vindicatory power of private law is 
considered in Chapter V. 
The wide sweeping powers of information gathering and reporting to the State 
gained through airlines and employers are considerable yet they lack the ‘compulsory’ edge 
that would be more persuasive to the courts that they represent public action. Deciding who 
accesses justice through the Human Rights Act based purely upon a distinction as to the 
physical nature of the control exercised is a flawed approach. It is obvious that the type of 
powers afforded to private actors through enforced privatisation are just as capable of 
violating rights as their compulsory powered (contractual) counterparts. The UK domestic 
courts are in need of a new test for the courts which does not rely upon such an arbitrary 
distinction and which is capable of recognising the control that these ‘soft’ powers afford 
the State. 
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4.3 European Court of Human Rights and the Convention 
In interpreting whether private actions can give rise to public legal responsibility under the 
Convention, obviously the main issue in the ECtHR does not mirror the UK courts’ fixat ion 
with a particular provision of the legislative instrument giving force to the Convention. The 
focus here is instead on how the ECtHR approaches the public/private divide (4.3.1) and 
specifically, the approach taken by the Court in understanding how an entity can be an 
extension of a contracting State and hence give rise to legal responsibility for that State 
(4.3.2). In addition, this section briefly explores how a wholly private entity’s actions can 
also give to legal responsibility for a contracting State (4.3.3). 
4.3.1 The ECtHR’s Approach to State Responsibility for Private 
Actions 
An application to the ECtHR must be directed against a Contracting State or a public 
official or body for which a State may be held responsible.54 This leaves two ways in which 
the actions of a private actor can give rise to legal responsibility for the State. If that private 
actor represents an agent of the State, that State is subject to a negative obligation vis-à-vis 
Convention rights. If the private actor is truly private and is not an extension of the State, 
then it is possible that the State is subject to a positive obligation toward Convention rights. 
Therefore, the acts of private actors as agents of the State are capable of directly giving rise 
to legal responsibility for the State but the State can also be found to have violated 
Convention rights by having failed to take all reasonable measures to protect individua ls 
against corporate abuse.55 For either type of obligation, “[t]his jurisprudence relates to the 
issue of state responsibility.”56 Employing a broad brush stroke, negative obligations 
typically apply to civil and political rights and positive obligations are more associated 
                                                                 
54 Article 34, European Convention on Human Rights. 
55 Augenstein. D., State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (2011) Submission to the Special Representative of the United 
Nations Secretary General on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises. Page 7. 
56 Williams. A., Public authorities: what is a hybrid public authority under the HRA? Page 54. In Hoffman. 
D., The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (2011). 
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with economic, social and cultural rights.57 This is not a hard and fast rule but rather a 
rough guide of how obligations generally arise at the ECtHR. 
 The type of privatisation undertaken does not give rise to an either/or choice as to 
positive or negative obligations. Privatisation through contract and enforced privatisa t ion 
will not automatically engage a negative or positive obligation. The ECtHR generally does 
not focus on describing whether a private actor’s role is that of a State agent or what type 
of obligation may be in question for the State. Furthermore, the Court decides its approach 
for each right in the Convention rather than having a uniform set of rules from which it 
applies the Convention’s obligations to the States. “…to apply the Convention in the 
private sphere across the whole spectrum of fundamental rights is inappropriate, …to 
understand this subject better it is essential to deal with each right separately.”58 The Court 
simply concentrates on an effective application of the Convention. To this end, State 
obligations are utilised in ways best suited to attain this effective application in the context 
of each right and on a case-by-case basis depending on the circumstances involved.  
The Court sometimes has difficulties in deciding whether a case involves a positive 
or a negative obligation, and may even decide not to make that distinction at all; 59 
Broniowski v Poland is a case in point.60 In the case of López Ostra v Spain, 61 which 
concerned environmental pollution, the Court considered whether the case should be 
analysed in terms of a positive obligation on the State or in terms of an interference by a 
public authority which would represent breach of the State’s negative obligation. The Court 
stated that whether a positive or negative obligation had arisen, “the applicable principles 
are broadly similar. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be 
struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, 
and in any case the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation.”62 
                                                                 
57 Harris. DJ., O’Boyle. M., Bates. EP., Buckley. CM., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(2014). Page 21-22. 
58 Clapham. A., Human Rights in the Private Sphere (1993). Page 178. 
59 Harris. DJ., O’Boyle. M., Bates. EP., Buckley. CM., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(2014). Page 22.  
60 Broniowski v. Poland, 31443/96, [GC].  
61 López Ostra v Spain, 16798/90. 
62 López Ostra v Spain, 16798/90. Paragraph 51. 
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4.3.1.1 The Public/Private Divide: Beyond State Responsibility 
It is also important to understand that consideration of the public/private divide in the 
Strasbourg Court is not limited to jurisprudence on State responsibility. The ECtHR has 
also examined that divide in the context of the definition of a governmental organisat ion 
under Article 34 ECHR. Article 34 addresses which entities can make individua l 
applications to the ECtHR. That provision proscribes governmental organisations from 
making such applications while the process is open to non-governmental organisations. 
The Court has made clear that the distinction between private actors that are agents of the 
State and purely private actors and the distinction between governmental organisations and 
non-governmental organisations, is identical.63  
The case of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Turkey is the clearest 
elucidation by the Court of the distinction within Article 34. The Court stated that 
governmental organisations include “legal entities which participate in the exercise of 
governmental powers or run a public service under government control” and in order to 
identify such organisations, account must be had of “its legal status and, where 
appropriate, the rights that status gives it, the nature of the activity it carries out and the 
context in which it is carried out, and the degree of its independence from the political 
authorities.”64 Radio France reiterated these criteria for public authorities.65 
4.3.2 Negative Obligations – Private Actors as Agents of the State 
When a State has crucial influence over and control of a company, it may be held 
responsible for the actions of that company, having regard to the public nature of its 
functions and management.66 In such circumstances, the private actor is regarded as an 
agent of the State and as such, an extension of that State’s interest such that a negative 
obligation exists for that State with regard to the actions of that agent. The all-important 
matter for the ECtHR is deciding how and when such an agency is established. Augenste in 
sets out the criteria which will be taken into account by the Court in determining whether 
                                                                 
63 Williams. A., Public authorities: what is a hybrid public authority under the HRA? Page 55. In Hoffman. 
D., The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (2011). 
64 Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Turkey, 40998/98. Paragraph 79. 
65 Radio France and Others v France, (Admissibility decision), 23 September 2003. 
66 Reid. K., A practitioner’s guide to the ECHR (2012). Page 42. 
137 | P a g e  
 
a private actor is an agent of the State. These include but are not limited to: “The 
corporation’s legal status;” “The rights conferred upon the corporation by virtue of its 
legal status;” “Institutional independence;” “Operational independence;” “The nature of 
the corporate activity;” “The context in which the corporate activity is carried out.”67 
The case of Yershova68 concerned an applicant who worked for a company that was 
tasked with supplying heat to the Russian city of Yakutsk. The city retained ownership of 
the company’s property while the municipal company exercised the right of economic 
control in respect of it. The Court had to decide whether or not the municipal company’s 
acts and omissions are attributable to the State under the Convention. In this regard, the 
company’s legal status, the rights that such status gave it, the nature of the activity it carried 
out and the context in which it was carried out, and the degree of its independence from 
the authorities were all relevant. The Court stated that it would have to consider whether 
the company “enjoyed sufficient institutional and operational independence from the State 
to absolve the latter from its responsibility under the Convention for its acts and 
omissions.”69 In that case, the official legal status (the private status) of the company did 
not absolve the State from what the Court determined as being that State’s legal 
responsibility.70 The corporation’s strong institutional links to the local town council, the 
local council’s control of the corporation’s assets and “the special nature of its activities”71 
were deemed to be more influential than the ‘private’ legal status of the entity in finding 
that that entity perpetuated the State’s negative obligation through its agency. 
The Van Der Mussele72 case concerned an avocat who was complaining that he had 
been required to defend a person without receiving any remuneration or being reimbursed 
his expenses. The Court had to consider the responsibility of the State for the 
implementation of a set of professional rules for avocats. The Court found that the Ordre 
                                                                 
67 Augenstein. D., State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (2011) Submission to the Special Representative of the United 
Nations Secretary General on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises. Page 8-9. 
68 Yershova v Russia, 1387/04. 
69 Yershova v Russia, 1387/04. Paragraph 55. 
70 Yershova v Russia, 1387/04. Paragraph 56. 
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des Avocats had been empowered by the State through legislation to exercise control over 
the legal profession in Belgium which in the eyes of the Court represented the exercise of 
governmental functions that should be attributed to the State. State responsibility was thus 
established for a violation arising out of the implementation of what looked, prima facie, 
to be a wholly private procedure. The standing jurisprudence is that the nature of the 
procedures that a private actor may be asked to carry out by the State are of “decisive 
importance” as well as the legislative framework upon which the relationship rests.73 
Negative obligations essentially leave the State in its ordinary position vis-à-vis the 
Convention except that its actions are extended through a private actor. Rights and State 
responsibility are applied in the normal way once it is established that a private actor is an 
agent of the State. The challenge lay in establishing that the private actor is an agent. 
Augenstein’s criteria, laid out supra, are broadly applied and are exemplified by cases such 
as Yershova and Van Der Mussele, with the function being carried out being of particular 
importance. 
4.3.2.1 Negative Obligations in Migration Control and Border 
Management 
In coming to decisions, such as Yershova and Van Der Mussele referenced above, typically 
the Court does not make reference to positive or negative obligations of the State. Instead 
the Court simply considers the nature of the relationship between the private actor and the 
State. If no such relationship exists, it remains to consider whether the State had a positive 
obligation to the aggrieved individual (see section 4.3.3.1, below). If a relationship does 
exist, then the ECtHR will consider whether the private actor represents an agent of the 
State. 
Both side of the distinction made in Chapter III, between those procedures that are 
privatised by contract and those that are privatised on the basis of being forced through a 
threat of sanction, involve for-profit commercial undertakings. In normal circumstances 
these private actors are subject to private law and their potential status as an agent of the 
State under the Convention, only extends insofar as they implement a migration control 
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Human Rights Courts and Monitoring Bodies (2009) Working Paper No.8, Academy of European Law, 
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and border management procedure. In Yershova the ECtHR dismissed the State’s argument 
that the private actor in question had been incorporated under domestic law as a separate 
legal entity with a private law status and that that status absolved the State from legal 
responsibility for its violations. The Court held that the company’s legal status under 
domestic law, while important, was “not decisive for the determination of the State’s 
responsibility for the company’s acts or omissions under the Convention.”74 Instead, the 
Court focused on company’s strong ties with the local public authorities and the public 
nature of its functions.75 
 The institutional independence of the private actors which implement migrat ion 
control and border management procedures varies by procedure. On one side of the 
aforementioned distinction, the existence of a contract between the State and the private 
actor is a crucial factor. A contract points toward a lack of institutional independence for 
the private actor and vice versa. The procedures that are implemented without a contract 
and which depend upon sanctions to force the private actor into that implementation, all 
have a legislative basis. A legislative basis by which the State enforces a private actor to 
undertake certain procedures obviously also points toward a lack of institutiona l 
independence. 
 The method of service delivery – by contract or through sanction – also reflects a 
divide in terms of operational independence. Contract requires an element of supervis ion 
even if monitoring has at times been lacking in detention and return escorts. Contracted 
privatisation also includes compulsory powers which require States to attach instruct ions 
as to what type of force is permitted and what is prohibited.76 While in practice there is a 
large degree of operational independence, the formalised arrangement of contract still lends 
credence to the argument that operations are managed by the State. Privatisation through 
threat of sanction is more straightforward in that there is total operational independence. 
The private actor is completely taken up with their commercial activities which they 
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implement with only a bare minimum of State oversight, more likely with spot checks or 
regular communication. The information gathering and decision-making involved in this 
type of privatisation does not compromise operational independence. In the admissibility 
decision of Woś v Poland77 the State set up a private entity to distribute compensation for 
World War II victims. Referring to its own admissibility decision,78 the Court stated that 
“while the Polish State did not have direct influence over the decisions taken by the 
Foundation in respect of individual claimants, the State’s role was nonetheless crucial in 
establishing the overall framework in which the Foundation operated.”79 This is 
particularly reassuring vis-à-vis procedures of enforced privatisation which rely on a 
legislative framework for their implementation. On this basis, carriers and employers 
would be interpreted as agents of the State and would therefore make the State subject to 
negative obligations with regard to their actions in the context of carrying out their 
obligations under that legislative framework. 
 The ECtHR can also find a State legally responsible for a Convention-viola t ing 
procedure purely on the basis of that procedure having a public nature. This criterion for 
legal responsibility has perhaps the greatest potential scope of application in the context of 
migration control and border management, which are the very epitome of a public function. 
However, it is not as straightforward as simply identifying a public element to the 
procedure. The provision of education is an area which is also commonly regarded as being 
a core public function. Yet, in the case of Costello-Roberts, that was not the finding of the 
Court. The case dealt more with positive obligations and so will be dealt with below 
(4.3.3.1) but for present purposes it is useful to note that the Court had an opportunity to 
find that the provision of education was a public function and did not grasp it. It was not 
clear from the remarks of the Court “whether the private school engaged the State's 
responsibility as a public authority,” the ECtHR instead began its analysis of State 
responsibility by emphasising that the Convention can place States under positive 
obligations to regulate the behaviour of private bodies in specific situations.80 Add to this, 
                                                                 
77 Woś v. Poland, 22860/02. 
78 Woś v Poland, (Admissibility decision), 1 March 2005. 
79 Woś v Poland, 22860/02. Paragraph 51. 
80 Williams. A., Public authorities: what is a hybrid public authority under the HRA? In Hoffman. D., The 
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consideration of the case of H v United Kingdom81 in which the Court found that the 
negligent behaviour of teachers did not represent the State and the Court could not accept 
a complaint against a private individual. The evidence points toward it not being possible 
to declare such wide-ranging and diverse fields as education as categorically being public 
functions. Migration control and border management would be even more difficult to argue 
as giving rise to State legal responsibility across the board. 
 There is no evidence to suggest that a compulsory powered procedure is seen by 
the Court as inherently representing a public function but its presence may well be taken 
as an influence by the Court. Given the ECtHR’s determination to effectively apply the 
Convention and to prevent privatisation from impacting upon contracting States’ 
Convention obligations, the Court is clearly determined to apply a broad understanding of 
the State in the right circumstances. 
4.3.3 Positive Obligations – The State’s Duty to Act 
When a private actor, which cannot be understood as being an agent of the State, violates 
ECHR rights then the Court may still find that the State had an obligation to act to prevent 
such violations from occurring. “The obligation on States under this treaty is, according to 
Article 1, to secure all rights, and this gives rise to positive obligations to protect potential 
and actual victims from infringements by non-state actors where this results from a failure 
to enact legislation.”82 State inaction can therefore also give rise to State legal 
responsibility. Positive obligations have been developed to give a more all-encompass ing 
protection to individuals.83 In the context of privatisation, in certain circumstances that 
protection allows individuals to bring actions against the State on the basis of having 
experienced a rights violation at the hands of a private actor even when the action which 
led to that violation had nothing to do with the State.  
The circumstances in which the Court will consider that the State should have acted 
to prevent a private actor from breaching a Convention right are open-ended. Contracting 
                                                                 
See also: Costello-Roberts v UK, 13134/87. 
81 H v United Kingdom, 11590/85. 
82 Clapham. A., Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (2006). Page 420. 
83 See: Xenos. D., The Positive Obligations of the State Under the European Convention of Human Rights 
(2012) 
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States must secure the individual’s enjoyment of their rights by establishing and 
maintaining a domestic legal system that will serve to support those rights. Contracting 
States must, within reason, foresee and prevent interferences with an individual’s rights. 84 
In examining whether a State has adequately ensured that a right will not be breached, the 
ECtHR considers whether the State could reasonably have been expected to act and 
whether it took the necessary steps to ensure the effective protection of the applicants’ 
rights.85 The State generally enjoys a wide margin of appreciation as to how it can satisfy 
its positive obligations under the ECHR. However, failures of national authorities to 
comply with domestic law and procedural irregularities reduce the margin of appreciation 
and are indicative of a violation of Convention rights.86  
 The case of Young, James and Webster v UK,87 concerned employees who were not 
trade union members and their employer British Rail who had signed an agreement with 
three trade unions that membership of one of those unions would become a precondition 
for employment. In light of the jurisprudence referred to in the context of negative 
obligations in the previous section, one might suspect that the links of British Rail to the 
UK might be the crucial subject matter. The UK evidently did make this presumption as it 
argued that British Rail did not represent an organ of the State. At any rate, the importance 
of this was implicitly rejected by the Court when the ECtHR did not dedicate any time to 
examining whether the actions of British Rail could be attributed to the State.88 The Court 
instead stated that the UK’s failure to legislate to protect workers from being forced to join 
                                                                 
84 Perhaps most famously set out in: Osman v UK, 23452/94. 
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a trade union violated the ECHR. “Accordingly, there is no call to examine whether, as the 
applicants argued, the State might also be responsible on the ground that it should be 
regarded as employer or that British Rail was under its control.”89 The ECtHR thus took 
an alternative path to establishing State legal responsibility other than attributing the 
actions of a private actor to the State.90 It did so by pursuing an expansive interpretation of 
a positive obligation being owed by the State rather the negative obligation which may 
have arisen if British Rail were understood as being an agent of the State.  
In the case of Osmanoğlu v. Turkey,91 an argument was made that a man’s life was 
under increased threat after his kidnapping and that the Turkish State failed to adequately 
act to prevent him losing his life. Turkey argued that because it was not its own agents 
which had kidnapped the man, it was not legally responsible, an argument which again 
betrays the State’s tunnel vision for negative obligations without consideration of their 
positive counterparts. The ECtHR found that a violation of Article 2 could be established 
without State agents having been involved in a murder which was committed by private 
actors if the State had failed to adequately protect the victim.92 The case shows how positive 
obligations may be used where negative obligations would fail. The Court has enshrined 
positive obligations of the State for private actions but in doing so the Court has 
demonstrated a reluctance to develop a general theory of positive obligations.93 It has 
instead been decided on a case-by-case basis, the extent to which States must act to ensure 
compliance with the Convention in completely private disputes.  
The extent of contracting States’ positive obligations to protect individuals against 
infringements of their rights by other private persons has not yet been adequately clarified 
but issues such as domestic violence (Articles 3 and 8), and the deprivation of liberty by 
terrorists or other kidnappers (Article 5) are areas in which the Court has found such an 
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obligation arises.94 Environmental protection is another area in which positive obligations 
play a key role in protecting the individual from State lapses. The Fadeyeva v Russia95 case 
dealt with a steel plant that was polluting the environment but which was not “…owned, 
controlled, or operated by the State.”96 The ECtHR found that Russia had not directly 
interfered with the relevant Convention rights. However, the Court went on to find that 
legal responsibility for the State may arise in environmental cases from “…a failure to 
regulate private industry. Accordingly, the applicant’s complaints fall to be analysed in 
terms of a positive duty on the State…”97 The Court concluded that the State authoritie s 
were clearly in a position to evaluate the pollution risks of the plant and to take adequate 
measures to prevent them. It was found that this was true to a degree whereby a nexus was 
established between the State and the polluting emissions such that a positive obligat ion 
was created for the State.98 
4.3.3.1 Positive Obligations in Migration Control and Border 
Management 
It is not difficult to see how positive obligations may be utilised in the context of migrat ion 
control and border management. Where negative obligations may fail, the Court can still 
turn to positive obligations to attach responsibility to the State. The case of Costello-
Roberts v UK99 concerned the State’s liability for corporal punishment meted out to a child 
in a private school in the UK. The UK stated that it had fulfilled its Convention obligat ions 
by legislating for a prohibition on corporal punishment in UK schools.100 The Court 
disagreed and stated that the punishment handed out to the child in Costello-Roberts, 
despite being the actions of a private actor (a headmaster of a private school) still had the 
potential to engage the responsibility of the United Kingdom under the ECHR if it proved to 
be incompatible with an article of the Convention.101  
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The ECtHR, in Costello-Roberts, outlined that States are under a duty to impose 
their will and cannot hide behind a claim regarding their own inability to ensure respect of 
instructions.102 A Joint (partly-dissenting) Opinion in that case elaborated on the 
impossibility of a parallel system of control in the hands of a private actor which could 
potentially evade State responsibility. That Opinion set out that a State could “neither shift 
prison administration to the private sector and thereby make corporal punishment in prisons 
lawful, nor can it permit the setting up of a system of private schools which are run irrespective 
of Convention guarantees.”103 This has obvious reticence for direct control. Where a State 
claims to have done its duty by pointing to stipulations placed in a contract, the Court may not 
be convinced that this is enough to have satisfy the State’s positive obligation to prevent a 
rights violation. This is especially true when the State’s monitoring is sporadic and limited in 
scope. The same is true of references in legislation to respect for migrants’ rights in procedures 
of enforced privatisation. 
The Court developed its approach in Costello-Roberts, “focused on the fact the case 
arose in the context of education, and that education is an area in which the state is 
assumed to have certain responsibilities.”104 Clapham pinpoints detention (“private 
prisons”) as a field where a similar finding could be made. The Court’s effort in making 
application of the Convention as effective as possible is made clear in this case. Despite, 
prima facie, the provision of education being a public function, the school in Costello-
Roberts could not be taken as an agent of the State and so a negative obligation could not 
be applied. It was made clear, however, that that field (provision of education) is still 
subject to positive obligations for the State. The private prisons example has obvious 
application to the privatisation of migrant detention. A parallel private system in a 
procedure of migration control and border management could potentially give rise to State 
responsibility because it is an area in which the State is assumed to have responsibility. 
 Spijkerboer posits that that argument which is “most forceful in rejecting a positive 
obligation in the border death context (namely: migrants themselves take these risks so 
States cannot be held responsible if they materialize) is rejected by the Court in terms that 
                                                                 
102 Ireland v UK, 5310/71. Paragraph 159. 
103 Costello-Roberts v UK, 13134/87. Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Ryssdal, Thór Vilhjálmsson, 
Matscher and Wildhaber. Page 16. 
104 Clapham. A., Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (2006). Page 356. 
146 | P a g e  
 
are directly applicable in the border control context.”105 That argument is based upon the 
terms established in positive obligations jurisprudence and Spijkerboer especially lays 
emphasis in the case of Öneryildiz v Turkey106 to illustrate his point. The applicant in the 
case was a 12-year-old boy who was resident of an area of rudimentary dwellings built 
without any authorisation on land surrounding a rubbish tip. Nine close relatives of the boy 
died when methane gas from the dump exploded next to their home. The criterion applied 
by the Court was to ask whether the authorities had done all that could be reasonably 
expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life? Spijkerboer is arguing in the 
context of border deaths and especially as to the drowning of migrants at sea. However, 
this argument could be extended to a positive obligation for the State for violations arising 
out of a privately implemented procedure such as carrier sanctions. 
 Positive obligations can be used by the Court to establish State legal responsibility 
for private actions and this is potentially true of both contracted and enforced privatisat ion. 
Private actors undertaking the State’s work under threat of sanction for non-compliance 
may have resort to positive obligations faster than their contracted counterparts. Agency 
may be more easily established on the basis of a contract than on the basis of the situation 
facing a private actor which is forced to undertake a procedure. Positive obligations for the 
State can potentially be extended to migrants who experience a rights violation at the hands 
of such private actors, so as to ensure the efficient application of the Convention. In this 
way, the State is obliged to ensure an individual’s effective enjoyment of the rights 
bestowed upon him or her through the Convention. 
As things stand, it appears that the effective application of the Convention as a 
driving force behind the Court will mean that positive obligations will be used as a 
complementary tool in ensuring protection of aggrieved individuals. Hypothetica l 
application of a complementary tool is difficult if it is to be used as a stop-gap solution in 
situations where negative obligations fail for some reason. However, it can be stated with 
some confidence that abstract references to respect for human rights, in a contract or in the 
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legislation that sets out a procedure of enforced privatisation, will not be enough to excuse 
the State from legal responsibility for a violation arising out of private implementation. 
4.4 Application of EU Fundamental Rights Law to Private 
Action 
This section is concerned with examining the case-law of the CJEU on the possibility of 
applying EU fundamental rights law to private action within the Member States before 
their domestic courts. That examination is undertaken in the greater context of this chapter 
– exploring the attribution of legal responsibility to the State for the actions of private 
actors. Donnelly points out that rather than the abstract discussions that happen at national 
level as to how public and private actors are treated differently in the context of human 
rights, in EU law the focus instead is on the effectiveness (effet utile) of Union law itself.107 
It is possible that in the interest of effet utile, the CJEU may adopt a broadened 
understanding of the State. This chapter examines the possibility that, in the name of the 
effectiveness of Union fundamental rights law, the CJEU may be moved to broaden its 
conception of the State. This vertical expansion may be undertaken by the Court such that, 
in certain circumstances, private action can represent an extension of the State and when it 
results in a violation of rights, legal responsibility can come to rest with that State.  
This section first briefly turns to acknowledge the possibility of the horizonta l 
application of Charter provisions and the part played by private actors and the unwanted 
horizontal effect which moves the Court toward broadening its concept of the State so as 
to expand upon the possibility for vertical effect (4.4.1). The circumstances in which the 
CJEU may be moved to expand upon the concept of “…an emanation of the State”108 is 
the subject of the second section (4.4.2). In order to better understand how the CJEU could 
possibly broaden its understanding of the State in the interests of ensuring the effective 
application of EU law, jurisprudence from another area of EU law is taken. That 
jurisprudence is taken from the CJEU’s understanding of the State in the context of the 
vertical direct effect of directives (4.4.2.1). Finally, the Luxembourg Court’s application 
of the principle of effet utile relies on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights being 
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applicable to a prima facie private violation in the first place. That requirement is 
revisited109 in the final section (4.4.3). 
4.4.1 Horizontal Application of the Charter 
The horizontal application of Charter provisions will not be considered here at length as 
the emphasis remains in exploring State legal responsibility.110 However, acknowledgment 
must be made that there exists an ongoing debate as to such application. Certain of the most 
crucial jurisprudence in the context of the horizontal application of the Charter has already 
referenced in the context of the extraterritorial application of the Charter (3.2.1). This 
reflects the common criterion to the application of the Charter to the actions of the Member 
States – it applies when they are “implementing Union law.”111 
A subsequent section (4.4.2.1) considers the way in which the CJEU has expanded 
its concept of the State in the context of vertical direct effect of directives. That expansion 
stems directly from the reluctance of the CJEU to read directives as having horizontal direct 
effect. The effectiveness of EU directives depends upon States not being able to delegate 
away legal responsibility and while the Court ruled out horizontal direct effect,112 it 
extended its vertical reach by expanding upon the notion of the State into the private sphere 
so as to ensure the effectiveness of directives. This has resulted in the substantia l 
jurisprudence which is touched upon below (4.4.2.1). 
4.4.2 Effet Utile and Expanding the CJEU’s Understanding of the 
State 
The application of EU law has always been primarily the task of Member States. 
Responsibility for breaches of that law, breaches that cannot be explained with an 
acceptable reason for derogation, rests with Member States. The consequences of 
delegation by a Member State to a private actor and a subsequent fundamental rights 
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violation by that private actor, represents unchartered waters for the CJEU. An examina tion 
of the general capability of the CJEU to expand its concept of the State in order to protect 
the effective application of Union law is beyond the scope of this work. In any case, such 
an examination has already been undertaken.113 However, one specific field of that rich 
jurisprudence can provide a valuable insight into how and when the Court will decide that 
the best course of action, in the interests of effet utile, would be to broaden the meaning of 
the State. This can lead to greater understanding as to the context in which the Court will 
expand the meaning of the State in the interest of the effectiveness of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. This would represent legal responsibility being attached to a Member 
State for the violation of a Charter right by a private actor. In theory then, private 
implementation could give rise to public legal responsibility. 
 Effet utile and its potential importance to a broadened conception of the State for 
the sake of legal responsibility for human rights violations may be illustrated with a simple 
example. One Member State performs its obligations under the Common Agricultura l 
Policy itself and, in doing so, gives protection to the right to privacy. It cannot be seen as 
an effective application of the law if another Member State can delegate those same 
obligations to a private actor which result in there being no protection for the right to 
privacy.114 To contextualise the implication of this argument for present purposes: in 
applying, for example, the Schengen Borders Code,115 the CJEU is motivated not to allow 
a Member State to implement aspects of it through a private actor such that the right to 
appeal an entry refusal is frustrated when another Member State implementing it itself will 
be held legally responsible for such frustration. Allowing this behaviour impacts upon the 
effectiveness of EU law, in this case, fundamental rights law. Instead, the CJEU will 
interpret the State broadly, so as to include the private actor not just to ensure the uniform 
application of Union law but in order to preserve its (the Borders Code and EU fundamenta l 
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rights law) effectiveness. In other words: “If a Member State is not able to adopt a measure 
that would conceal a Community right from the person to whom it applies, then it seems, 
by analogy, that a Member State should not be able to adopt a method of service delivery 
that would conceal a Community right from the person to whom it applies.”116 
All four of the privatised procedures outlined in Chapter II trace their genesis back 
to EU directives. Sanction-driven procedures (enforced privatisation) explicitly envisage a 
role for private actors within the legislation. Those procedures that have been privatised by 
contract (the examples in Chapter II were return escorts and detention) may be carried out 
by the State or may be delegated to a private actor, it is the choice of the State. While the 
effet utile argument may be extended to both sides of the enforced/contractual distinct ion, 
the kind of absurdity in application that was highlighted supra with the Common 
Agricultural Policy example is more apparent in privatisation by contract. The directives 
related to enforced privatisation incorporate private actors across the board. By contrast, 
the directives that provide for return escorts and detention do not necessitate the 
involvement of private actors but States have introduced private actors themselves. That  
introduction may result in variance in the application of EU law from a Member State that 
has privatised to a Member State which implements the procedures itself. 
This debate is purely academic at the moment because there is no firm guidance 
from the Court but it is certainly worth considering the potential for effet utile to spur the 
CJEU into taking a creative approach to the protection of EU fundamental rights in the 
context of privatised migration control and border management. It is thus useful to briefly 
consider the approach taken by the CJEU to effet utile in another field. The vertical direct 
effect of directives provides a particularly rich jurisprudence in this regard and it is to that 
case-law this chapter now turns. 
4.4.2.1 An “Emanation of the State” and the Vertical Direct Effect of 
Directives 
Jurisprudence on the application of effet utile to the protection of EU fundamental rights is 
speculative and a moot point for now. Fortunately, there does exist guidance from other 
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areas of EU law which shows how the CJEU can impart an expansive understanding of the 
State so as to include private actors if so required. Perhaps the best example comes from 
the implementation of EU directives. In the case of Marshall, 117 the CJEU expanded its 
notion of vertical direct effect by creating a broad concept of what it is that the Court can 
interpret as representing State action. It was an early but significant step toward increasing 
the obligation to give effect to Union law, beyond Member States, to include all organs of 
the State. The CJEU stated in that case that the State could appear in a number of guises: 
“..it must be pointed out that where a person involved in legal proceedings is able to rely 
on a directive as against the state he may do so regardless of the capacity in which the 
latter is acting, whether employer or public authority. In either case it is necessary to 
prevent the state from taking advantage of its own failure to comply with Community 
law.”118 
Marshall was followed by the seminal case of Foster v British Gas PLC119 which 
further clarified this broadened scope by setting out that “…a body, whatever its legal form, 
which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for 
providing a public service under the control of the State and has for that purpose special 
powers …is included …among the bodies against which the provisions of a directive 
capable of having direct effect may be relied upon.”120 In coming to that decision, the Court 
took into account the institutional set-up of the company – State reporting requirements; 
State appointed members of the company’s board; budgeting requirements, etc.121 AG Van 
Gerven’s Opinion stated that the crucial issue was not the legal form of the private actor 
itself but the extent to which its activities were under the control of the State.122 
The decision in Foster was reinforced in Kampelmann.123 In Kampelmann the Court 
again set out that certain private actors qualify for consideration as being public authorit ies 
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if they are under the control of the State or possess the “special powers” referred to above 
in Foster v British Gas.124 The CJEU does not prioritise the source of these “special 
powers” as being the crucial factor in determining whether a private actor can be 
considered public on the basis of a particular procedure. In other words, it is not the 
constituting document in contract or particular piece of legislation which gives rise to the 
Court finding that the State has a “special power”. Instead, as Tomkin states: “…the Court 
has progressively moved to uncouple form from function. When determining the 
application of Union law to private entities, priority is afforded to the underlying nature 
and purpose of a particular function rather than to the legal form of the entity performing 
that function.”125 It is not easy to discern criteria from how the CJEU has distinguished 
private actors who represent an extension of State power so that the CJEU can ensure the 
effectiveness of Union law. That criteria would separate those private actors from other 
which do not engage the State’s legal responsibility in this way. This criteria has not been 
definitively set out by the Court and so “…it is not entirely clear what kind of control the 
State must have over a body for it to be part of the State.”126  
A broad concept of the State being interpreted by the CJEU through its consideration 
of the vertical direct effect of directives is just one example from across EU law of how 
the State has broached the public/private divide. Tomkin outlines a number of different 
areas in which a measure implemented by a private actor has a public character or in which 
it exercises functions on behalf of a Member State or public authority. These include value 
added tax; free movement of goods; state aid law; and public procurement.127 It is beyond 
the scope of the present work to conduct a forensic examination of the CJEU’s approach 
in all of these areas but it is important to note the willingness of the Court in other areas 
when considering its potential in defending the effectiveness of EU fundamental rights law.  
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4.4.3 The Charter’s Requirement – “Implementing Union Law” 
A previous section (3.2.2) examined the Charter’s threshold requirement for application – 
that the State is implementing Union law. This section will not reiterate that which has 
already been established but instead briefly touches upon how this may be applied in the 
context of the procedures of privatisation. Suffice here to recall that EU fundamental rights 
law will apply to acts of the institutions and agencies and to Member States in the course 
of implementing their Union obligations, when derogating from those same obligations or 
when generally acting within the scope of EU law.128 
 Are private actors, in implementing migration control and border management 
procedures, implementing EU law? The relevant privatised procedures – the detention of 
migrants, the return of migrants, carrier sanctions and employer sanctions – have all been 
legislated for at Union level. It is possible to give an opinion as to whether a particular 
procedure represents the implementation and application of Union law or not by way of 
reference to CJEU jurisprudence. With regard to the detention of migrants, that procedure 
has been set out in the Reception Directive and by the Returns Directive.129 The nature of 
directives in general is such that it allows the Member State room to manoeuvre in 
implementation but directives, nonetheless, represent an act of the EU and their 
implementation is capable of engaging a Member State’s legal responsibility under the 
Charter.130 The question may be posed: Does detention of migrants by a Member State 
represent the implementation and application of an EU act, in this case the return and 
reception directives? Similarly, does the privatised return of migrants represent the 
implementation of the return directive? It is hard to see how the Court would see these 
procedures in any light other than as a Member State applying an EU act, even if it is not 
stated explicitly in the domestic enforcing legislation. The Charter would thus be engaged. 
Even in the absence of express implementing legislation, a Member State’s implementa t ion 
                                                                 
128 Donnelly. C., Delegation of Government Power to Private Parties – A Comparative Perspective (2007). 
Page 272. 
129 See especially, Articles 15-17 of the Return Directive. Directive 2008/115/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member 
States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. 
See also: Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers. Recital 10. 
130 See: C-442/00 Cabellero. Paragraph 31. 
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of return and detention would also be considered as measures that have been adopted by a 
Member State and that has already been governed by provisions of EU secondary 
legislation. 
Similarly, employer sanctions and carrier sanctions have been legislated for by the 
EU and acts adopted by the Member States which pertain to enforcing that legislation are 
also likely to be deemed by the Court as engaging the Charter. Again, even if acts are 
adopted which do not explicitly implement an EU act, the EU has certainly governed in 
this area already and that will be enough to engage the Charter. As was stated in Chapter 
III, Article 51 is not all-encompassing and not everything can be considered to have already 
been touched by EU acts. Notwithstanding this fact that Article 51 is not all things to all 
men and as such areas do exist in which the Charter is not applicable, the conclusion must 
be that the privatised procedures examined in Chapter II will engage the Charter. 
4.5 Conclusion – Effect of Privatised Control on State 
Responsibility 
States cannot delegate tasks to a private actor that it has undertaken not to do itself. 
However, this is not definitively self-evident from the three judicial settings examined in 
this chapter. Rather, the Courts have experience mixed results in forming coherent and 
cohesive case-law when a private actor has been entrusted with public procedures. The 
courts’ jurisprudence in other areas is not easily applied to migration control and border 
management but nevertheless, has been examined here with a view to better understanding 
the varied and serious challenges in ensuring that States can be made ultimately responsible 
in law for the control that they exert over a given procedure through a private actor. 
 The UK’s domestic courts have laboured under an institutional approach to 
interpreting the legal responsibility of the State. That approach has thrown up results that 
have, at times, given rise to vociferous criticism that justice was not being served. A 
functional approach is preferred by many of these critics. The dominant approach – the 
institutional method – has been outlined as potentially having certain difficulties with 
privatised migration control and border management procedures. In particular, the great 
fear expressed by the aforementioned critics of the institutional approach is that the 
exertion of compulsory powers does not automatically signal State responsibility. The 
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distinction between contracted privatisation and privatisation by threat of sanction also 
comes sharply into focus here. Those procedures that are forced upon private actors being 
subject to an institutional rather than functional approach are vulnerable to not being 
considered as having public control such that the State must be made legally responsible. 
Academic unease at the UK domestic courts’ approach to the public/private divide in the 
context of Section 6(3)(b) has often referenced compulsory powers. While that concern is 
somewhat valid, the first section in this chapter underlined the vulnerability of the UK 
courts’ approach to attaching legal responsibility on the basis of indirect control. Questions 
remain as to the ability of the UK courts to deal with non-compulsory powers which are 
still very much capable of infringing human rights of a migrant.  
Overall, the ECtHR is a powerful force for an inclusive approach to reading private 
actors’ rights violations as giving rise to legal responsibility for the State where the State 
is exercising control. This is because of the Strasbourg Court’s willingness to pursue the 
effective application of the Convention. This priority of effectively applying the 
Convention has meant that the ECtHR is not constrained by a strict adherence to a single 
model by which it must approach all relevant cases. The success of Strasbourg in this realm 
has been down to this flexibility in application. Institutional, functional and other 
considerations may, separately or in combination, be read by the Court as establishing State 
legal responsibility. State legal responsibility necessitates the Court establishing that the 
private actor in question was acting as an agent to the State in breaching an individua l’s 
rights. However, even categorisation of the breach as being the act of a third party and not 
an act of the State’s agent is still not fatal to an individual’s action. There still exists the 
opportunity to attach a different type of legal responsibility to the State through examining 
its positive obligations. All in all, the ECtHR provides a relatively robust and 
comprehensive protection of rights from the danger of private violation. 
The final section of this tripartite judicial examination concerned the CJEU. That 
section explored the possibility that the CJEU would expand its concept of the State in the 
interest of effectively applying EU fundamental rights law. This has previously been done 
in other areas of Union law and one such area was taken to demonstrate how the Court can 
broaden its concept of the State in the interest of effet utile. One such decision in this 
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jurisprudence is the case of Kampelmann which demonstrated the Court’s willingness to 
look at the nature of the power and not just the source of that power in order to determine 
whether or not a private actor qualifies as being public in nature.131 In other words, a private 
actor may be deemed to have public character when it is under the control of public 
authorities or where the private actor has a special power or is exercising powers that are 
normally associated with the State. This means that the CJEU is also acutely conscious of 
the form versus function (institutional versus functional) debate which can be delved into 
when adjudicating on the public/private divide. This offers hope for the potential of the 
CJEU as offering a comprehensive test in the future. 
Perhaps the most useful single unifying conclusion is that debates over the approach 
taken and the factors that a court must take into account should come second to the effective 
application of fundamental rights. That conclusion is only clearly mirrored in action by the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The danger is that the less formalised procedures of enforced 
privatisation, which do not incorporate compulsory powers, will be taken as the acts of a 
wholly private actor when in actual fact the State has significant control. The absence of 
anything as formalised as a contract alongside the implementation of new functions that 
have never previously been carried out by the State, could act to mislead a court in its 
pursuit of the ‘correct approach’ instead of the most effective application of law. Privatised 
procedures that are forced through threat of sanction have not found their way into the 
courts for consideration and struggle to be recognised as procedures that are controlled by 
the State beyond the clamour of academia and civil society.132 Certain commentators have 
asserted that the conduct of airline personnel in preventing a particular person from 
boarding a flight is conduct that is “probably” also attributable to the European State.133 
                                                                 
131 Akhter. R., The Public/Private Divide in EU Law (2011) Diffusion: the UCLan Journal of 
Undergraduate Research Volume 4(1). Page 6. 
See also: C-253-256/96 Kampelmann and Others v Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe. Paragraph 46. 
132 See: Scholten. S & Minderhoud. P., Regulating Immigration Control: Carrier Sanctions in the 
Netherlands (2008) European Journal of Migration and Law 10, 123. 
See also: De Lange. T., The Privatization of Control over Labour Migration in the Netherlands: In Whose 
Interest? (2011) European Journal of Migration and Law 13, 185. 
133 Taylor bases her assertion on Article 33 of the refugee convention rather than Article 3 ECHR.  
See: Taylor. S., Offshore Barriers to Asylum Seeker Movement: The Exercise of Power without 
Responsibility? Page 106. In Mc Adam. J., Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security (2008).  
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That word “probably” reflects the considerable doctrinal and practical hurdles faced in 
attaching legal responsibility to the State for the control it exercises. 
The conclusion must necessarily be that the effect of the control exerted by the State 
through privatised procedures can be to compromise the maxim that the State cannot 
delegate to a private actor that which it has undertaken not to do itself. While it remains 
true that “…a number of legitimate goals may reasonably be thought served by private 
delegations”134, the effect of the control retained by the State despite that delegation must 
be adequately dealt with by the courts. 
  
                                                                 
134 Lawrence. D., Private Exercise of Government Power (1986). Page 657. 
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V. Externalisation, Privatisation and a 
Migrant’s Access to Justice 
5.1 Introduction – Courting Frustration of the Triggers 
Chapters III and IV have considered the main legal impediments which arise for a migrant 
who wishes to vindicate the rights that they allege to have been violated by externalised or 
privatised procedures. For externalisation, narrow interpretations of extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction can frustrate the vindication of rights. For privatisation, it is the attribution of 
the wrong to the private actor rather than the State which can thwart the vindica tion of 
rights. Those legal hurdles are capable of frustrating legal responsibility by not allowing 
its consideration to ever be triggered. 
This chapter further considers the nature and effect of the control exercised by the 
State through privatised and externalised procedures. In testing for legal responsibility for 
the State, the inclusion or exclusion of compulsory powers has, in certain circumstances, 
been taken as the indicator of legal responsibility. Decisions as to legal responsibility of 
the State for alleged violations of rights can be decided on the basis of this arbitrary 
distinction between indirect and direct control. In this context, the following section revisits 
the relevant tests for legal responsibility and the extent to which they can allow for the 
frustration of legal responsibility (5.2). Migrants’ access to justice does not falter because 
of legal impediments alone though and the subsequent section (5.3) examines how access 
to justice and the vindication of rights can be frustrated on the basis of practical and 
procedural hurdles. 
The penultimate section (5.4) of this chapter examines realistic ways forward for 
the courts in ensuring that legal responsibility is triggered as appropriate. In substance, this 
means setting out a doctrinal response to the challenges posed by the phenomena and 
especially in making sure that indirect control can engage the legal responsibility of States. 
The final section (5.5) draws a conclusion to the foregoing. 
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5.2 Indirect Control – Compulsory Powers as the Indicator of 
Legal Responsibility 
The ‘effective control’ model is the dominant test in both the ECtHR and the UK’s domestic 
courts in considering whether a State has engaged extraterritorial jurisdiction and therefore, 
whether or not legal responsibility can be triggered. The tests ability to ensure that State 
control entails legal responsibility for that State is made all the easier due to the fact that 
the courts (the ECtHR and UK domestic courts at least) themselves use a control orientated 
test to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction. Privatisation stands in contrast with 
externalisation insofar as it does not rely on a test based on control per se. Privatisa t ion 
instead relies on a number of different approaches, some of which include consideration of 
State control, some of which do not. What unites the conclusions of the UK domestic courts 
and the ECtHR for both phenomena is in their consideration of direct control. For either 
phenomenon, the incorporation of compulsory powers in the implementation of a 
procedure will almost always lead to a conclusion that the State must take legal 
responsibility for any violation arising out of that implementation. 
In the context of this research’s case-study, the UK, the approach of the courts and the 
position of the State has been that compulsory powers have been the single most consistent 
indicator of State responsibility for violations arising out of the implementation of 
externalised or privatised procedures. For externalisation, the exercise of compulsory 
powers has consistently been interpreted as signifying the exercise of extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction. Likewise, the delegation of such powers to a private actor will be convinc ing 
to courts that legal responsibility must remain with the State. This is the case despite the 
fact that the UK courts are beholden to an institutional test in which compulsory powers 
do not feature. It must be questioned whether there exists an over-reliance on compulsory 
powers as the indicator of legal responsibility. The presence of such powers is often the 
key barometer by which a judicial forum comes to a positive decision as to whether or not 
legal responsibility should be attached to a State. Taking direct control as an indicator is, 
in and of itself, not an approach without merit. Compulsory powers are understandab ly 
thought of as being, with certain limited exceptions, the sole preserve of the State. Certain 
court approaches reflect that understanding with the effective control model of 
externalisation being a good example of a test that is heavily influenced by compulsory 
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powers. It is therefore an approach which lays the emphasis in the powers utilised in 
implementing a procedure rather than examining the procedure as a whole. 
 Control of implementation may be achieved through the use of more overt and 
visible powers or it may be achieved through less discernible means. Rights violations by 
compulsory powered procedures usually include an equally visible result – physical harm 
or even death. Such harm generally points to a violation of the right to life1 or the 
prohibition on inhumane or degrading treatment or torture.2 Indirect control naturally 
represents more subtle expressions of State control. More understated procedures offer the 
State an indirect control which is capable of violating the rights of migrants. However, the 
results of the violations in question are less obvious than those breached by compulsory 
powers. The rights in question include non-refoulement3 and the right to asylum.4 The 
nature of the State’s indirect control – non-compulsory and with less visible violat ions 
arising out of implementation – can be used to coerce the State’s desired effect without 
triggering consideration of legal responsibility for the State. 
5.2.1 Externalisation – The ‘Effective control’ Model 
To briefly visit upon a Court not considered in this work, the case of McDonald v Mabee5 
saw Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes deliver a judgment which considered the Court’s 
jurisdiction. In that judgment Holmes stated that “[t]he foundation of jurisdiction is 
physical power.”6 Holmes’ approach can be understood as being that jurisdiction refers to 
the capacity of a State to exercise certain powers.7 A Member State’s ability to exercise 
compulsory powers is certainly not territorially bounded, nor is its obligation to respect 
rights. Problems arise because the test for extraterritorial jurisdiction places too much store 
in the physical expression of control. The ‘effective control’ model, by which the 
                                                                 
1 Article 2, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 2, European Convention of Human Rights. 
2 Article 4, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 3, European Convention of Human Rights. 
3 Article 19, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 3, European Convention of Human Rights. 
4 Article 18, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. A right to asylum was suggested for the second protocol 
of the ECHR in 1961 but was rejected.  
See: den Heijer. M. Article 18. Page 523. In Peers. S., Hervey. T., Kenner. J., Ward. A., The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (2014). 
5 McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 U.S. 90. 
6 McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 U.S. 90. Paragraph 91. 
7 Oduntan. G., Arriving before you Depart: Law and Fiction in Juxtaposed Control Zones. Page 338. In  
Shah. P., & Menski. W., Migration, Diasporas & Legal Systems in Europe (2006). 
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Strasbourg court considers extraterritorial jurisdiction, lends itself to depending upon direct 
control. Jurisdiction remains tied to territory in its application bar certain ‘exceptional’ 
circumstances which have been almost exclusively dominated by compulsory powers. The 
status quo is that indirect control, including the organising, coordination, decision-mak ing, 
funding, training or other forms of support abroad, will not engage a State’s extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction. Even the presence of immigration officials and the ‘advice’ and guidance that 
they provide to the decision as to access for a migrant will find it difficult to trigger the 
legal responsibility for a State. The ability of a migrant to vindicate their rights vis-à-vis 
the State is therefore frustrated by a somewhat narrow interpretation of extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction.  
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence has also only found contracting States to have engaged 
their extraterritorial jurisdiction where the State has exercised direct control. Al-Skeini,8 
understandably heralded as a positive departure by many and now regarded as being the 
primary guidance on the extraterritorial application of the Convention, did nothing to 
temper this reliance on compulsory powers. On the contrary, the Court in that case 
reiterated that “What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and control 
over the person in question.”9 The Strasbourg court also still requires an exercise of public 
powers (territorial) element in its effective control model. This does nothing to temper the  
reliance on compulsory powers and has only served to make the Court’s requirements even 
more convoluted. In this regard Smith (No.2)10 was a welcome expansion on Al-Skeini but 
did nothing to move extraterritorial jurisdiction over individuals beyond consideration of 
the exercise of compulsory powers. 
The current range of exceptions to a strictly territorial understanding of jurisdict ion, 
under which the ECtHR and the UK domestic courts labour, fail to provide suffic ient 
protection for indirect control in the context of migration control and border management. 
Immigration Liaison Officers, for instance, are unlikely to be interpreted as representing 
one of the traditional exceptions to jurisdiction being based on territory. Yet, if one of those 
officers was to place a migrant under arrest for an hour or physically restrain him or her, 
                                                                 
8 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, 55721/07, [GC]. 
9 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, 55721/07, [GC]. Paragraph 136. 
10 Smith and others v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41. 
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the opposite finding is far from being beyond the bounds of belief. It is the personal model 
by which ILOs’ work would be considered. However, given Al-Skeini’s requirement for 
physical power and control, it will take a further expansion upon the Court’s interpretat ion 
of the personal model before the work of ILOs can act so as to engage the jurisdiction of 
those officers’ home State. Al-Skeini’s public powers requirement could, potentially, be 
satisfied in the context of migration control and border management because the work of 
any immigration officer could be said to represent the exercise of such powers. It must be 
added though that those public powers obviously do not compare to the type of public 
powers being exercised by the UK in Iraq in the Al-Skeini case. In any case, on this point, 
Smith (No.2) likely heralds a change in direction. 
The more recent case of Jaloud.11 again underlined the importance of the physica l 
element in the actions of State agents: “…the use of force by a State’s agents operating 
outside its territory may bring the individual …into the State’s Article 1 jurisdiction. This 
principle has been applied where an individual is taken into the custody of State agents 
abroad.”12 Maintaining this approach without any nod in the direction of being more 
inclusive of indirect control is inadequate when one considers that Immigration Liaison 
Officers can impact upon access to protection without needing a compulsory power such 
as being able to detain. Falling short of exercising direct control, it is therefore still true to 
state that “…by shifting migration control further from state territory both geographically 
and conceptually, control may be asserted more unconstrainedly…” 13 once that doesn’t 
cross the threshold of exercising compulsory powers. Milanovic’s example of a UK 
intelligence officer feeding questions and information to the Pakistani torturer who is 
interrogating a terrorist suspect in Pakistan14 may equally be applied to an Immigration 
Liaison Officer’s advice to an airline which can lead to the refoulement of an asylum 
seeker. 
                                                                 
11 Jaloud v The Netherlands, 47708/08, [GC]. 
12 Jaloud v The Netherlands, 47708/08, [GC]. Paragraph 136. 
13 Gammeltoft-Hansen. T., Access to Asylum (2011). Page 147. 
14 Milanovic. M., Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (2011). Page 219. 
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5.2.2 Privatisation – Assorted Tests for State Legal Responsibility 
The ECtHR, as has already been considered (4.3.2), makes reference to a disparate set of 
influences in coming to a decision as to State legal responsibility for a privately 
implemented procedure. This array of influences gives the State a more holistic approach 
which is capable of addressing each case on the basis of its own facts. It is therefore less 
rigid than it is in dealing with extraterritorial jurisdiction and is better equipped to meet the 
challenges posed by indirect control. The ECtHR has been able to place the emphasis where 
it is felt that emphasis is needed for a particular procedure in coming to a conclusion vis-
à-vis State legal responsibility. That varied approach has not found favour in the UK where 
the domestic courts continue to toil under the confusing system of the institutional test. The 
Van Der Mussele15 case points to the Strasbourg Court’s willingness to find that a public 
function, which a private actor has been compelled to implement by a State through 
legislation, represents the exercise of governmental functions such that legal responsibility 
for any rights violation arising out of its implementation should be attributed to the State. 
In the Human Rights Act, Section 6(3)(b) has caused ambiguity with its application. 
It remains somewhat unclear as to what type of functions will implicate the State and more 
especially, how the UK courts must come to that conclusion. The position at the present 
moment is that Section 6(3)(b) HRA “has been tightly circumscribed, and the section only 
clearly encompasses regulatory or physically coercive powers.”16 Procedures which 
exhibit a direct control and will most likely be interpreted as representing State action. 
However, uncertainty persists for those procedures which do not incorporate compulsory 
powers. The implication of the provision being ‘tightly circumscribed’ is that beyond 
compulsory powers there lay only a narrow field of application for Section 6(3)(b) and that 
approach is “regrettable.”17 It is regrettable because it could possibly exclude procedures 
of enforced privatisation. The courts’ application of Section 6(3)(b) therefore gives rise to 
a risk of the frustration of legal responsibility. 
                                                                 
15 Van Der Mussele v Belgium, 8919/80. 
16 Donnelly. C., Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Parties (2007).  Page 269. See also: YL v. 
Birmingham City Council & Ors [2007] UKHL 27. Baroness Hale at paragraph 63. 
17 Donnelly. C., Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Parties (2007).  Page 269.  
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 The UK courts have, on occasion, held that the delivery of contracted-out public 
services by a private organisation acting on behalf of central or local government, do not 
constitute public authorities.18 That is true of contracted privatisation that does not 
incorporate compulsory powers but the procedures considered in the present context are 
compulsory powered. The more formal delegation through contract of a procedure that was 
once being implemented by the State stands in marked contrast to enforced privatisation in 
the context of an institutional test. The relationship between State and private actor with 
enforced privatisation is not quite as formalised. The procedures of enforced privatisa t ion 
are not ones which had been ever undertaken previously by the State and, obviously for a 
non-compulsory powered procedure, do not directly manifest in physical injuries or 
death.19 Rather than representing a public to private transfer, enforced privatisation actually 
represents a new migration control and border management procedure. Notwithstand ing 
certain very serious procedural complications added by privatisation, which will be 
explored below (5.3.2), in the context of privatisation by contract the State usually remains 
liable for the actions of its delegate.20 This is far less certain for the more informally 
arranged procedures of enforced privatisation. 
 Clayton reassures her readers that “Privately run detention centres in the UK are 
beyond question public authorities for HRA [Human Rights Act] purposes.”21 This is borne 
out by the experience of the UK domestic courts, in civil actions especially. The Courts 
have had occasion to consider legal responsibility for detention.22 Clayton points to the 
                                                                 
18 Williams. A., Public authorities: what is a hybrid public authority under the HRA? Page 49-50. In 
Hoffman. D., The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law. See: Cameron v. Network Rail 
Infrastructure Ltd [2006] EWHC 1133 [2007] 1 WLR 163; James v. London Electricity Plc [2004] EWHC 
3226. 
19 As referred to in section 5.2. 
20 Davies. A., Government Contractors: Public or Private? (2008). Page 237. 
21 Clayton. G., The UK and Extraterritorial lmmigration Control: Entry Clearance and Juxtaposed Control 
in Ryan. B., and Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control (2010). Page 427. 
22 The rights violations of private actors, who have been instructed to detain, have given rise to vicarious 
legal responsibility for the State. See: ID and others v Home Office [2005] EWCA Civ 38. The Home 
Office had sought to argue that although an immigration officer had authorised the detention of the 
claimants, it was not responsible for their actual physical detention, a private actor had that task. However, 
it was found that this delegation of the detention procedure did not relieve the State of legal responsibility 
for the false imprisonment given that the detentions were caused by the immigration officers who 
authorised them. 
See: Scott. M., & Wistrich. H., ID and Others and Unlawful Detention: The Issues Explained (2005) Legal 
Action Magazine. 
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case of R (on the application of D and K) v SSHD23 in this regard. In that case, damages 
due to the claimants for unlawful detention under the ECHR were payable by the Home 
Office alone. This is opposed to damages being payable by the private actor contracted to 
provide the detention. This finding was made on the basis that the Court adjudged that 
responsibility for the unlawful detention rested “primarily with the First Defendant and 
also because the actuality is that in cases such as these the decision to detain or release is 
that of the First Defendant: no one else.”24  
It is highly contentious whether the inclusion of fundamental rights guarantees in a 
contract is capable of ensuring adherence even if the government take their duties to 
monitor such implementation seriously. The evidence points toward the UK not taking 
these duties to monitor seriously.25 In the view of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
the inclusion of such guarantees by themselves cannot be depended upon in order to 
properly counteract the narrow interpretation of public authorities. Such dependence would 
likely be: “partial, inconsistent…” and could lead to the “unequal protection of rights.”26 
The Committee stated that fundamental rights cannot be fully and effectively protected 
through the use of contractual terms and that contractual guarantees cannot be used to 
replace the direct application of the Human Rights Act to service providers.27 It would be 
more useful if the contract actually stipulated that the private actor involved should be 
considered as a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act in the context 
of the procedures being contracted for and that those contracts were then also made fully 
public.  
The Joint Committee on Human Rights of the House of Lords and House of Commons’ 
report stated that a private body is only likely to be held to be a public authority performing 
public functions under Section 6(3)(b) if: it is exercising coercive powers devolved from 
                                                                 
23 R(on the application of D and K) v SSHD [2006] EWHC 980. 
24 R (on the application of D and K) v SSHD [2006] EWHC 980. Paragraph 122. 
25 For an example of criticism of UK monitoring of compulsory powers during removals, see: Amnesty 
International report. Out of Control: The case for a complete overhaul of enforced removals by private 
contractors (2011). Available at: http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/out_of_control_1.pdf 
26 House of Commons, House of Lords, Joint Committee on Human Rights Report: The Meaning of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act. Seventh Report of Session 2003–04. Paragraph 153. 
27 House of Commons, House of Lords, Joint Committee on Human Rights Report: The Meaning of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act. Seventh Report of Session 2003–04. Paragraph 21 of the 
Conclusions and Recommendations. 
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the State; it is exercising powers of a public nature directly assigned to it by statute; or if 
its structures and work are closely linked with the State body that is delegating.28 The report 
went on to state that as a result of this approach the protection of human rights is not 
dependent on a procedure’s capacity to interfere with human rights so much as the 
relatively arbitrary criterion of the body’s administrative links with institutions of the 
State.29 Procedures of forced privatisation, such as employer sanctions and carrier 
sanctions, are not exercising powers directly assigned to them by statute. The State is in 
fact simply changing the way in which private actors use powers that they already had. 
Private actors do so so as to avoid censure by the State and conduct these tasks as directed 
by statute. It is highly dubious whether the legislative basis for procedures of enforced 
privatisation would result in the State being found legally responsible under the 
institutional approach. 
Relying on compulsory powers as the key indicator of liability for the State, is based 
upon fundamentally flawed logic. The 2006–07 House of Lords and House of Commons 
Joint Committee on Human Rights report is in agreement with its earlier counterpart in 
arguing that it is the function which an entity is performing that should be determinative of 
whether that entity represents a public authority. There is nothing in Section 6(3)(b) HRA 
to suggest that an entity’s institutional proximity to the State or their compulsory powers 
vis-à-vis the service user should determine responsibility.30 An approach which considers 
the nature of the function being implemented could represent a more all-encompassing test 
by which to approach procedures with a somewhat confused public/private identity. Such 
a functional test has the potential to consider enforced privatisation in a new light. 
5.3 Access to Justice and Practical and Procedural 
Impediments 
More than any other EU Member State, the UK has advanced the notion of privatis ing 
procedures which normally would be seen as being inherently the role of the State and 
externalising many functions of its migration control and border management. Despite this 
                                                                 
28 House of Commons, House of Lords, Joint Committee on Human Rights Report: The Meaning of Pu blic 
Authority under the Human Rights Act. Seventh Report of Session 2003–04. Paragraph 40. 
29 House of Commons, House of Lords, Joint Committee on Human Rights Report: The Meaning of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act. Seventh Report of Session 2003–04. Paragraph 41. 
30 Palmer. E., Judicial Review, Socio-Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (2007). Page 146. 
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significant investment, the scale of the jurisprudence that considers alleged fundamenta l 
rights violations at the hands of externalised or privatised migration control and border 
management in UK courts, has not been significant. Externalisation and privatisation do 
not depend solely upon the legal impediments that arise through those phenomena in order 
to frustrate legal responsibility for the State. Certain other procedural and practical 
obstacles arise upon the State’s adoption of these phenomena. These impediments to a 
migrant’s access to justice are encountered long before the legal hurdles considered in 
Chapters III and IV. 
 For externalisation, as well as the legal impediment imposed by narrow 
interpretations of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the simple geography involved presents 
migrants with a very practical impediment which can oftentimes prove to be fatal to their 
ability to gain access to justice. In order for a remedy to be effective, it must be practicable 
for a complainant and when a migrant is exiled from any legal recourse for a violat ion 
which is alleged to have occurred on the high seas or inside a third State, remedies are not 
practicable.31 With regard to privatisation, in addition to legal difficulty in ascribing 
responsibility for private action to public authorities when appropriate to do so, there is an 
added procedural impediment to the vindication of fundamental rights. The procedural 
impediment in question is that migrants often choose an alternative basis for their claim 
other than through an action based in fundamental rights. In particular, a migrant who 
alleges a fundamental rights violation may opt to pursue his/her action through private law. 
There are very good reasons why alternative remedies exist and why they are pursued by 
claimants. Those remedies still represent a path to justice but this research is based on 
fundamental rights and there are question marks as to whether private law can afford a true 
vindication of the right in question. Access to justice and the vindication of rights can thus 
be denied in different ways by both externalisation and privatisation. 
                                                                 
31 See: Alpes. MJ., Airport Casualties: Non-Admission and Return Risks at Times of 
Internalized/Externalized Border Controls (2015) Social Sciences Vol 4(3). 
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5.3.1 Externalisation – Access to Justice Beyond the External 
Borders 
An alleged violation may be experienced in a third State or on the high seas by a migrant 
who is attempting to reach the Union. Alternatively, a migrant who has already reached the 
Union may experience a violation during their forced return32 to a third State.33 In either 
case, a migrant with a complaint as to a violation of their fundamental rights finds 
themselves in an externalised setting and in attempting to gain access to justice they not 
only must contend with the substantive legal issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction but also 
with considerable procedural and practical obstacles.34 The reasons for migrants not 
pursuing effective remedies remotely are manifold but all revolve around the 
interconnected practical and procedural problems arising out of their geographical and 
administrative remoteness.35 The meaning of access to justice is, in itself, fraught with 
difficulty.36 While the focus of scholarly work with regard to access to justice in the context 
of migration control and border management has often been on the right to an effective and 
expeditious remedy and a fair trial, this section focuses on the quite literal interpretation of 
the phrase – the ability to gain access to the courts. 
In some rare circumstances, a migrant’s saving grace in making the State take 
responsibility for the control it exerts abroad has been that their legal representatives have 
gone to extraordinary lengths to gain access to justice on their behalf or because an NGO 
pursued their case. However, these are the tiny minority of instances and their difficult 
                                                                 
32 See: The website of the Post-Deportation Monitoring Network. Available at: 
http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/post-deportation-monitoring-network 
33 A 2011 European Commission study stated that only 13% of returns from EU Member States were 
monitored beyond their arrival point. See: European Commission Directorate-General Justice study, 
Freedom and Security Comparative Study on Best Practices in the Field of Forced Return Monitoring 
(2011) Matrix Insight Ltd and International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). Page 27.  
Studies have been conducted as to the need for monitoring for failed asylum seekers who are subsequently 
returned to their country of origin or a country of transit. For example, see: Podeszfa. L., & Manicom. C., 
Avoiding Refoulement: The Need to Monitor Deported Failed Asylum Seekers (2012) Oxford Monitor of 
Forced Migration, Volume 2(2), 10. 
34 Similar to what Brouwer called the ‘unprivileged’ migrant. See: Brouwer. E., Effective Remedies for 
Third Country Nationals in EU Law: Justice Accessible to All? Page 390. In Guild. E., & Minderhoud. P., 
The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law (2012). 
35  For an overview of the impact of procedural and practical obstacles through externalisation, see: 
Gammeltoft-Hansen. T., ‘Hic abundant leones’: the institutional reach of refugee protection. In 
Gammeltoft-Hansen. T., Access to Asylum (2010). 
36 Rhode. D., Access to Justice (2004). 
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journey to the vindication of rights serves to illustrate how a migrant’s access to justice can 
easily be frustrated by his/her geographical and administrative remoteness. These hurdles 
can ensure that the preliminary legal question as to jurisdiction is never considered, let 
alone, the actual merits of the case. The central practical challenge in gaining access to 
justice is the ability of a migrant’s legal representatives to maintain contact with that 
migrant after he or she has been removed or when they have experienced a push-back. 
Even with that contact, procedural obstacles abound. Gaining an adequate power of 
attorney from that migrant is a serious hurdle.37 Similarly, where an NGO has acted on 
behalf of a migrant and wishes to continue to do so, gaining the necessary locus standi in 
order to appear before a court can be an onerous task. 
A glance through the most pivotal case-law examined in Chapter III reveals the 
important part that migrants’ representatives and NGOs have played in facilitating access 
to effective remedies when a migrant tries to gain access to such remedies from a remote  
location. In the Hirsi case38 the lawyers representing those migrants who had been taken 
on board the Italian ship and returned to Libya, had to go to great lengths to ensure that 
they kept in contact with those migrants.39 These lawyers, Mr A.G. Lana and Mr A. 
Saccucci, stated that they had managed to stay in touch intermittently with the migrants in 
Libya by phone and by email and that humanitarian organisations in Libya had drawn up 
powers of attorney and forwarded them to the representatives in Rome.40 The lawyers had 
lost contact with eighteen of the twenty-four applicants by the time the case was heard by 
the ECtHR. The ECtHR stated that once the applicant’s understanding and consent were 
clear and unambiguous, a power of attorney was legitimate.41 A case with a similar set of 
circumstances had previously been dismissed by the ECtHR. In Hussun42 the Court stated: 
« Compte tenu de l'impossibilité d'établir le moindre contact avec les requérants dont il est 
question, la Cour considère que leurs représentants ne peuvent pas, d'une manière 
                                                                 
37 See: Lambert Abdelgawad. E., Preventing and Sanctioning Hindrances to the Right of Individual Petition 
before the European Court of Human Rights (2011). 
38 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 27765/09, [GC]. 
39 Costello. C., Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored (2012) 
Human Rights Law Review 12(2), 287. Page 306-307. 
40 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 27765/09, [GC]. Paragraphs 48-51. 
41 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 27765/09, [GC]. Paragraph 55. 
42 Hussun and Others v Italy, 10171/05, 10601/05, 11593/05 et 17165/05. 
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significative, continuer la procédure devant elle. » 43 While the Hirsi case shows that the 
hurdle is surmountable, the Hussun case demonstrates that, in a very practical sense, power 
of attorney can be difficult to obtain from potential applicants in a volatile third State where 
it is difficult to remain in contact, violence is commonplace and migrants cannot access 
essential services.  
The potential of an NGO to work for a migrant remotely is demonstrated by the the 
Prague Airport case44 in which the individual appellants were joined by an NGO – the 
European Roma Rights Centre (“ERRC”). The Court’s eventual finding that the work of 
the British Immigration Liaison Officers in Prague airport was discriminatory45 can be 
largely put down to the work carried out by the ERCC in its collection of data. However, 
across the EU, this is the exception rather than the norm as NGOs are not often in a position 
to work in this way. “Narrow rules relating to legal standing prevent civil society 
organisations from taking a more direct role in litigation.”46 The Fundamental Rights 
Agency deemed ten of the then twenty-seven Member States to be “overly restrictive” in 
allowing NGOs to take a case on behalf of a migrant and many other Member States were 
also obstructive to the extent that “legal standing is one of the major restrictions regarding 
the right of access to justice.”47 The majority of EU Member States have not accepted that 
there exists any general right to file a public interest complaint (actio popularis), which 
would enable an individual or other entity to take an action in the name of the general 
public, without being the victim or having been directly authorised to represent the 
                                                                 
43 Hussun and Others v Italy, 10171/05, 10601/05, 11593/05 et 17165/05. Paragraph 49. No English 
translation of case. Author’s translation: In view of the impossibility of establishing any contact with the 
applicants in question, the Court considers that their representatives cannot continue with the proceedings 
before it. 
44 Regina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another ex parte European Roma Rights Centre and 
others [2004] UKHL 55. 
45 Regina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another ex parte European Roma Rights Centre and 
others [2004] UKHL 55. Paragraphs 92-94. 
46 EU non-discrimination law is an exception to this. See: Fundamental Rights Agency report. Access to 
Justice in Europe: An Overview of Challenges and Opportunities (2011). Page 11. 
47 Fundamental Rights Agency report. Access to Justice in Europe: An Overview of Challenges and 
Opportunities (2011). Page 40. 
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victim.48 With regard to the ECtHR,49 in 2014 it relaxed50 its usual approach which is to 
require that the NGO has express authorisation from the victim of the violation in order to 
take a case on their behalf. However, it is difficult to envisage cases arising in the context 
of migration control and border management the facts of which could match the extreme 
facts of that recent deviation from the norm. A friend or family member of a deceased 
person can still take an action under the Human Rights Act. Close relatives of a deceased 
person can be victims in their own right and can sue under Article 2 ECHR.51 However, 
the UK government has been criticised for having removed the ability of representative 
groups to bring proceedings that would vindicate the rights of others by retaining the victim 
requirement for Human Rights Act cases.52 
The reality is that “[i]n the great majority of cases deported migrants ‘disappear’ 
from the radar of the lawyers who used to represent them prior to their deportation.”53 
Hirsi was an extreme exception to this trend. M.S.S.,54 albeit concerning a transfer from 
EU Member State to another Member State under the Dublin Regulation,55 was a simila r 
exception whereby legal representatives went above and beyond their usual duty. Any 
optimism that such rare cases do spur must be taken in the context that public law 
organisations advocating for migrants’ rights ask themselves whether it is worthwhile to 
expend resources pursuing such cases. In the UK, public interest lawyers have to consider 
the benefit the litigation would bring to the wider public.56 In an era of cuts to free legal 
aid in the UK and when there are so many deserving applicants who are in full contact with 
                                                                 
48 Fundamental Rights Agency report. Access to Justice in Europe: An Overview of Challenges and 
Opportunities (2011). Page 40. 
49 Article 34, ECHR. 
50 In 2014 the ECtHR found that in certain “exceptional circumstances,” an NGO could represent the 
victim of a violation despite not being a victim itself or having been granted a power of attorney by the 
victim to take such an action. See: Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Câmpeanu v Romania, 
47848/08, [GC]. Paragraph 112. 
51 Leyland. P., & Anthony. G., Textbook on Administrative Law (2013).  Page 75. See also: McCaughey 
Application [2011] 2 WLR 1279. 
52 Leyland. P., & Anthony. G., Textbook on Administrative Law (2013).  Page 75. 
53 Dembour. MB., When Humans become Migrants (2015). Page 418. 
54 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, 30696/09, [GC].  
55 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third -country national or a 
stateless person. 
56 See: Welch. J., Litigating the Public Interest, Report of the Working Group on Facilitating Public Interest 
Litigation (2006) Liberty.  
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their legal representatives, the choice is made on the basis of likelihood of success which 
will naturally tend to exclude a migrant who is not present.57 
5.3.2 Privatisation – Private Law as an Alternative Remedy 
In the UK, private law provides an alternative remedy to an action in fundamental rights in 
establishing the State as legally responsible for a wrong arising out of the implementa t ion 
of privatised migration control and border management procedures. The most important 
avenue in private law is through tort. The use of tort as an alternative remedy rather than a 
public law action based on fundamental rights, raises questions as to the vindicatory power 
of private law. A successful action under the Human Rights Act definitively vindicates the 
fundamental rights of the claimant. There is debate as to tort’s ability to do so. In addition, 
it is possible for the State to be omitted from a tort action and thus avoid legal responsibility 
altogether for a violation of a migrant’s fundamental rights. 
5.3.2.1 The Vindicatory Power of Tort 
With the passage of the Human Rights Act into force in 2000, a free-standing right of action 
was created. However, it would be a grave mistake to think that the Human Rights Act 
filled a total vacuum where there had been absolutely no effective remedies before. Tort 
made an important contribution to filling any such vacuum. Long before the advent of 
human rights legislation in the UK, private law already reflected some of the values and 
morals later enshrined in human rights statutes.58 Both human rights and private law seek 
to provide remedies to individuals who have experienced a violation of their rights.59 Public 
authorities are liable in tort in exactly the same way as any private individual.60 In the wake 
of the passage of the Human Rights Act into law, questions arose as to whether it would 
herald a convergence of the tort liability of public authorities and human rights.61 The 
                                                                 
57 The situation is such that a crowdfunding platform for public interest litigation has been set up which 
seeks to gather funds from the general public in order to undertake cases in the public interest . 
CrowdJustice is a crowdfunding platform built specifically for legal cases. It gives the tools to build a 
community around a case and gain financial and community support to help get that case to court. 
Available at: https://www.crowdjustice.co.uk/ 
58 Flaherty. M., Private Law and its Normative Influence on Human Rights. Page 207. In Barker. K., & 
Jensen. D., Private Law Key Encounters with Public Law (2013). 
59 Flaherty. M., Private Law and its Normative Influence on Human Rights. Page 209. In Barker. K., & 
Jensen. D., Private Law Key Encounters with Public Law (2013). 
60 Leyland. P., & Anthony. G., Textbook on Administrative Law (2013).  Page 458. 
61 Du Bois. F., Human Rights and the Tort Liability of Public Authorities (2011) 127 Law Quarterly 
Review 589. Page 589. 
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Supreme Court, or the House of Lords as it then was, decided against such a convergence 62 
and the alternative systems have continued to co-exist since then. 63 The UK’s domestic 
courts have instead pursued a course whereby private law (tort) and public law (human 
rights) represent alternatives.64 
The question of which of these two avenues should be pursued by a claimant is usually 
decided by reference to the specific circumstances of a case and by the motivation of the 
complainant. The UK’s highest courts have sought to promote a clear separation between 
the remedies that are available under the Human Rights Act as opposed to those that are 
available in tort.65 By and large, damages are much more substantial in tort cases. Damages 
can deeply influence complainants but by no means should they be taken as being the only 
issue to consider. Other such issues include: the time limits for taking a case; the legal 
standing of the applicant; the expected length of proceedings etc. Successful proceedings 
in tort consider the loss, damage or violation suffered by the claimant or the sum required 
to ‘punish’ the defendant.66 Damages under the Human Rights Act depend on a broader 
range of considerations than tort and mirror awards given at Strasbourg67 which are 
typically a nominal amount and are only given when material damage is caused to the 
complainant. In a public law action, a declaratory judgment is oftentimes deemed as 
providing sufficient relief. “Vindication of rights through section 8 [the Human Rights 
Act] is thought to require an award of damages only rarely. …This is thought to reflect the 
primary function of such actions;” 68 The primary function being to afford an applicant 
vindication of their violated rights. 
The charge has long stood that civil actions are designed to compensate claimants for 
a loss while Convention claims are intended to uphold rights standards and represent a 
                                                                 
62 Most prominently in: Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2009] 1 A.C. 225. 
63 Dickson. B., Human Rights and the UK Supreme Court (2013). Page 34. 
64 This is not to say that tort has remained untouched by passage of the Human Rights Act. For an 
interesting historical context on the courts recognition of ‘new’ causes of action in order to give effect to 
ECHR rights, see: Wright. J., Tort Law and Human Rights (2001). Page 27. 
65 Steele. J., Damages in tort and under the Human Rights Act: remedial or functional separation? [2008] 
Cambridge Law Journal 606. Page 606. 
66 Steele. J., Damages in tort and under the Human Rights Act: remedial or functional separation? [2008] 
Cambridge Law Journal 606. Page 617. 
67 The ‘mirror principle.’ See: R (Greenfield) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 
14. Paragraph 6. 
68 Steele. J., Tort Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2014). Page 555. 
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public expression of rights vindication.69 This perception of tort as being compensatory has 
fuelled questions as to the capability of its remedies to adequately vindicate a claimant’s 
rights.70 Steele speaks for the majority of commentators by rejecting the absoluteness of 
the compensatory/vindicatory distinction as being overly “simplistic.” That author argues 
for an alternative distinction to be made on the basis that both avenues provide vindica tory 
power in their remedies, the difference being that while tort actions remedy rights 
violations for the benefit of the individual claimant, actions under the Human Rights Act 
vindicate and protect ECHR rights in the public interest.71  
In the action in tort of ID and others v Home Office,72 the Court of Appeal considered 
a Home Office argument as to the procedure pursued by the claimants. The case concerned 
an alleged breach of rights which occurred in privatised detention for migrants. The Home 
Office argued that the claim should be struck out because it had been pursued through a 
tort action rather than by way of public law judicial review proceedings. The Court stated 
that the relevant question was not whether “the right procedure” had been adopted but 
whether the forum chosen deprived a party of the opportunity of having its case heard 
justly.73 The Court found that in a damages case such as ID, private law proceedings were 
most appropriate given that the Administrative Court (from where it was on appeal) had no 
jurisdiction to hear an action for damages alone. However, there were also issues 
concerning whether the power to detain had been exercised lawfully. These issues are of a 
‘public law’ nature and would benefit from being tried by a judge with Administra t ive 
                                                                 
69 Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police and Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police 
[2008] UKHL 50. Paragraph 138.  
For similar statements, see: Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134. Paragraph 87. And: Watkins v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17. Paragraph 9. And: R (Greenfield) v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2006] 2 A.C. Paragraph 19. 
70 For example, see: Donnelly. C., Delegation of Government Power to Private Parties – A Comparative 
Perspective (2007). Page 380. 
For a more optimistic reading of tort’s vindicatory power, see: Barker. K., Private and Public: The Mixed 
Concept of Vindication in Torts and Private Law. In Pitel. SGA., Neyers. JW., & Chamberlain. E., Tort 
Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (2013). 
71 Steele. J., Damages in tort and under the Human Rights Act: remedial or functional separation? [2008] 
Cambridge Law Journal 606. Page 608. 
72 ID and others v Home Office [2005] EWCA Civ 38. 
73 Scott. M., & Wistrich. H., ID and Others and Unlawful Detention: The Issues Explained (2005) Legal 
Action Magazine. Page 24. 
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Court expertise.74 To fully address this range of issues, the Court stated that the best 
approach for the action was a High Court judge with Administrative Court experience 
sitting as judge in the county court to consider a claim for damages.75 The case showcases 
the kind of complex questions of procedure that beset procedures that have a complex 
public/private make-up. 
The conventional wisdom is that the courts, rather than immersing themselves in 
technical distinctions between public and private rights, should focus on the practical 
consequences of a claimant choosing one alternative over another. In other words, the 
courts should exercise their judgment in each case rather than be bound over by 
presumptions about procedural rigidity.76 This flexible approach has been reflected 
somewhat by the rules that now govern the judicial review procedure in England and Wales 
which have likewise been changed in order to encourage flexibility.77 Dispensing with the 
pointless ‘mirror principle,’ whereby damages awarded in an action under the Human 
Rights Act must reflect those awarded in Strasbourg, would go a long way toward 
encouraging claimants down the avenue of public law. The courts could increase damages 
in public law cases in order to reflect the compensatory framework already in place with 
tort. This change in the damages culture in public law would in not in any way harm the 
relationship between the Human Rights Act and the ECHR and would not draw into 
question the vindicatory power of the public law avenue. 
No comprehensive study has been carried out as to the extent to which claimants 
such as migrants pursue one alternative over and above the other. While the award could 
potentially be large, taking a tort action is expensive and can take as long as three years to 
go to trial. Claimants may be eligible for legal aid but will have to convince the Legal Aid 
Agency that their case has a good chance of succeeding before they will be able to access 
funding. In the context of the type of cuts to legal aid mentioned above (5.3.1), it is likely 
that any tort action by a migrant would have to be in reaction to having suffered a serious 
                                                                 
74 Scott. M., & Wistrich. H., ID and Others and Unlawful Detention: The Issues Explained (2005) Legal 
Action Magazine. Page 24. 
75 ID and others v Home Office [2005] EWCA Civ 38. Paragraph 128. 
76 Paraphrasing Lord Woolf in: Trustees of the Dennis Rye Pension Fund v Sheffield City Council [1998] 1 
WLR 840. See also: Leyland. P., & Anthony. G., Textbook on Administrative Law (2013). Page 197-198.  
77 Leyland. P., & Anthony. G., Textbook on Administrative Law (2013). Page 198. 
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injury or loss before the funding needed to pursue an action in tort will be provided. Under 
the current status quo, “…tort law cannot adequately accommodate human rights 
claims.”78 Tort actions cannot categorically afford a migrant the ‘deeper’ vindication 
which exculpates a right for the whole community. Without adequately reforming the 
damages that are given on the basis of actions under the Human Rights Act, tort remains 
an attractive, if non-vindicatory (in the ‘deeper’, societal, sense of the word), alternative. 
This ‘deeper’ vindication of rights also forces the State to address problems with 
rights protection79 whereas a private law remedy such as tort tends to address wrongs once 
off and in an ad hoc manner. Vindicating rights for the whole of society is supposed to 
contribute toward ensuring that such a violation will be avoided in the future whereas 
vindication of a right purely for one individual will not make such a contribution. 
5.3.2.2 Omission of the State 
The other potential procedural hazard arising out of the tort alternative, which may act so 
as to frustrate the vindication of fundamental rights, is that the State may be omitted from 
an action altogether. This leaves the claimant to pursue the private actor alone through the 
tort action. The decision to omit the State may come down to a claimant’s preference or it 
may come as a result of a judge’s decision. A tort action which illustrated how such 
circumstances may arise is that of John Quahquah. In 1997 Mr Quaquah was detained at 
the privatised immigration detention centre of Campsfield. After a riot at that centre, Mr 
Quaquah, alongside eight others, was charged with offences in relation to the riot. The 
prosecution in that case collapsed when Group 4 Security employees, who were key 
witnesses for the prosecution, were shown to have fabricated their evidence.80 In the wake 
                                                                 
78 Du Bois. F., Human Rights and the Tort Liability of Public Authorities (2011) 127 Law Quarterly 
Review 589. Page 596. 
79 Steele makes the same point in the context of the tort/human rights divide:  
The ‘primary object’ of the Convention was “to promote uniform protection of certain fundamental human 
rights.” This ‘primary object’ was generally adequately served by a finding of a violation, because the 
expectation is that “a member state found to have violated the Convention will act promptly to prevent a 
repetition of the violation.” 
See: Steele. J., Damages in tort and under the Human Rights Act: remedial or functional separation? [2008] 
Cambridge Law Journal 606. Page 614. 
80 Molenaar. B., & Neufeld. R., The Use of Privatised Detention Centers for Asylum Seekers in Australia 
and the UK. In Coyle. A., Campbell. A., Neufeld. R., Capitalist Punishment: Prison Privatization and 
Human Rights (2003). 
See also: Allison. R., Group 4: a history of blunders . The Guardian, 15th August 2003. Link: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/aug/15/immigration.immigrationandpublicservices  
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of that case, Mr Quaqauh brought civil proceedings for malicious prosecution against 
Group 4 and the Home Office.81   
In May 2001, a single judge decision in the High Court struck the Secretary of State 
from that claim.82 The Judge did so on the basis that it was within the power of the Secretary 
of State to delegate the running of an immigration detention centre to an independent 
contractor and given that the Secretary of State had exercised all reasonable care in the 
selection of such a contractor, he could not be liable for the torts of that contractor’s 
employees.83 The Judge stated that attaching the Home Office to the action would have to 
mean that “the Home Secretary would be under a wide-ranging liability for a number of 
persons and organisations over which he did not have, and never had, any direct control. 
Such an accretion of responsibility was not necessary to ensure that detained persons were 
properly treated and would be able to recover compensation if they were not.”  84 The 
reasoning in the Quaquah case was sound but it nonetheless demonstrates how the State 
can be easily omitted from a tort action in favour of pursuit of a private actor. 
Finally, tort can, theoretically, also impact upon a purely public law remedy. There 
is a body of opinion that argues that the mere existence of private law as an alternative 
remedy can influence the outcome of cases under the Human Rights Act. The case of YL,85 
examined in Chapter IV, considered whether or not a body should be considered as a public 
authority for the sake of the Human Rights Act. The Judges in YL expressly agreed that 
their interpretation of section 6(3)(b) did not depend upon whether the claimant’s 
Convention rights enjoyed other common law, statutory or contractual protection. 86 
Nevertheless, it has been speculated as to whether the majority’s decision may have been 
                                                                 
81 Mr Quaquah’s action for malicious prosecution subsequently failed: Quaquah and others v Group 4 
[2003] EWHC 1504 (QB). 
82 Quaquah  v Group 4 (Total Security) and the Home Office (23 May 2001; unreported). 
83 Molenaar. B., & Neufeld. R., The Use of Privatised Detention Centers for Asylum Seekers in Australia 
and the UK. In Coyle. A., Campbell. A., Neufeld. R., Capitalist Punishment: Prison Privatization and 
Human Rights (2003). 
84 This decision of Wright J. in Quaquah v Group 4 (Total Security) and the Home Office (23 May 2001; 
unreported) was later quoted in: McE v Reverend Joseph Hendron & Ors  [2007] SC 556. Paragraph 91. 
85 YL v. Birmingham City Council and others [2007] UKHL 27. 
86 YL v. Birmingham City Council and others [2007] UKHL 27. Paragraph 79-80. 
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influenced by the existence of alternative remedies which were open to the claimant 
through common law.87 
5.4 Ensuring that Control can Trigger Legal Responsibility – 
Doctrinal Solutions 
The potential for frustration legal responsibility for control, in the context of externalisa t ion 
and privatisation, arises especially in the exercise of indirect control by the State. This 
section examines the ways and means by which the judicial framework examined in this 
research may better combat that frustration of legal responsibility. This examination takes 
place in the context of also contrasting these ‘best practice approaches’ with how the 
courts are currently approaching the phenomena. 
 The State cannot be brought to task for each and every violation that is connected 
with the State, howsoever remote that connection may be. This principle is applicable to 
both externalisation and privatisation. Both phenomena have considered moves toward a 
functional test although, as will be examined below (5.4.1 and 5.4.2), the test differs 
between each phenomenon. The resistance to such a functional shift for both 
externalisation and privatisation is based on the fear that the State would be brought to bear 
for far too broad a range of procedures. Therefore, any functional test must provide the 
courts with flexibility and an ability to be discerning as to how it is applied and thus what 
gives rise to State legal responsibility. This section examines the best way for the courts 
can proceed to establish such a test. For both externalisation and privatisation, this involves 
incorporating aspects of a functional test to their respective approaches to externalised and 
privatised procedures of migration control and border management in order to establish a 
mixed test. 
 In the context of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the departure from the restrictive 
Banković88 regime, has been underway for some time. The next section (5.4.1) takes that 
evolution to what is argued to be, its logical conclusion. Extraterritorial jurisdiction has 
gone down the ‘effective control’ pathway rather than a purely functional test but 
                                                                 
87 Case comment from Blackstone Chambers, Patel. N., & Steele. I., Human Rights & Care Homes. 
Available at: 
http://www.blackstonechambers.com/news/newsletters/public_law_focus_articles/care_homes.html 
88 Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States , [GC]. 52207/99. 
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functionalism has still had a marked influence on that evolution. With regard to public legal 
responsibility for a rights violation arising out of the private implementation of a public 
function, the subsequent section (5.4.2) explores how a fully functional test may provide a 
way forward for the courts. The final section (5.4.3) considers the potential of the CJEU to 
play a leading role in establishing the triggers for State legal responsibility for rights 
violations where appropriate. 
5.4.1 Jurisdiction tied to Territory and its Reimagined Exceptions 
The concurring judgment of Pinto De Albuquerque in Hirsi,89 extensively quoted in the 
introduction to this research (Section: Who and Where?), argued for an approach to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction which completely ignores territory in favour of one which is 
engaged every time a primary State function is implemented. Pursuing a test of this kind 
would mean that the courts turn away from the framework of exceptionalism that underpins 
the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction at present. Under the De Albuquerque test, if 
the function of a procedure is concerned with the control of migration or the management 
of the border then the State’s jurisdiction is automatically engaged no matter where it is 
being implemented. 
The Concurring Opinion of Justice Bonello in the Al-Skeini case advocated for a 
different type of functionalist test. Bonello’s approach was that the Court should recognise 
the State as having exercised jurisdiction whenever it falls within its power to violate an 
individual’s rights. In other words, the State engages its jurisdiction whenever and 
wherever the State has ‘authority over’ and ‘control of’ a situation such that it can violate 
rights. 90 Judge Bonello did acknowledge that the Grand Chamber’s findings in Al-Skeini 
had placed the ECtHR’s extraterritorial jurisdiction doctrine on a sounder footing than 
before. However, instead of the Court’s re-imagining of the traditional approach based 
upon the framework of exceptions to territorially based jurisdiction, Judge Bonello would 
have come to the same conclusion by reference to a functional test.91 Judge Bonello argued 
                                                                 
89 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 27765/09, [GC]. 
90 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, 55721/07, [GC]. Concurring Opinion of Justice Bonello. 
Paragraph 11-12. 
91 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, 55721/07, [GC]. Concurring opinion of Judge Bonello. 
Paragraph 3. 
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that the logical corollary of universality is a functional approach to extraterritor ia l 
applicability.92 “In relation to Convention obligations, jurisdiction is neither territorial 
nor extraterritorial: it ought to be functional – in the sense that when it is within a State’s 
authority and control whether a breach of human rights is, or is not committed, …it would 
be an imposture to claim that, ah yes, that State had authority and control, but, ah no, it 
had no jurisdiction.”93 It is not the actual act or omission that was covered by the 
implicated human rights obligation that is considered in the functionalist approach, but the 
potential (or functional capacity) of the State to comply with fundamental rights 
obligations or to violate them.94 The contrast between tests goes to the very heart of this 
research’s distinction within control (direct v indirect). A functional test does not depend 
on establishing that a physical expression of control was exercised by the State. The 
difference was illustrated in stark terms in Al-Skeini between Judge Bonello advocating for 
a functional test and the rest of the Grand Chamber opting for the effective control’s 
(personal model) test that they found to be based upon the “physical power or control” 
exercised by the State over a person through a procedure.95 
In light of Al-Skeini, the Strasbourg Court and the UK’s domestic courts are now 
even less likely to make the move to a Bonello style functional test. They will instead 
continue to implement the aforementioned re-imagining of exceptionality in extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction. However, that re-imagining also has the potential to give the courts a broad 
scope with which to find that the State has engaged its extraterritorial jurisdiction. The 
continued evolution of exceptionality provides the courts with an opportunity to 
incorporate a functional element into the ‘effective control’ test for extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction. The objective of a functional test is to establish a responsive yet consistent 
approach which to apply to procedures implemented by the State anywhere in the world.96 
That objective can be further integrated into the test that has emerged in the jurisprudence 
                                                                 
92 Shany. Y., Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional Approach to Extraterritoriality in International 
Human Rights Law (2013) The Law & Ethics of Human Rights, Volume 7(1), 47. Page 66. 
93 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, 55721/07. Concurring Opinion of Justice Bonello. 
Paragraph 12. 
94 Shany. Y., Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional Approach to Extraterritoriality in International 
Human Rights Law (2013) The Law & Ethics of Human Rights , Volume 7(1), 47. Page 66. 
95 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, 55721/07. Paragraph 136. 
96 Shany. Y., Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional Approach to Extraterritoriality in International 
Human Rights Law (2013) The Law & Ethics of Human Rights , Volume 7(1), 47. Page 66. 
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since the Banković decision and which, in the Strasbourg Court, has culminated in Al-
Skeini. The word ‘further’ is used here because there have already been traces of a 
functionalist test in that jurisprudence. 
Al-Skeini dispensed once and for all with the Banković-era adherence to the refusal 
to allow the ECHR’s provisions to be “divided and tailored”,97 albeit the Grand Chamber 
didn’t explicitly say so. Nevertheless, the departure from reading the Convention as an 
indivisible package of rights reflects a realisation by the Court that the Convention must 
be applied whenever and wherever the State has the capacity to violate any one of the rights 
contained in the Convention. This represents the integration of a functional element within 
the exceptions-based approach. This functional element has been argued as long being 
evident in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, in the context of interception at sea at least.98 
De Boer goes as far as to say that, in the context of the Hirsi case, argues that that case 
indicated the Court’s more general willingness to apply “a functional-test-disguised-as-
an-effective-control-test.”99The UK Supreme Court’s analysis in Smith (No. 2) has also 
been argued as representing the emergence of a functionalist approach.100 Extraterritoria l 
jurisdiction in that case was a step closer to a test based purely on the exercise of authority 
and control as advocated by Bonello in Al-Skeini. This can be argued on the basis of the 
expansion of exceptionality so as to encompass a personal model based on the control a 
State has over an individual through its own officials. Yet, the case still grounded itself in 
exceptionality and, crucially, retained the public powers (a sort-of territorial) element of 
the State having to exercise public powers. The test laid out in Al-Skeini is in fact a 
reimagining of the effective control test rather than being an outright functional test. 
The ECtHR has always hesitated to pursue approaches which placed an “impossible 
or disproportionate burden on the authorities.”101 The Court’s hesitancy to pursue a 
functional test is reflective of this yet the effect of this reticence is that it negatively impacts 
                                                                 
97 Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, 52207/99, [GC]. Paragraph 75. 
98 Gammeltoft-Hansen. T., Access to Asylum (2013). Page 124 and 145-146. 
99 De Boer. T., Closing Legal Black Holes: The Role of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Refugee Rights 
Protection (2014) Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 28(1). Page 12. 
100 Holcroft-Emmess. N., Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the ECHR – Smith (and Others) v 
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upon the Convention’s potential for universal application. The integration of a functiona l 
element within the traditional exceptions can still provide an appropriate test. The ‘effective 
control’ test of the personal model and the spatial model can continue to be reimagined by 
the courts so as to include a functional element. The advent of a functional element, within 
the traditional exceptions to extraterritorial jurisdiction, has the potential to move the courts 
away from the outdated reliance on compulsory powers as an indicator of jurisdic t ion 
having been engaged or at least to be able to properly address indirect control when they 
arise. 
The straightforward application of a functional test could serve to ensure that legal 
responsibility arises out of the exercise of indirect control102 but an effective control test 
that integrates a functional element is also capable of providing the courts with the scope 
to attach legal responsibility to the State for such a control. This would close any 
“structural incentive”103 for States to engage in the externalisation of migration control 
and border management procedures through a direct or indirect control. These approaches 
would provide tests that took Judge Bonello’s crucial question into consideration: did it 
depend on the agents of the State whether the alleged violation would be committed or 
would not be committed?104 Finally, a test based on effective control but with an element 
of the functional test is discerning in application such that it could ease fears that every 
single State function anywhere in the world, would be read as engaging State obligat ions 
in ways which make the Convention unduly cumbersome and unwieldy. It is posited that 
this mixed test is the way forward in ensuring that consideration of legal responsibility for 
States is triggered as appropriate for externalised procedures. 
                                                                 
102 Bhuta states that the functional approach “has morally salutary consequences…” because it does not 
allow States to violate rights outside their territory in ways which it is prohibited from doing inside its 
territory – the derivative of the public law premise that control entails responsibility, mentioned in the 
introduction to this research (section: Control and Legal Responsibility for that Control) 
See: Bhuta. N., The Frontiers of Extraterritoriality – Human Rights Law as Global Law. Page 11. In Bhuta. 
N., The Frontiers of Human Rights – Extraterritoriality and its Challenges (2016).  
103 Gammeltoft-Hansen. T., Access to Asylum (2013). Page 146-147. 
104 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, 55721/07. Concurring Opinion of Justice Bonello. 
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5.4.2 Public Liability for Privately Implemented (Public) Functions 
The problematic approach of the UK domestic courts to establishing public liability for 
privately implemented public functions has already been explored in the previous chapter 
(section 4.2). The UK domestic courts have mainly pursued an institutional approach and 
have declined any incorporation of a functional approach and in doing so have given rise 
to a jurisprudence that has placed the emphasis “…on the public source of power rather 
than …on the kind of function that a body performs.”105 The functional test in privatisation 
revolves around examining whether the role undertaken by a private actor is one which can 
be identified as being, in normal circumstances, that of the State. Just as the case against 
functionalism in the context of extraterritorial jurisdiction (section 5.4.1), the UK domestic 
courts’ hesitancy is rooted in a fear of placing an unrealistic burden on the State to be 
responsible for too wide a range of procedures. Privatisation is thus subject to the same 
balancing act as externalisation – finding an equilibrium between the desire to give rights 
a suitable platform while also refraining from widening the ambit of State liability too 
extensively. What is needed is a refined test which incorporates a functional element 
without making that the sole basis of the test. 
 The Joint Committee on Human Rights of the House of Lords and House of 
Commons has been clear that it is the function that a person is performing that should be 
determinative and that there is nothing in Section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act to 
suggest that a person's institutional proximity to the State or their compulsory powers in 
relation to the service user should decide the issue.106 The UK public authorities must be 
made legally responsible on the basis of the function involved in implementing the 
procedure rather than on the basis of evidence of institutional control such as the presence 
of State officials, evidence of direction from the State etc.107 Despite this considerable body 
of criticism, the UK domestic courts have remained devoted to the institutional test. In 
order to assuage public fears as to the integrity of the Human Rights Act, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights stated that any procedure that incorporates compulsory 
powers should result in legal responsibility for the State even under the current judicia l 
                                                                 
105 Palmer. E., Judicial Review, Socio-Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (2007). Page 143. 
106 Palmer. E., Judicial Review, Socio-Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (2007). Page 146. 
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approach. That reassurance does little to soothe concerns as to whether the State can and 
will be held answerable for the exercise of indirect control. 
 A legislative solution has been pondered in the UK whereby a whole industry or 
sector is designated as representing a public function. However, the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights found that a “sector-by-sector” approach would not be effective.108 As was 
touched upon in Chapter IV, the Strasbourg Court has found State responsibility in certain 
circumstances within certain sectors while finding no such legal responsibility in other 
instances within the same sector.109 The obvious preference then remains that a doctrinal 
rather than a legislative shift is embraced in order to rise to the challenges presented by 
privatisation. The Strasbourg Court provides significant guidance in this regard. The 
ECtHR incorporates a functional element within its approach while not relying solely on 
that test. The Strasbourg Court in fact takes a broad spectrum of influences in deciding 
whether a private actor’s actions can give rise to public legal responsibility. The 
jurisprudence examined in Chapter IV reflects this. In the Yershova110 case an institutiona l 
element was clearly decisive for the Court while in the case of Van Der Mussele,111 the fact 
that the procedure in question was deemed to be a governmental function was the deciding 
factor. These cases complement each other within a mixed jurisprudence and should not 
be taken as offering contradictory guidance. By refusing to be tied down to a single precise 
test, courts are free to consider what it interprets as being most telling of State involvement 
in a particular case. It also prevents a situation whereby a whole policy area is designated 
as being a public function and allows the courts some flexibility in its approach.  
One clear benefit of taking such a flexible approach would be that it is more capable 
of properly considering indirect control of the State. The benefit accrues because the court 
can move beyond rigid adherence to the institutional approach and it is not dependent on 
the absence or presence of compulsory powers as an indicator of public control. The 
method for service delivery is also roughly divided along the lines of direct and indirect 
                                                                 
108 House of Commons, House of Lords, Joint Committee on Human Rights Report: The Meaning of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act. Ninth Report of Session 2006–07. Page 43. 
109 The contrast may be made within the field of education. This point was made in section 4.3.2.1. See 
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110 Yershova v Russia, 1387/04. 
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control. In general, direct control’s approach of contract has not been decisive in making 
the State legally responsible for the private procedure in question in the UK domestic 
courts. This has been pointed out by Donnelly and is borne out by the cases of Leonard 
Cheshire and YL.112 With a mixed test, the formal relationship that develops between a 
contractor (the State) and contractee (a private actor) can be read as being an indicator that 
the State is in control of the procedure in question without any resort to consideration of 
the procedure’s incorporation of a compulsory power. At the same time, the pliant threat 
of sanction could still be considered a procedure of the State on the basis that it is a State’s 
function if the more informal nature of its method for service delivery is not found to be 
convincing to the court that the State is liable. It is clear that the mixed test provides the 
courts with a more comprehensive tool for analysis, especially vis-à-vis indirect control. 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights had suggested that legislation could make 
clear that “For the purposes of s. 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998, a function of a 
public nature includes a function performed pursuant to a contract or other arrangement 
with a public authority which is under a duty to perform the function.”113 It is to be hoped 
that any such reference to “other arrangement” would include the threat of sanction. In 
any case, the Joint Committee on Human Rights recommended that, in the absence of a 
legislative solution, an unequivocal declaration should be made in the contract whic h 
identifies the body performing a procedure on the strength of that contract as being a public 
authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act.114 Such a declaration is absent from 
the migration control and border management contracts that have been examined as part of 
this research.115 
In the absence of a legislative alternative or of a willingness by the State to confirm 
a private actor’s status in public law within the contract, a reinvigorated test to be applied 
by the courts is best placed to discern State responsibility as appropriate. Such a test also 
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has the added benefit of considering indirect control which may be more difficult on a 
legislative basis. Obviously, relying on guarantees placed within contracts does nothing to 
ensure that the frustration of legal responsibility does not arise as a result of enforced 
privatisation. The UK’s lower courts have thus far refused to explicitly depart from their 
adherence to “Leonard Cheshire without further guidance from the House of Lords.”116 
This is despite the UK government having openly expressed its wish that the courts toward 
taking a more functional approach. The shift must be made by the UK Supreme Court 
which, in turn, may need to see an outright rejection of the Leonard Cheshire line of case-
law in the Strasbourg Court before they are convinced. Given the innovative nature of the 
State in privatisation and the complex relationships which necessarily flow from that 
process, it is better left in the hands of the courts to identify what should constitute public 
action from its purely private counterpart. With the aid of a mixed test, encompassing a 
functional element, the courts could achieve an equitable distribution of responsibility. 
5.4.3 The CJEU’s Role in Rights Protection in Europe  
The CJEU does not come to privatisation and externalisation in the context of fundamenta l 
rights under the weight of the same legacy as the UK’s national courts or the ECtHR. There 
exists a vast jurisprudence in the UK domestic courts and in the ECtHR that considers 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and State responsibility for privately implemented (public) 
procedures. That jurisprudence has at times acted as a limit in tackling the rise of the 
frustration of legal responsibility, especially by not being capable of addressing indirect 
control. In developing its own case-law in this area, the CJEU may have opportunities to 
contribute toward the effective prevention of any frustration of State legal responsibility. 
The CJEU’s place in European fundamental rights protection must be kept in mind 
when examining externalisation and privatisation. Despite the back log of cases at the 
ECtHR having eased in recent years,117 the adequate implementation of human rights 
guarantees at national level remains key to the overall protection of fundamental rights in 
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Europe.118 Beyond the national setting and in the context of fundamental rights, “The 
ECtHR represents, in terms of caseload as well as influence, the main mechanism for 
accessing justice above the national level in Europe.”119 The ECtHR’s individua l 
complaints mechanism provides access to justice beyond the national level for fundamenta l 
rights violations which does not otherwise exist. Once the case emanates from a contracting 
State of the ECHR and the applicant has exhausted all domestic remedies and avenues for 
redress, he/she will be able to access the Strasbourg court.120  
The CJEU, of course, does not possess an equivalent to the individual complaints 
mechanism that exists for the ECtHR. However, the CJEU, notwithstanding the fact that it 
does not act as an appeal court, still has a crucial impact on how fundamental rights are 
interpreted by the Member States’ domestic courts. In certain circumstances, an aggrieved 
individual may pursue an action in the General Court and the CJEU for an alleged breach 
of fundamental rights.121 A claimant can request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU in 
his/her national courts which will adjudicate as to whether to make that request or not.122 
The national court, in issuing a request for a preliminary ruling, is inviting the CJEU to 
provide an interpretation of a provision of EU law that is needed to resolve a dispute 
pending consideration at the national level.123 
 Chapters III and IV have already examined the CJEU’s potential for combatting the 
frustration of legal responsibility.124 The potential of the Court, to impact upon State 
responsibility in both externalisation and privatisation, is considerable. The CJEU has 
given glimpses of this potential in disparate fields. For privatisation, in ensuring the 
effectiveness (effet utile) of the Union’s fundamental rights law, the Court is not limited to 
the example examined in Chapter IV i.e. the Court’s expansive reading of the State in order 
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to protect the effet utile of directives. The focus for externalisation was the CJEU’s 
potential to take an expansive outlook as to the extraterritorial application of the EU 
Charter of Fundament Rights. That expansive application may be made on the basis that 
the Court applies the Charter whenever and wherever EU law is being applied. The 
approach to applying the Charter that the CJEU has already pursued in an internal setting 
would make the distinction between indirect and direct control inconsequential. 
The CJEU is in fact well placed to ensure that the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
is applied in such a way so as to ensure that a frustration of the trigger for State legal 
responsibility cannot arise. 
5.5 Conclusion – The Courts Approach to the Triggers 
The control retained by the State in procedures that are externalised or privatised is often 
such that it satisfies the definition of control set out in this research yet it can also preclude 
the application of legal responsibility to that State. Control of privatised or externalised 
migration control and border management procedures and legal responsibility for that 
control, can therefore diverge. The degree to which this effect is achieved depends greatly 
upon the nature of that control. Most notably, the application of compulsory powers in 
both privatised and externalised procedures, while not definitively ensuring that legal 
responsibility is attached to the State for the offending procedure, does greatly heighten the 
chances of such a finding. By contrast, the absence of compulsory powers makes it difficult 
to apportion legal responsibility to the State even where it is clearly involved in directing, 
steering and influencing a procedure. 
Mixed tests are capable of recognising that the State can control migrants in many 
different guises and should be held to account for rights violations which are a result of 
their efforts in migration control and border management. The mixed test in both  
privatisation and externalisation include a functional element, although this functiona l 
element is different for each phenomenon. These functional elements are capable of 
ensuring that indirect control for a State will result in legal responsibility for that State. In 
addition to the legal impediments faced, with externalisation there are additional practical 
and procedural obstacles for a migrant which affords the State supplementary security from 
having legal responsibility attached to it by a court. For privatisation, certain legal choices 
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made by an aggrieved migrant can lead to the aggrieved rights going without being 
vindicated, albeit the migrant may still gain just satisfaction through the alternative avenues 
pursued. Innovative judicial approaches cannot overcome certain of the practical and 
procedural hurdles faced. 
In any case, it is important to recognize that even if an effective overarching test is 
framed, the nature of procedures that have been privatised or externalised are such that 
even cases dealing with the same procedures may differ in detail. Cases must be considered 
on their own merits and the Courts can only act as a bulwark against the frustration of State 
legal responsibility when presented with suitable test cases. In the context of privatisat ion, 
“…each type of delegation and the specific circumstances of the arrangement”125 is 
unique. Similarly, implementation across an externalised procedure can vary enormously.  
In sum, it is difficult to make a broad sweeping analysis across all externalised and 
privatised migration control and border management procedures. However, there are 
certain trends across those phenomena which help to explain how the triggers for the 
judicial consideration of State legal responsibility function and how they oftentimes depend 
upon arbitrary control-based tests. Gaining a better understanding of these triggers can 
allow lawyers to find ways to better approach them and ensure that migrants gain access to 
justice. 
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Conclusion – The Importance of the Triggers 
Triggering Legal Responsibility for the State 
This research has examined the triggers of legal responsibility for externalised and 
privatised procedures of migration control and border management. It has posited that the 
jurisprudence shows that the courts have struggled to come to terms with the legal 
impediments for a migrant arising out of externalisation and privatisation. To a certain 
extent, that struggle has revolved around an approach which was inherently flawed in its 
determination to apply control-based tests which turn on the absence or presence of 
compulsory powers. Those powers are taken as being the crucial indicator that a State 
should be made legally responsible for a violation which occurs during the implementa t ion 
of an externalised or privatised procedure. Consideration of alleged violations and the 
potential for legal responsibility for the State is therefore dependant on the nature of control 
rather than purely on the extent to which the State controls implementation. Indirect control 
by the State can lead to rights violations for which the State is just as culpable. The legal 
impediments are accentuated by considerable practical and procedural obstacles. Taken 
together, the legal, practical and procedural impediments can each prove to be fatal to a 
migrant’s access to justice when he or she alleges a violation of his or her rights at the 
hands of a privatised or externalised procedure. 
 This work made clear proposals on what tests should be applied so as to attribute 
legal responsibility to the State as appropriate (section 5.4). These proposals represent a 
concrete way forward for the courts in better adjudicating on the triggers of legal 
responsibility so as to better ensure access to justice for migrants. The way forward 
proposed requires mixed tests across both phenomena that would be capable of accepting 
compulsory powers as being indicative of State legal responsibility without simultaneous ly 
neglecting the possibility that indirect control could also engage that responsibility. The 
next section of this conclusion further considers the merits of these doctrinal solutions 
while also briefly addressing certain alternative solutions. 
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The Doctrinal Solutions – Are they Enough? 
The doctrinal solutions recommended in Chapter V do not provide immediate and 
completely holistic solutions to the challenges faced. However, they are realistic and 
represent the best way forward in evolving toward such holistic solutions. Any solution 
that is judicially based is going to necessitate the emergence of appropriate test cases and 
the willingness of the judiciary to pursue an evolution away from long-established 
jurisprudence. Above all, such an evolution toward the mixed tests that are proposed here 
will take time. These are the inevitable limitations of the doctrinal solutions suggested. 
However, despite these limitations, the doctrinal solutions remain the preferred method by 
which a suitable approach to the triggers of State legal responsibility may be engage and 
State legal responsibility be established as appropriate. 
 Legislative reform is an obvious alternative. The attraction to such an immed iate 
solution is tempered by consideration of the ability to legislate effectively and gauging how 
realistic a prospect realistic legislative reform truly is. In the context of extraterritor ia l 
jurisdiction, reform of the Convention in this regard is highly improbable. By the same 
token, writing on suggested reforms of the Human Rights Act in a way which boosts 
inclusivity for complainants, is a fool’s errand. In the current climate, such reform has no 
chance of success. An alternative role for legislative reform may be to enshrine in all 
domestic legislation whether the State has a legal control over its immigration officers in 
the external role envisaged by the piece of legislation in question. This approach is equally 
impractical and has little or no chance of being pursued. What is most attractive about the 
doctrinal solutions suggested here is the flexibility in application that comes with a courts 
judgment. 
 A legislative solution to the challenges raised by privatised procedures gains more 
traction. The question arises as to whether to do it sector-by-sector with whole industr ies 
and services being legislated as representing an area for which the State is legally 
responsible or to simply legislate for each single procedure. With regard to the latter 
solution, it is not difficult to imagine procedures which may not require legislation before 
the State shifts its implementation over to the private sector. For the former legisla t ive 
solution, the unique nature of each instance of privatisation make it difficult to legis late 
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for. This is evidenced by the UK domestic jurisprudence (see sections 4.2 and 5.4.2) where 
the courts have alternated between finding public legal responsibility and not within single 
sectors. In these circumstances, a reassessment of the jurisprudence can be argued as 
providing a more realistic area in which to promote reform. The courts pursuing a departure 
in the jurisprudence would also provide a more responsive way by which to deal with the 
challenges posed by privatisation as they arise. 
 The doctrinal solutions proposed in this research do not represent a huge departure 
from the jurisprudence. They instead build upon a foundation already laid by the courts 
and take it in a direction whereby indirect control can be better assessed than is currently 
the case. For externalisation, this requires further incorporation of an interpretation of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the functional capacity of the State to comply or 
violate fundamental rights. In the context of privatisation, the test is broadened toward 
considering functions that are normally those of the State, that are implemented by a private 
actor and result in a violation, as triggering consideration og legal responsibility for the 
State. These recommended pathways for the courts therefore represents a realistic and 
effective way forward by which to ensure that these crucial triggers afford access to justice 
to aggrieved migrants.  
A hallmark of the proposed solutions is that the suggested tests move away from 
an obsession with measuring control and relying on the physical expression of that control. 
Counter-intuitively, dispensing with tests obsessed with control and pursuing the doctrinal 
solutions outlined in this research (section 5.4) would mean that the courts are better placed 
to ensure that States are made culpable wherever they act and in whatever form they take, 
if they control the implementation of the offending procedure. Mixed tests provide a better 
mirror of State control than control-based tests. In addition, the proposed tests are reflective 
of the understandable concerns which exist across both privatisation and externalisa t ion 
that a change in direction for the jurisprudence could mean the State is made liable for all 
and every violation. The courts will still be able to bring a crucial element of flexibility so 
as to ensure fairness for both State and migrant in adjudicating on the triggers for State 
legal responsibility. 
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The argument for doctrinal solutions as being preferential to other routes for reform 
is without prejudice to the fact that the procedural and practical problems examined in 
Chapter V (section 5.3) would remain despite any such reform. Likewise, however, it is 
difficult to see how other pathways to reform could eradicate these impediments to a 
migrant’s access to justice. What is required in this regard is an attitude change from the 
State. The State must adopt a greater understanding of these practical and procedural 
problems. Greater recognition of these problems would provide an impetus for institutiona l 
and procedural reform that would work to allow greater access to justice and the possibility 
of the vindication of the fundamental rights of migrants. This is not a simple journey to 
reform. Having made that point, it should also be underlined that a by-product of the pursuit 
of the doctrinal solutions outlined in Chapter V would be to encourage fundamental rights 
lawyers and their clients toward pursuing the vindication of their rights in ways which they 
are not at the moment. 
In the context of privatisation, the increased likelihood of success for rights cases 
with legitimate grievances would boost the view of rights as being a genuine remedy. More 
than this though, in the context of the UK, there needs to be a rethink in how damages are 
treated in human rights based case-law. For externalisation, again it is posited that moves 
toward the doctrinal solution suggested by the judiciary would encourage more lawyers 
and their clients to attempt to overcome the almost overwhelming practical obstacles faced. 
In the absence of fundamental reforms to the inner workings of the ECtHR with regard to 
locus standi, alongside parallel reforms in contracting States, the doctrinal solutions 
proffered here would still offer some relief to the practical problems faced. 
No solution can represent a silver bullet to all of the problems which arise out of 
the externalisation or privatisation of migration control and border management 
procedures. However, the doctrinal solutions considered here are argued as offering the 
most realistic and progressive way forward toward establishing a regime that makes access 
to justice and the vindication of rights more practical and effective rather than intangib le 
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and, to all intents and purposes, illusory. They provide a way forward by which control, as 
it has been defined in this work,1 triggers consideration of a State’s legal responsibility. 
Vindication and the Attribution of Legal Responsibility 
This research has sought to shed light on the crucial first part of how legal responsibility is 
attributed to the State in the context of privatisation and externalisation. The concentration 
on the triggers for legal responsibility necessarily comes at the cost of consideration of the 
second part of how legal responsibility may be attributed to the State. This second part 
considers how specific rights of a migrant are vindicated in court and thus the actual 
attribution of legal responsibility. The research does not pretend to be an all-encompass ing 
work which examines all and every aspect of the two phenomena in question. Instead, this 
work sought to pinpoint the particularly important but somewhat understudied triggers for 
that later consideration of the relevant rights – the merits of the case. 
 The application of the mixed tests proposed in Chapter V (section 5.4) is difficult 
to do forensically because implementation is such a variable factor. Procedures are rarely 
implemented uniformly. Even a legislative or contract basis for a procedure does not 
guarantee uniformity in application and design. Application can only be made in the 
abstract until suitable test cases arise which can serve as a guide to lawyers vis-à-vis 
triggering consideration of legal responsibility for the State. Similarly, consideration of the 
rights at stake is somewhat abstract in the absence of the specific facts in a given case. 
Therefore, the vindication of rights and consequent attribution of legal responsibility to the 
State, is subject to the specific circumstances and implementation in question in a particular 
case.  
This is not to say that concentration should purely on the triggers of State legal 
responsibility and that there is no point in academics examining the vindication of rights 
and the attribution of legal responsibility. On the contrary, such an examination can be 
understood as representing the logical corollary to the present research and an opportunity 
to extend this study. Indeed, certain scholars have already made this leap and have laid an 
                                                                 
1 Introduction: The Research Questions. 
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important foundation to further study in this area.2  Similarly, this research was not 
undertaken to shed light on the motivation of Member States but its conclusions do 
generate its consideration. 3 This is work for political scientists and those specialised in 
governance and administration and could not be undertaken in this work. 
The detention of migrants may threaten a breach of rights with regard to the right 
to liberty and security,4 the right to respect for private and family life5 and the flouting of 
certain procedural guarantees.6 Privatisation does not raise confusion as to State legal 
responsibility for these guarantees, after all, the administrative or judicial decision to detain 
is made by State organs and not by a private actor charged with the actual detention. The 
State remains responsible for violations of such rights. The confusion is limited to the day-
to-day enforcement of the detention decision which has been made by the State. The right 
to life7 and the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 8 
are unfortunately potentially placed at risk for migrants forcibly detained by a private actor 
at the behest of the State. The violation of these rights is closely associated with the 
implementation of compulsory powers. Similarly, escorted returns by a private actor is 
enforcing a return decision by the State and so rather than refoulement, the violation which 
can lead to confusion for the Court as to whether the private actor or State is responsible 
are more the right to life and the prohibition of torture. Enforced privatisation does not 
incorporate compulsory powers and so the fundamental rights actions arising out of any 
violation will not be physically apparent in terms of an injury or death but will be more 
                                                                 
2 Most notably, see Moreno-Lax’s treatment of non-refoulement and the right to asylum: Moreno-Lax. V., 
Seeking Asylum in Europe – Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law (2012) 
PhD Thesis, Université Catholique de Louvain 
3 Scholten explores the subject, “Why Governments Delegate Tasks: Exploring ‘Shifts in Governance .’” 
See: Scholten. S., The Privatisation of Immigration Control through Carrier Sanctions: The Role of Private 
Transport Companies in Dutch and British Immigration Control (2015). Section 2.3, page 24. 
4 Article 6, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 5, European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
5 Article 7, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 8, European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
6 See: Boeles. P., den Heijer. M., Lodder. G., & Wouters. K., European Migration Law (2014). Page 394-
397, 431-434. 
See also: Flynn. M., Immigration Detention and Proportionality (2011) Global Detention Project Working 
Paper No. 4. 
7 Article 2, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 2, European Convention on Human Rights. 
8 Article 4, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 3, European Convention on Human Rights. 
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likely to raise questions as to a person’s privacy,9 their right to asylum10 or the implications 
of a decision not to allow that person entry to the EU.11 
 The same direct versus indirect distinction is made within externalisat ion. 
Refoulement and the right to asylum are again relevant, this time in the context of both 
externalised procedures considered by this work – immigration liaison officers and 
maritime interdiction. Rights violations arising out of compulsory powers such as the right 
to life and prohibition of torture, are only relevant for maritime interdiction. Perhaps what 
is noteworthy is the fact that absolute, non-derogable rights are relevant for indirect ly 
controlled procedures as well as their directly controlled counterparts. As stated above, the 
triggering of consideration of an alleged rights violation should only be taken as the first 
of two serious legal hurdles. The second hurdle, proving that that right has indeed been 
breached, can itself also be an onerous task.  
Taking refoulement for instance, the ECHR applies rigorous criteria and exercises 
close scrutiny when assessing the existence of a real risk of ill-treatment upon return such 
that “since adopting the Chahal12 judgment it has only rarely reached such a 
conclusion.”13 Article 3 is a non-derogable, “absolute” provision.14 “The Court has 
nevertheless carefully and intentionally delimited the scope of protection; successfully 
establishing a ‘real risk’ is not straightforward, and the interpretative battles fought across 
Europe are evident in the recent jurisprudence of the Court.”15 In consideration of the 
possibility of a violation of Article 3 through refoulement, the Court will have regard to 
what must have been the foreseeable consequences of the removal of the applicant16 to that 
individual’s country of origin or to a country of transit in the light of the general situation 
                                                                 
9 Article 8, European Convention on Human Rights. Article 7 and 8, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU. 
10 Article 18, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
11 Article 3, European Convention on Human Rights . Article 19, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
12 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 22414/93, [GC]. 
13 Saadi v. Italy, 37201/06, [GC]. Paragraph 142. 
14 See for instance: Saadi v. Italy, 37201/06, [GC]. Paragraph 137. 
15 Harvey. C., The International Protection of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: the Role of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Page 189. In Abass. A., & Ippolito. F., Regional Approaches to 
the Protection of Asylum Seekers: An International Legal Perspective (2013). 
16 Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, 13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87; 13447/87; 13448/87. 
Paragraph 108. 
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there as well as his or her personal circumstances.17 It must be shown that the risk is ‘real’ 
and that the authorities of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing 
appropriate protection.18 
It is clear that the vindication of a migrant’s rights and parallel attribution of legal 
responsibility to the State are the rational extension of this research but are far from 
straightforward. The doctrinal solutions suggested by this work cannot be taken as ensuring 
the attribution of legal responsibility to the State but rather a step toward ensuring that the 
court will get to consider alleged rights violations and the migrant will therefore receive 
proper access to justice. 
‘Where does the buck stop?’ – Revisiting the Scenario 
This research set out to answer questions that focussed on a State’s control and legal 
responsibility for that control in the context of privatisation and externalisation. Ultimate ly, 
however, this research asked the question of when should a State’s legal responsible for a 
rights violation arising out of externalised or privatised procedure be triggered? 
The research questions19  reflect the fixation on control which dominates debate for 
both privatisation and externalisation. Those questions also reveal a general prejudice that 
it is indeed the nature of the control exercised by the State which must be decisive in 
shaping legal effect. In other words, whether State control is direct or indirect is decisive 
in deciding whether legal responsibility must come to rest with the State or not. That 
approach has shown itself to be rather simplistic through the judicial framework’s 
jurisprudence in which too much importance is laid on the presence of compulsory powers 
in a procedure. Rather than the nature of control that should be decisive in this way, a 
combination of factors should be taken into account in deciding whether or not the State 
must be given responsibility. This is reflected in the doctrinal solutions explored in Chapter 
                                                                 
17 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC] 27765/09. Paragraph 117. 
18 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC] 27765/09. Paragraph 120. For inadequate assurances given by the 
Indian government being considered as crucial by the Court, see: Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 22414/93, 
[GC]. 
19 For ease of reference, the research questions are: Firstly, what is the nature and effect of any control that 
a Member State retains despite having delegated implementation of a procedure to a private actor or having 
relocated implementation of a procedure beyond the EU’s external borders? Secondly , can legal 
responsibility be attached to the State on the basis of that retained control?  
200 | P a g e  
 
V which considered approaches which employed mixed tests rather than the current 
judicial approaches which lay too much store in the nature of State control. Approaches 
that are not purely control focussed but which make fundamental rights practical and 
effective are to be preferred over and above striving for a wholly control based approach 
which may well allow those rights to instead remain theoretical and for all intents and 
purposes, illusory. The mixed tests advocated for in Chapter V (5.4.1 and 5.4.2) are not 
control orientated and as a consequence are actually more capable of considering indirect 
control than the control orientated tests which are only responsive to compulsory powered 
procedures (direct control).  
The introduction to this research began by reference to a scenario involving a 
woman who was refused access to protection in a Pakistani airport as a result of a decision 
taken by a private actor. In situations whereby that woman manages to overcome the very 
serious practical and procedural hurdles faced, the legal obstacles are equally momentous. 
The dilemma faced by the lady in this scenario recalls certain of the details of Jimmy 
Mubenga’s situation in Heathrow airport.20 This is despite their journeys being at the 
opposite ends of migration control and border management – entry and return. Speaking 
before the UK parliament’s Home Affairs Committee investigation of Mr Mubenga’s 
death, the UK government’s then Interim Director General of Immigration Enforcement, 
Mr David Wood stated: "I am willing to apologise to the extent that it was our 
responsibility."21 This qualified apology led the chairman of the Committee to ask: “So it 
is the failings of G4S?” Mr. Woods responded by attaching blame to “the failings of the 
particular escorts. G4S did deliver the training, in accordance with the guidelines we had 
provided.” The Chairman attempted to clarify the point: “So it is not the company, it is not 
the Home Office, it is the two escorts who were there?” In answer, Mr. Wood stated: “Look, 
we must all learn from this. It was an absolutely tragic incident and we must all learn from 
it…” One telling later contribution was when a member of the Committee asked, almost 
rhetorically: “Where does the buck stop?”  
                                                                 
20 Jimmy Mubenga’s story was described in section 2.2.2. 
21 Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence, House of Commons Oral Evidence taken before the Home 
Affairs Committee. Evidence of David Wood, Interim Director General, Immigration Enforcement 
Directorate. Answering question before the Home Affairs Committee on Tuesday 16th of July, 2013. 
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Externalisation and privatisation present considerable challenges for lawyers and 
policymakers who are interested in providing migrants with meaningful access to justice 
for rights violations arising out of procedures of which the State had considerable control. 
Legal responsibility, ‘the buck’, can and can be triggered for the State in a more inclus ive 
and effective way than is currently the case. 
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Authorities – Freedom of Information  
(In Chronological Order) 
 
8 June 2016 
Subject: 38872-McNamara-Confirmation of issuing of information 
 
Dear Mr McNamara 





Knowledge and Information Management Unit 
Performance and Risk Directorate 
4th Floor Peel 
2 Marsham Street 
London 
SW1P 4DF 
T: +44 (0)20 7035 4848 
6 June 2016 
Subject: 38872-McNamara-Final response notification 
Dear Mr McNamara 
  
Please find attached the Home Office response letter to your request for information, case 
38872.  
  
I apologise for the delay in providing it to you.  We also have some redacted infromation to 
send to you.  
  
However this information is too large to send out via email.  We therefore request that you 
email us your postal address to “FOIRequests@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk” marking your email 
with reference 38872 and for the attention of myself, M Riddle.  When recevied I will then 
issue you in the post the contract infromation we are releasing on a CD.    
  





Knowledge and Information Management Unit 
Performance and Risk Directorate 
4th Floor Peel 
2 Marsham Street 
London 
SW1P 4DF 






   
 Corporate Services  
2 Marsham Street 
London SW1P 4DF 











Dear Mr McNamara 
 
Freedom of Information request: reference 38872 
 
Thank you for your e-mail of 7 March 2016, in which you ask for an exhaustive list of all 
contracts made between the Home Office and private actors for the provision of  the 
detention of migrants, the removal of migrants from the UK and any contracts with private 
VISA issuing companies. Your request has been handled as a request for information 
under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and can be found in full in the enclosed 
Annex A.  
 
We believe that some of the information you have requested is already reasonably 
accessible to you.  It can be found on the Government contracts finder at this link 
https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder and on the old contracts finder site 
https://data.gov.uk/data/contracts-finder-archive/ previously supplied to you.   
 
You have already listed some of the links in your request found in full in the enclosed 
Annex A and therefore we have not provided them to you again.   
 
You also sought information in relation any tenders that have been offered by the Home 
Office for such services. I am able to inform you that any and all tenders on offer are 
published on the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) at this location 
http://www.ojeu.eu/whatistheojeu.aspx and on the contracts finder 
https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder.   
 
Section 21 of the Freedom of Information Act exempts the Home Office from having to 
provide you with this information, because it is already reasonably accessible to you.  If 
you have any difficulties in accessing this information at the source which I have indicated, 
please contact me again. 
 
As the old contracts finder site is not currently working correctly, I am able to disclose 
some of the information that you have requested, for the Immigration Removal Centres 
(IRCs) at Brook House, Campsfield House, Tinsley House and Dungavel. The contracts 
for these IRCs, each consisting of a number of documents, can be found attached to this 
response. 
 Brook House, 22 documents 
 Campsfield House, 20 documents 
 Tinsley House, 19 documents 
 Dungavel, 22 documents. 
 
I have also provided at the enclosed Annex B a list of contracts we also feel fall within the 
scope of your request.  We have however kept this to a title and brief descriptor.  This is 
because the scope of your request is so wide that to provide the contracts in full would 
place a considerable burden on the Home Office because of the need to perform the 
necessary redactions.  If you were to insist on the provision of copies of every single 
contract your request would likely be refused as vexatious. We hope that the list we can 
provide is sufficient to meet your present needs. 
 
I can also confirm that the Home Office holds additional information in relation to the IRC 
contracts provided. However, after careful consideration we have decided that this 
information is exempt from disclosure under sections 31(1)(f) and 43(2) of the Freedom of 
Information Act. These provide that information can be withheld where disclosure would 
prejudice the maintenance of security and good order in prisons or in other institutions 
where persons are lawfully detained, or commercial interests, and the public interest falls 
in favour of applying the exemption. 
 
Arguments for and against disclosure in terms of the public interest, with the reasons for 
our conclusion, are set out in the enclosed Annex C. 
 
Additionally some of information requested is also withheld under section 41(1) of the 
FOIA. This provides that information can be withheld where information was provided in 
confidence.  Section 41(1) is an absolute exemption that does not require the 
consideration of the public interest test.  
 
The Home Office also has obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998 and in law 
generally to protect personal data.  We have concluded that some of the information you 
have requested is exempt from disclosure under section 40(2) of the FOI Act, because of 
the condition at section 40(3)(a)(i). This exempts personal data if disclosure would 
contravene any of the data protection principles in Schedule 1 to the Data Protection Act. 
 
You also sought confirmation whether the Home Office was aware of any other UK public 
authority that has contracted private actors for the provision of such services. I am able to 
tell you that the Home Office is not aware of any other UK authority having contracts for 
the provision of these services. 
 
If you are dissatisfied with this response you may request an independent internal review 
of our handling of your request by submitting a complaint within two months to the address 
below, quoting reference 38872. If you ask for an internal review, it would be helpful if you 
could say why you are dissatisfied with the response.  
 
Information Rights Team 
Home Office 
Third Floor, Peel Building 
2 Marsham Street 
London SW1P 4DF 
e-mail: foirequests@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk   
 
As part of any internal review the Department's handling of your information request will be 
reassessed by staff who were not involved in providing you with this response. If you 
remain dissatisfied after this internal review, you would have a right of complaint to the 
Information Commissioner as established by section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act. 
 
 
Yours sincerely  
 
Martin Riddle 
Information Rights Team 
 
Switchboard 020 7035 4848 
E-mail  FOIRequests@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk 
Annex A 
 




Many thanks for your latest email. I have used the contract finder search portal as the 
Home Office suggested. I have found that it has become more user friendly in the past few 
months and is now much easier to search. I still wish to confirm whether I have all 
applicable contracts. I am quite sure that I still have not found quite a number of these 
contracts. 
As I stated to the Home Office previously, I need to find all contracts made between the 
Home Office and private actors for the provision of  the detention of migrants, the removal 
of migrants from the UK and any contracts with private VISA issuing companies. In general 
I want to see all contracts made by the Home Office on behalf of the UK with private actors 
for the provision of services in the context of immigration and asylum. 
I am also interested in seeing any tenders that have been offered by the Home Office for 
such services. 
Is the Home Office aware of any other UK public authority that has contracted private 
actors for the provision of such services? 
Through the contract finder search portal, I have access to the following contracts: 
With Serco for the provision of services at Yarl's Wood Detention Centre from 2014 to 
2023. - https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/02227540-2d38-461a-b53c-
d344f8738ab9 
With Mitie Care & Custody Ltd for the provision of services at Colnbrooke and 
Harmondsworth from 2014 to 2022. -
 https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/6f06e335-cd7d-4bca-9514-
43af3602385a 
A tender for the provision of services at Gatwick Airport's Immigration Removal Centres. -
 https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/d0f3ed51-4746-4971-b619-
d57c322db7c3 
Escorting and Travelling Services Re-Procurement Project. -
 https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/a7893eef-3df8-4ce9-8b41-
ace6986f02f6 
Could you please furnish me with an exhaustive list of all such contracts and tenders?  
  
Annex B  - Response 
 
 Some of the information you have requested is already reasonably accessible to 
you.  It can be found on the Government contracts finder at this link 
https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder and on the old contracts finder site 
https://data.gov.uk/data/contracts-finder-archive/ previously supplied to you.  Your 
request above contains the links of some of the contracts already published.  
 
Below are the links to the published COMPASS contracts on the archived Contracts 
Finder portal: 
 
COMPASS - Provision of accommodation, transport and related services for the 




COMPASS - provision of accommodation, transport and related services for the 




COMPASS - Provision of accommodation, transport and related services for the 




COMPASS - Provision of accommodation, transport and related services for the 




COMPASS - Provision of accommodation, transport and related services for the 










 The contacts for Brook House, Campsfield House, Tinsley House and Dungavel 
can be found attached to this response.  Redactions have been made for each 
contract under engaging section 31(1)(f), 40(2), 41(1) and 43(2) of the Freedom of 
information Act. 
 
 Any and all tenders on offer are published on the Official Journal of the European 
Union (OJEU) at this location http://www.ojeu.eu/whatistheojeu.aspx and on the 
contracts finder https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder.   
 
 The Home Office is not aware of any other UK Authority having contracts for the 
provision of these services 
 
 Please find below a summary list of additional UK Visa’s and Immigration service 
contracts held by the Home Office.  At present, as stated we would consider 
providing redacted versions of these contracts as placing a burden on the authority 
under section 14 of the Act and would likely consider providing a redacted version 
of each of these contracts as vexatious, within the scope of this particular request. 




Sodexo Support Payments 
Sprakab Language Analysis 
Verified Language Analysis 
Sitel UK Contact Centre 
HGS 
Information Service for 
overseas visa applicants 




Ecctis Entry Requirements Validation 
Iron Mountain Records Services 
VFS Visa Application Centres 





Annex C – Exemptions 
 
Absolute Exemptions - Section 40(2) (Personal Information) and Section 41(1) 
(Information provided in confidence). 
 
The exemptions are absolute exemptions and do not require the consideration of the 
public interest test. Redactions made under section 40(2) have been made because of the 
condition at section 40(3)(a)(i). This exempts personal data if disclosure would contravene 
any of the data protection principles in Schedule 1 to the Data Protection Act. 
 
Public interest test in relation to sections 31(1)(f) and 43(2) 
 
Some of the exemptions in the FOI Act, referred to as ‘qualified exemptions’, are subject to 
a public interest test (PIT).  This test is used to balance the public interest in disclosure 
against the public interest in favour of withholding the information, or the considerations for 
and against the requirement to say whether the information requested is held or not.  We 
must carry out a PIT where we are considering using any of the qualified exemptions in 
response to a request for information.  
 
The ‘public interest’ is not the same as what interests the public.  In carrying out a PIT we 
consider the greater good or benefit to the community as a whole if the information is 
released or not. The ‘right to know’ must be balanced against the need to enable effective 
government and to serve the best interests of the public. 
 
The FOI Act is ‘applicant blind’. This means that we cannot, and do not, ask about the 
motives of anyone who asks for information. In providing a response to one person, we are 
expressing a willingness to provide the same response to anyone, including those who 
might represent a threat to the UK. 
 
Section 31(1)(f) (Law enforcement) 
 
Considerations in favour of disclosing the information 
 
There is a public interest in disclosing the information as it would increase the 
transparency of the work of the Home Office and its arrangements and operations within 
Immigration Removal Centres. There is also a public interest in ensuring public confidence 
in the security of the UK’s immigration detention estate.  
 
Considerations in favour withholding the information 
 
There is a strong public interest in ensuring the integrity of the UK’s immigration detention 
estate. Disclosure would allow the public to assess the effectiveness of the security in 
place at the Removal Centres. Someone who wished to compromise that security could 
then use that information to breach security and could effect a release of detainees held 
there.  This is clearly not in the public interest. 
We conclude that the balance of the public interest lies in withholding the information. 
 
Section 43(2) (Commercial interests) 
 
Considerations in favour of disclosing the information 
 
There is a public interest in disclosure to the extent that this would help ensure 
transparency in the Home Office’s use of public funds and in particular to maintain the 
department’s accountability to taxpayers. Disclosure of this information would also enable 
the public to assess if the Home office is getting best value for money for its contracts with 
private providers and partner agencies. Disclosure of the process followed would also lead 
to greater accountability and reassuring the public that the tendering process was fairly 
run.  
 
Considerations in favour withholding the information 
 
There is a public interest in Government departments and agencies being able to secure 
contracts that represent value for money and anything that would undermine this is not in 
the public interest. Value for money can best be obtained where there is a healthy 
competitive environment, coupled with the protection of the Government’s commercial 
relationship with industry.  
 
Release of the withheld information would provide competitors with information, not 
available to them by any other means, about current service providers. This would create 
an unfair advantage resulting in a prejudice to the commercial interests of the company 
concerned. Disclosure would also prejudice the Home Office’s commercial interests by 
damaging commercial relationships with contractors and service providers. This risks:  
o Companies would be discouraged from dealing with the public sector, fearing 
disclosure of information that may damage them commercially; or  
o Companies would withhold information where possible, making the choice of the best 
contractor more uncertain as it would be based on limited censored data.  
 
We conclude that the balance of the public interest lies in withholding the information. 
 
 
Date  6/6/2016 
 
6 April 2016 
Subject: 38872-McNamara-PIT extension notification 
 
Dear Mr Mc Namara 
  
Please find attached an update from the Home Office in relation to your request for 





Knowledge and Information Management Unit 
Performance and Risk Directorate 
4th Floor Peel 
2 Marsham Street 
London 
SW1P 4DF 






   
 Corporate Services  
2 Marsham Street 
London SW1P 4DF 




Frank Mc Namara 
Frank.McNamara@EUI.eu 
 




Dear Mr Mc Namara 
 
Freedom of Information request: reference 38872 
 
Thank you for your e-mail of 7 March 2016, in which you ask for an exhaustive list of all 
contracts made between the Home Office and private actors for the provision of  the 
detention of migrants, the removal of migrants from the UK and any contracts with private 
VISA issuing companies. Your request has been handled as a request for information 
under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 
 
We are considering your request.  Although the Act carries a presumption in favour of 
disclosure, it provides exemptions which may be used to withhold information in specified 
circumstances.  Some of these exemptions, referred to as ‘qualified exemptions’, are 
subject to a public interest test.  This test is used to balance the public interest in 
disclosure against the public interest in favour of withholding the information. The Act 
allows us to exceed the 20 working day response target where we need to consider the 
public interest test fully.   
 
The information which you have requested is being considered under the exemptions in 
sections 31(1)(f) and 43(2) of the Act, which relates to Law Enforcement and Commercial 
Interests. These are qualified exemptions and to consider the public interest test fully we 
need to extend the 20 working day response period. We now aim to let you have a full 





Yours sincerely  
 
Martin Riddle 
Information Rights Team 
Switchboard 020 7035 4848 
E-mail  FOIRequests@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk 
9 March 2016 
Subject: FoI Case Ref 38872 - (Frank McNamara) - Acknowledgment 
 
Mr. McNamara, 
Thank you for contacting the Home Office with your request. 
This has been assigned to a caseworker (case ref 38872). We will aim to send you a full 
response by 07/04/2016 which is twenty working days from the date we received your 
request. 







2 October 2015 
Subject: 34150 – Mc Namara 
 
Dear Mc McNamara 
  









   
 Shared Services  
2 Marsham Street 
London SW1P 4DF 




Mr Frank McNamara   
Via email to: Frank.McNamara@EUI.eu  
 
2 October 2015  
  
Dear Mr McNamara 
 
Reference number: Internal review - 34150 
 
Thank you for your email of 13 April 2015 in which you asked for an internal review of our 
response to your Freedom of Information (FOI) request regarding Home Office contracts 
with private security firms, specifically those who deal with the detention and removal of 
migrants, as well as private visa issuing companies. I apologise for the delay in responding 
to your request.  
 
I can confirm that an archive website has been created to hold contracts not held on the 
new contracts finder website. This can be found at: https://data.gov.uk/data/contracts-
finder-archive/ .  
 
However, please note that not all information may be available on this website. We are 
currently liaising with stakeholders to resolve this issue and hope that this will be resolved 
as soon as possible.   
 
Once again, I apologise for the time taken to issue the response and the inconvenience 







Information Rights Team 






















Dear Mr McNamara 
 
[Reference 34150]  
 
Thank you for your e-mail of 20 January 2015, in which you ask for information about 
contracts with private security firms which have been charged with the enforcement of 
immigration controls. Your request has been handled as a request for information under 
the Freedom of Information Act 2000. We are now in a position to provide a response to 
your request.  
 
We believe that the information you have requested is already reasonably accessible to 
you. It can be found in the contracts finder at the following link: 
https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder  
 
Section 21 of the Freedom of Information Act exempts the Home Office from having to 
provide you with this information, because it is already reasonably accessible. If you have 
any difficulties in accessing this information at the source which I have indicated, please 
contact me again.  
 
If you are dissatisfied with this response you may request an independent internal review 
of our handling of your request by submitting a complaint within two months to the address 
below, quoting reference 34150. If you ask for an internal review, it would be helpful if you 
could say why you are dissatisfied with the response.  
 
Information Access Team  
Home Office Third Floor, Peel Building  
2 Marsham Street  
London SW1P 4DF  
e-mail: info.access@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk  
 
As part of any internal review the Department's handling of your information request will be 
reassessed by staff who were not involved in providing you with this response. If you 
remain dissatisfied after this internal review, you would have a right of complaint to the 




D Pottinger  
Information Access Team  




2 Marsham Street  
London SW1P 4DF  




Mc Namara, Frank  
Frank.McNamara@EUI.eu  
 
13 April 2015  
 
Annex –questions:  
 
 
1) Does the Home Office make available its contracts with private security firms which 
have been charged with the enforcement of immigration controls? Specifically, the 
detention of migrants, the removal of migrants from the UK and any contracts with 
private VISA issuing companies.  
 
Yes, all contracts are published on the contracts finder : https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder  
 
2) I wish to see the actual text of any and all contracts between the Home Office and 
these private companies.  
 
The text of the contracts is published on the contracts finder: https://www.gov.uk/contracts-
finder  Some text is commercially sensitive – section 43 of the FOI Act, and has been redacted 
from the published contracts.  
 
3) Is the information released under the FOI release 29746 and 29785 still accurate? 
Have any other companies been contracted to carry out detention or removal since the 
release of that information? Also, is the information from FOI release 31255 still 
accurate?  
 
The information from the previous FOIs is now out of date. All relevant contracts since then 
have been published on the contracts finder portal, which you can access from the following 






























Annex – explanation of exemption  
 
Section 43 – commercial interests  
 
(1) Information is exempt information if it constitutes a trade secret.  
(2) Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely 

















































Annex B – Internal review request 
 
In light of your response to my FoI request, I have two questions. 
 
First, having extended the 20 day response period from my request on the 20th of 
January, your office stated that the new deadline for reply was the 17th of March. I have 
now received a response on the 13th of April and it simply contained a link to the contracts 
finder website. Is this the usual time period needed to send this link to information that was 
already publicly available? That is 11 weeks instead of the 20 days response period 
initially mentioned. 
 
Second, I cannot gain access to the contracts that interest me through the contract finder 
website. If I search 'migration', 'asylum' or the name of companies which I know have dealt 
with detention and removal of migrants in the past, no result comes up. I feel that limiting 
my research to this contract finder website will inevitably make me miss certain contracts. 
Is there a way in which your office could list the contracts made and mentioned in my initial 
request and allow me to search for the text through the contract finder website? 
 




   
Frank Mc Namara 
Doctoral Researcher, Department of Law, 
European University Institute, 
Villa Schifanoia, 
Via Boccaccio 121 - 50133 Florence - Italy 
e-mail: Frank.McNamara@eui.eu 




















Annex C - Further complaint procedure 
 
This completes the internal review process by the Home Office.  If you remain dissatisfied 
with the response to your FOI request, you have the right of complaint to the Information 
Commissioner at the following address: 
 









8 June 2015 
Subject: 34150 - Internal Review - McNamara 
 
Dear Mc McNamara 
  















Mr Frank McNamara 
 
Via email to: Frank.McNamara@EUI.eu 
 




2 Marsham Street 
London SW1P 4DF 




   
 
 
Dear Mr McNamara 
 
Freedom of Information request (our ref: 34150) 
 
Thank you for your email of 14 April 2015, in which you asked for an internal review of our 
response to your Freedom of Information (FOI) request regarding Home Office contracts 
with private security firms, specifically those who deal with the detention and removal of 
migrants, as well as private visa issuing companies.  
 
We apologise for the time it has taken to provide you with a response. I have liaised with 
the unit responsible for the contracts website. Unfortunately there is currently an IT issue 
with the old contracts finder website (https://online.contractsfinder.businesslink.gov.uk/ ). 
Whilst I can confirm that the contracts that you requested in regards to the detention and 
removal of migrants are on this website, it is not possible to see these contracts unless 
you are registered to the website and it is currently not possible to do this. Other than the 
contracts enclosed in Annex A, the contracts that you request have not been published on 
the new contracts website (https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder). This issue has been 
raised with the Crown Commercial Service and we are seeking to resolve this problem as 
soon as possible.  
 
Please note that you will be required to register on both the old and new contracts finder 
websites in order to view all of the contracts.  
 
Please also note that no there are no contracts with private visa issuing companies. Visas 
are issued by the diplomatic missions abroad. However, the Home Office works with visa 
application centres (VACs). The VACs collect application forms, visa fees, biometric data 
of the applicant and submit all these to the visa sections for processing.  
 
We are able to provide you with two links which are accessible on the new contracts finder 
website. These can be found in Annex A. I can confirm that the Home Office holds the 
information that you requested about the following:  
 
 Contracts held by the Home Office regarding the detention of migrants in the UK.   
 
Please note that some information has been redacted, and the redactions have been 
made by virtue of sections 43(2) and 31(1)(f) of the Freedom of Information Act. This 
provides that information can be withheld where disclosure would prejudice commercial 
interests and the maintenance of security and good order in prisons or in other institutions 
where persons are lawfully detained and the public interest falls in favour of applying the 
exemption. 
 
Arguments for and against disclosure in terms of the public interest, with the reasons for 
our conclusion, are set out in Annex B. 
 
Once this IT issue has been resolved, we will respond to your internal review in full.  
 







Information Access Team 
 



































Contracts accessible on https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder : 
 















































Annex B – Public interest test in relation to sections 43(2) and 31(1)(f) 
 
Some of the exemptions in the FOI Act, referred to as ‘qualified exemptions’, are subject to 
a public interest test (PIT).  This test is used to balance the public interest in disclosure 
against the public interest in favour of withholding the information, or the considerations for 
and against the requirement to say whether the information requested is held or not.  We 
must carry out a PIT where we are considering using any of the qualified exemptions in 
response to a request for information.  
 
The ‘public interest’ is not the same as what interests the public.  In carrying out a PIT we 
consider the greater good or benefit to the community as a whole if the information is 
released or not. The ‘right to know’ must be balanced against the need to enable effective 
government and to serve the best interests of the public. 
 
The FOI Act is ‘applicant blind’. This means that we cannot, and do not, ask about the 
motives of anyone who asks for information. In providing a response to one person, we are 
expressing a willingness to provide the same response to anyone, including those who 




Considerations in favour of disclosing the information 
 
There is a public interest in disclosing the information as it would increase the 
transparency of the work of the Home Office and its arrangements and operations within 
Immigration Removal Centres. There is also a public interest in ensuring public confidence 
in the security of the UK’s immigration detention estate.  
 
Considerations in favour withholding the information 
 
There is a strong public interest in ensuring the integrity of the UK’s immigration detention 
estate. Disclosure would allow the public to assess the effectiveness of the security in 
place at the removal centres. Someone who wished to compromise that security could 
then use that information to breach security and could effect a release of detainees held 
there.  This is clearly not in the public interest. 




Considerations in favour of disclosing the information 
 
There is a public interest in disclosure to the extent that this would help ensure 
transparency in the Home Office’s use of public funds and in particular to maintain the 
department’s accountability to taxpayers. Disclosure of this information would also enable 
the public to assess if the Home office is getting best value for money for its contracts with 
private providers and partner agencies. Disclosure of the process followed would also lead 
to greater accountability and reassuring the public that the tendering process was fairly 
run.  
 
Considerations in favour withholding the information 
 
There is a public interest in Government departments and agencies being able to secure 
contracts that represent value for money and anything that would undermine this is not in 
the public interest. Value for money can best be obtained where there is a healthy 
competitive environment, coupled with the protection of the Government’s commercial 
relationship with industry.  
 
Release of the withheld information would provide competitors with information, not 
available to them by any other means, about current service providers. This would create 
an unfair advantage resulting in a prejudice to the commercial interests of the company 
concerned. Disclosure would also prejudice the Home Office’s commercial interests by 
damaging commercial relationships with contractors and service providers. The risks are:  
o Companies would be discouraged from dealing with the public sector, fearing 
disclosure of information that may damage them commercially; or  
o Companies would withhold information where possible, making the choice of the best 
contractor more uncertain as it would be based on limited censored data.  
 






































Annex C - Further complaint procedure 
 
If you remain dissatisfied with the response to your FOI request, you have the right of 
complaint to the Information Commissioner at the following address: 
 

















13 April 2015 
Subject: 34150 McNamara 2015-13-04 response 
 
Mr McNamara 
Please find attached a response to your FOI request.  I am sorry that there has been a delay in 
providing you with a response. 
  
D Pottinger 












Mc Namara, Frank  
Frank.McNamara@EUI.eu 
 
13 April 2015 
Shared Services 
Directorate 
2 Marsham Street 
London SW1P 4DF 




   




Thank you for your e-mail of 20 January 2015, in which you ask for information about 
contracts with private security firms which have been charged with the enforcement of 
immigration controls. Your request has been handled as a request for information under 
the Freedom of Information Act 2000.   We are now in a position to provide a response to 
your request.  
 
We believe that the information you have requested is already reasonably accessible to 
you.  It can be found in the contracts finder at the following link: 
https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder 
 
Section 21 of the Freedom of Information Act exempts the Home Office from having to 
provide you with this information, because it is already reasonably accessible.  If you have 
any difficulties in accessing this information at the source which I have indicated, please 
contact me again. 
 
If you are dissatisfied with this response you may request an independent internal review 
of our handling of your request by submitting a complaint within two months to the address 
below, quoting reference 34150. If you ask for an internal review, it would be helpful if you 
could say why you are dissatisfied with the response.  
 
Information Access Team 
Home Office 
Third Floor, Peel Building 
2 Marsham Street 
London SW1P 4DF 
e-mail: info.access@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk   
 
As part of any internal review the Department's handling of your information request will be 
reassessed by staff who were not involved in providing you with this response. If you 
remain dissatisfied after this internal review, you would have a right of complaint to the 






Information Access Team 
 
Switchboard 020 7035 4848 




1) Does the Home Office make available its contracts with private security firms 
which have been charged with the enforcement of immigration controls? 
Specifically, the detention of migrants, the removal of migrants from the UK and any 
contracts with private VISA issuing companies. 
 Yes, all contracts are published on the contracts finder : https://www.gov.uk/contracts-
finder 
2) I wish to see the actual text of any and all contracts between the Home Office and 
these private companies. 
The text of the contracts is published on the contracts finder: https://www.gov.uk/contracts-
finder  Some text is commercially sensitive – section 43 of the FOI Act, and has been 
redacted from the published contracts. 
3) Is the information released under the FOI release 29746 and 29785 still accurate? 
Have any other companies been contracted to carry out detention or removal since 
the release of that information? Also, is the information from FOI release 31255 still 
accurate? 
The information from the previous FOIs is now out of date.  All relevant contracts since 
then have been published on the contracts finder portal, which you can access from the 




Annex – explanation of exemption 
 
Section 43 – commercial interests 
 
(1) Information is exempt information if it constitutes a trade secret.  
(2) Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be 
likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person (including the public authority 
holding it). 
 
17 February 2015 
Subject: 34150 McNamara PIT letter 2015-17-02 
 
Mr McNamara 
























2 Marsham Street 
London SW1P 4DF 




   




Thank you for your e-mail of 20 January 2015, in which you ask for information about 
Home Office contracts with private security firms which have been charged with the 
enforcement of immigration controls. Your request has been handled as a request for 
information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.    
 
We are considering your request.  Although the Act carries a presumption in favour of 
disclosure, it provides exemptions which may be used to withhold information in specified 
circumstances.  Some of these exemptions, referred to as ‘qualified exemptions’, are 
subject to a public interest test.  This test is used to balance the public interest in 
disclosure against the public interest in favour of withholding the information. The Act 
allows us to exceed the 20 working day response target where we need to consider the 
public interest test fully.   
 
The information which you have requested is being considered under the exemption in 
section 43 of the Act, which relates to commercial interests. This is a qualified exemption 
and to consider the public interest test fully we need to extend the 20 working day 
response period. We now aim to let you have a full response by 17 March 2015.  
 
If you have any questions about the handling of your information request then please do 











Information Access Team 
 
Switchboard 020 7035 4848 
E-mail  info.access@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk 
 
22 January 2015 
Subject: FOI Request 
 
Frank Mc Namara 
  
Thank you for contacting the Home Office with your request. 
  
This has been assigned to a caseworker (case ref 34150). We will aim to send you a full 
response by 17/02/2015 which is twenty working days from the date we received your 
request. 
  
If you have any questions then please do not hesitate to contact us. 
  
Thank you 
  
FOI Requests 
Home Office 
